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ABSTRACT

The

state-by-state

quota

regulation

contained

in

Amendment 2 to the Summer Flounder Fishery Management Plan
became effective on January 1, 1993.

The research sought to

determine the implications that the state-by-state quotas have
imposed on federal summer flounder permit holders.

Commercial

fishermen were believed to have landed their summer flounder
out-of-state to take advantage of more favorable possession
limits in other states, and to have accrued higher costs as a
result of their decisions to land out-of-state.

A survey was

administered to commercial fishermen in Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, and North Carolina, to ascertain behavioral changes,
as

a

result of

state-by-state quotas.

The

research also

examined the proliferation of state licensing requirements,
the loss of traditional fisheries, and captains engaging in
unsafe

navigational

determine

whether

practices.
state-by-state

The

inquiry

quotas

sought

have

to

created

inefficient practices among the commercial fishing industry,
which is contrary to the intent of National Standard 5 of the
Magnuson Fishery Management and Conservation Act of

1976.

National Standard 5 requires that all fisheries management
plans promote efficiency whenever practicable.

The researcher

believes that Amendment 2 does not promote efficiency in the
commercial summer flounder fishery, because higher costs have
been accrued, with no additional benefit to the resource.
is

It

believed that an alternative to state-by-state quotas,
ii

specifically

regional

quotas,

could

meet

the

meet

the

overfishing definition specified in the Plan, while imposing
less costs to the industry.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my husband,
Albert, for his love, support, and patience throughout my
years of graduate school.

Next, I would like to thank my committee members for
their help and guidance while researching and writing my
thesis:
Dr. William Gordon, Major Professor
Dr. Lewis Alexander, Department of Marine Affairs
Dr. Richard Pollnac, Department of Sociology

I also wish to thank Dr, Harold Fisher, Department of
Chemistry, for giving me the opportunity to work under his
direction during my years at the University of Rhode Island.

Many, many thanks are in order to all fishing industry
members, state fishery directors, federal fisheries officials,
council members, colleagues, and friends, who provided
information necessary to writing this thesis.
Their time
spent discussing the issues with me was invaluable, and I am
grateful to them.

Lastly, I would like to thank my family and in-laws for
their ongoing moral support.

iv

V. THE SURVEY
A. Frequency of Out-of-State Landings
B. Motivations for Landing Out-of-State
C. Higher Costs Associated with Landing
Out-of-State

114
114
116

VI. STATE LICENSING

119

VII. THE ATLANTIC COASTAL FISHERIES
COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT ACT

151

VIII. THE REALITY OF AMENDMENT 5

156

IX. FEDERAL VERSUS STATE JURISDICTION

174

X. DIRECTED FISHERY AND MIXED TRAWL FISHERY ISSUES

181

XI. DISCUSSION

190

XII. CONCLUSION

198

EPILOGUE

209

APPENDIX

212

BIBLIOGRAPHY

218

vi

125

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 - Revised State Quota Shares

35

Table 2 - Summer Flounder Commercial Landings by
State and Size Class, 1980-89 combined

46

Table 3 - Percent of Measured Summer Flounder
less than 13" TL and 14" TL landed
in several states

47

Table 4 - Summer Flounder Landings by State
and Fishing Areas, 1983-89, combined

49

Table 5 - Distribution (%) of Summer Flounder
Commercial Landings by Month by
State, All Gear, 1980-89

51

Table 6 - Summer Flounder Commercial Landings
by State, 1940-89

54

Table 7 - Percent of Summer Flounder landed by
commercial fishermen in each state,
including all Paralichthyd species,
1980-89

80

Table 8 - Percent of Summer Flounder landed by
commercial fishermen in each state,
including only Paralichthyd dentatus,
1980-89

80

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 - Northeast Atlantic Statistical
Reporting Area

viii

50

Reprinted with permission by William McKinley,
Commercial Fisheries News, March 1995
ix

CHAPTER ONE
PROBLEM STATEMENT

Catch quotas have been used in the management of marine
fisheries

in the United states,

since the

passage of

Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of

the

1976.

Trip limits were established according to vessel classes for
cod,

haddock,

and yellowtail

flounder

in

Atlantic Groundfish Plan (42 FR 13997).

1977,

under

the

Many variations of

quota management have been implemented by both domestic and
international

fisheries

managers,

including

quotas, allocations based on gear type,

individual

and sector quotas.

Amendment 2 to the Summer Flounder Fishery Management Plan
(FMP) was the first FMP which divided an overall quota among
U.s. states, but did not discriminate with regard to fishing
grounds

or state of

landing.

State-by-state quotas

were

instituted January 1, 1993, and are proposed in this thesis
to have generated higher costs to the industry, as a result
of greater occurrences of out-of-state landings by federal
summer flounder permit holders.
Permit holders that land minimal quantities of summer
flounder

from

states

such

as

Maine,

New

Hampshire,

and

Delaware will presumably be less affected than permit
holders

that

directly

target

summer

flounder

(ie:

Carolina), and permit holders that land significant
1

North

quantities of summer flounder in a non-targeted fishery (ie:
Rhode Island).

It is likely that some captains experience

inconveniences such as having to alter traditional landing
patterns,

while

including

others

increased

may

endure

operational

genuine

costs

and

the

hardship,
loss

of

a

traditional fishery.
This

study

investigated

the

related

hardships

that

federal summer flounder permit holders experienced, based on
their home port state, as a result of Amendment 2.
have

likely

flounder
costs.

included:

landing

1)

alteration of

patterns,

and

2)

Impacts

historical

additional

summer

operating

Additional investigations focused on: 1) the loss of

a directed summer flounder fishery by some fishermen, 2) the
proliferation of state summer flounder landing licenses and
regulations, and 3) captains engaging in unsafe navigational
practices.

Hazardous navigational practices could include

remaining offshore while waiting for a state to raise trip
limits,

or

traveling

to

a

state

under

unsafe

weather

conditions to take advantage of more favorable trip limits.
As a condition of participating in the summer flounder
fishery in federal waters, all vessel owners must possess a
federal

summer

maintained

on

flounder
the

vessel

permit.
at

This

all

permit

times

(57

FR

must

be

57358).

Although the owner of the fishing boat mayor may not be the
vessel

operator,

this

research

2

sought

to

determine

the

changes in operational behavior by the person operating the
fishing vessel.
This study sought to identify the nature of potential
impacts created by state-by-state quotas
well

as

to

determine

experienced

operational

business,

the

degree

constraint

of

their

current

severity.

changes

research

amongst

the

impose

If

permit

that

represented

by

to

these

assess

summer

flounder

the
The

if state-by-

inefficient or unreasonable

commercial

their

changes.

to determine

as

holders

affected

attempted

principal research question was
state quotas

on fishermen,

fishing

practices
industry.

National Standard 5 of the Magnuson Act requires that FMPs
promote efficiency whenever practicable (16 USC 1851).

At

issue is whether Amendment 2 really facilitates "the fishery
to operate at the lowest possible costs (MAFMC, 1991 P 69)."
Vessel captains holding federal summer flounder permits
from Massachusetts,

Rhode

Island,

and North Carolina were

asked to participate in a limited survey.

Vessel operators

from these states were believed to have accrued higher costs
as a result of their decisions to land summer flounder in
states other than preferred states.

Higher costs may have

included but were not limited to: 1) out-of-state permits,
2)

additional

operational costs,

3)

costs associated with

dealing with an unfamiliar out-of-state dealer, and 4) costs
to pay lumpers.

3

There is extensive review in the literature documenting
the

attributes

of

individual quotas
(Coull,

P 64),

various

quota

strategies,

including

(Sutinen), quotas allocated by gear type

regional quotas according to distance

from

shore (Ibid p 354), and sector quotas (Symes p 323); however
this

literature

has

not

examined

the

characteristics

federal quota management on a state-by-state basis.

of

Insight

into this research problem was acquired by the author in her
work

as

a

port

agent

for

the

National

Service in Point Judith and Newport,
research
financial

represents
impacts

flounder fishery.
managers

and

diverse

effects

Alternatives

an

initial

Rhode

effort

Fisheries

Island.

to

generated by Amendment

This

delineate

2 to the

the

summer

This thesis attempts to provide fisheries

administrators

to

Marine

of

with

broader

state-by-state

state-by-state

quotas

insight

quota
are

to

the

management.
outlined

and

discussed.

METHODOLOGY TO BE USED IN THE RESEARCH

The goal of the research was to identi fy and examine
the

impacts

Amendment 2).

of

state-by-state

quotas

(as

influenced

by

The management unit for summer flounder under

Amendment 2 includes both federal and state waters, from the
southernmost boundary of North Carolina to the northernmost

4

boundary

of

Maine.

Any

commercial

fisherman

holding

a

federal summer flounder permit is required to abide by the
regulations

contained

in

Amendment

2.

Those

fishermen

lacking a federal permit, who fish strictly in state waters,
were not included in this study.

These individuals are not

required

regulations

to

abide

by

the

same

as

fishermen

operating with federal permits (57 FR 37358).
A

survey

changes
behavior,

in
as

instrument

landing
a

was

patterns,

result

of

developed
economic

to

costs,

state-by-state

distinguish
and

quotas.

social
Due

to

funding constraints, a traditionally significant sample size
was

not

pursued.

A traditional

sampling

framework would

likely have been invalid due to the prerequisites to qualify
for a federal summer flounder permit.

Because Amendment 2

allowed anyone that sold summer flounder between the years
1985-90 to qualify for a moratorium permit,

an individual

that caught one pound of summer flounder from a canoe and
sold it during the requisite years, could obtain a license
(MacDonald, 1994).

Consequently, there were federal summer

flounder permit holders that were not considered appropriate
to include in the survey.
A sample of fishing vessels that harvested substantial
quantities of summer flounder in a targeted or non-targeted
fishery was considered necessary to the exploratory nature
of

this

research.

Study

participants

5

were

limited

to

fishermen

that

because this

harvested

summer

flounder

by otter

trawl,

is the only gear type which mandates permit

holders to comply with minimum mesh size regulations.
include

other

gear

types

would

have

introduced

To
other

variables (ie: effort) which may have confounded the focus
of this research.
Another condition for study involvement was that all
survey participants indicated their home port was the same
during the years
operators

of

1990-94,

the

boat

and that they were the primary

throughout

this

same

time

period

(several participants operated another boat of similar size
and power during these years,
patterns

did

not

change

but indicated their fishing

because

of

this

factor).

The

current research did not include "dayboats," or boats which
typically make 1 to 2 day trips in the survey,

as it was

believed these boats were less likely to be affected by trip
limits.

These

vessels

generally

harvest

much

smaller

quanti ties of summer flounder than larger offshore

"trip"

boats, and were less inclined to travel large distances to
land

out-of-state.

Gi ven

all

these

conditions

for

involvement in this study which the author sought to satisfy
when selecting potential respondents,
size was

modest.

Attempting

significant data set,

to

the resulting sample

acquire

a

traditionally

which may have yielded questionable

interpretations due to uncontrolled external and

6

internal

influences,

as well as the limits to deriving

having statistical significance, was not made.

information
Instead, the

research sought to identify respondents most likely to have
been

affected

by

state-by-state

quotas,

in

an

effort

to

document the effects of those who were believed to have been
the most affected by Amendment 2.
obtained

from

the

information gained
flounder

from

fishermen,

the

National
from

vessels,

Based on landings reports

Marine

fish dealers
and

from

author developed

a

Fisheries

Service,

that purchase summer
testimony

list

of

given

federal

by

summer

flounder permit holders that were most likely to be affected
by the implementation of state-by-state quotas.
A pretest was executed with selected vessel operators,
in an attempt to identify interpretative problems with the
survey.

Questionnaires were administered in-person to the

pre-selected summer flounder permit holders in Massachusetts
and Rhode Island.
conducted
Carolina,

with

Letters and telephone communications were
pre-selected

concluding with a

permit

holders

in

North

follow-up telephone interview.

The North Carolina respondents were much more difficult to
reach due to extensive fishing schedules.

One interview was

conducted by cellular telephone with the captain actively
engaged in fishing.
Vessel operators were asked a series of questions which
inquired

about

events

or

circumstances

7

prior

to

the

implementation
subsequent

to

of

Amendment

the

2,

implementation

as

well

as

of

Amendment

to

events

2.

Most

questions were close-ended with either a YES/NO response, or
a five-point Likert-scale format.

Four questions required

numerical responses, and one open-ended question was asked
of vessel operators,

in which they had the opportunity to

relate unique circumstances they experienced, as a result of
Amendment 2.
While the survey provided basic data essential to the
study,

the

extensive

majority
federal

regulatory

of

and

changes

the

research

state

gathered

effort

information,
from

the

Interviews with pertinent individuals,
gained

as

an

employee

of

the

focused

on

well

as

as

eleven

states.

as well as

National

Marine

insight

Fisheries

Service contributed to the remainder of the research effort.
Given

the

small

sample

traditional

statistical

recognized

for

Although

the

of

a

permi t

holders,

which

threshold,

appropriate

statistically,

trends

size

the

the

not

survey

concerns

responses

larger population of

did

a

should

be

of

cannot

federal

surpass

validity.

reflect

summer

it is likely that the general

the

flounder

trends and

concerns were reflected.
One final note regarding the survey.
the questionnaire,

the researcher

found

In administering
that

questions which required numerical responses,

8

some of

the

could not be

answered

unless

This was

not

insisting

only an

on

probability

its

of

respondents.
responses

vessel

operators

surveyed

their

logbooks.

imposition to many respondents,

use

would

obtaining

an

have

greatly

adequate

reduced

number

of

but
the

willing

Consequently, fishermen were asked to estimate

which

required

a

numerical

value.

It

was

anticipated that responses would underscore general trends
that were occurring, but no attempt to implement statistical
tests was made.

Therefore, the survey should be considered

as an instrument by which some of the effects of Amendment 2
can be documented, but makes no effort to offer statistical
evidence which represents a sub-sample of all federal summer
flounder

permit

holders.

The

rationale

for

overall trends rather than numerical values
one

considers

the

short

time

interval

since the passage of Amendment 2.
in Massachusetts in June 1994,
June

1994,

1994.

and

All

that

which

on

logical

if

has

elapsed

Surveys were administered

in Rhode Island in May and

in North Carolina

questions

is

focusing

in October and November

inquired

as

to

events

or

circumstances prior to Amendment 2 included the three years
prior to

its

inception,

the years

1990-92.

Even

if

the

survey had been administered at the end of 1994, it would be
dubious to suggest a

statistical difference exists

in the

behavior of summer flounder permit holders before and after
Amendment

2,

given

the

short

9

time

span

that

has

elapsed

since January 1993.
The

following

research hypotheses

are based on their

relationship to state-by-state quotas:
H-1

It is hypothesized that vessel operators significantly
alter their choice of preferred states for landing
summer flounder during certain sub-periods, to take
advantage of more favorable possession limits.

H-2

It is hypothesized that vessel operators have accrued
increased financial costs, due to their decisions to
land summer flounder in states other than preferred
states of landing.

To

clarify

these

seemingly

conflicting

hypothetical

statements, vessel operators are landing summer flounder in
a

state other than their state of preference,

possession

limits

(unfavorable

in

possession

these

states

limits

may

because the

are

more

favorable

not

make

it

effective to land in their preferred states).

cost-

As a result

of taking advantage of more favorable possession limits in
other states,

fishermen

have accrued

increased costs

they

normally would not have, had they been able to land the same
quantity

of

summer

flounder

in

landing.

10

their

preferred

state

of

CHAPTER TWO
HISTORY OF SUMMER FLOUNDER MANAGEMENT

The passage of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976 gave unprecedented authority to the
United States in governing its coastal fisheries.

For the

first time, establishment of fishery management plans (FMPs)
would regulate activities of both foreign and domestic
fishing, within 200 miles of the coastline (16 USC 1801).
Summer flounder (Paralichthys dentatus) was one species that
warranted attention of the newly formed regional Councils.
Stocks were exhibiting signs of overfishing, and indicators
of population abundance were unfavorable (MAFMC, 1987 P 10).
The development of FMPs for species which demanded immediate
attention such as groundfish, were given priority;
consequently, the first fisheries management plan for summer
flounder was not implemented until 1988.

Since then, the

Plan has been fully amended five times, and partially
amended once.
Summer flounder, or fluke, can be found in coastal and
estuarine waters from the northern Gulf of Mexico to Nova
Scotia, but are most prevalent in the Middle Atlantic Bight.
They are present in shallow coastal waters during the spring
and summer months, and migrate to the outer edges of the
continental shelf in the fall and winter (MAFMC, 1991 P 14).

11

Summer flounder are referred to as serial spawners, in that
they have an extended spawning season throughout the fall
and winter, releasing eggs in batches over vast ranges of
the continental shelf from Cape Cod, Massachusetts to Cape
Lookout, North Carolina (Ibid p 16).

Seasonal fisheries

follow the annual inshore/offshore migration of summer
flounder.

For example, 90% of all commercial summer

flounder landings occurring between the months of January
and April, are harvested from the EEZ.

During the summer,

when fluke move to northern inshore waters, the fishery
follows this migration.

Between the months of June and

August, approximately 58% of the total commercial summer
flounder landings are harvested from state waters (Ibid p
38).
The Middle Atlantic Fishery Management Council (MAFMC)
requested the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission
(ASMFC) to prepare the draft plan in 1977.

Questionnaires

were sent to state fishery managers, eliciting suggestions
for plan development.

The consensus among those polled, was

that state involvement would be critical in administering an
effective fishery management plan for summer flounder
(MAFMC, 1987 P 7).

States have continued to play an active

and important role in developing amendments to the original
summer flounder FMP, including Amendment 2, the first
federal fisheries management plan to establish state-by-

12

state quotas.
The ASMFC, with representation from nine of the eleven
coastal states (Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and
North Carolina), completed a state/federal draft plan in
1982.

Objectives included promoting optimum yield from the

fishery, reducing the probability of recruitment failure,
addressing the impacts of both commercial and recreational
fisheries, minimizing regulations, and achieving compatible
regulations between state (Territorial Seas) and federal
waters (Exclusive Economic Zone).

Specific recommendations

to achieve these objectives within state waters included a
14-inch total length minimum fish size, and/or a 5 1/2"
minimum mesh size to allow escapement of undersized fish.
The ASMFC plan was merely a recommendation to the nine
states to enforce the proposed measures, and was not legally
binding (Christian, 4/93).
Although the research focuses primarily on the effects
of the state-by-state quota provision of Amendment 2, the
first FMP and Amendment 1 are reviewed to provide background
information on the need for developing Amendment 2.
Amendments 3, 4, 5, and 6 are also briefly discussed in the
text.

Amendments 4 and 5 were passed as a direct result of

problems stemming from state-by-state quotas.

Amendments 3

and 6 are also included to impart an overall understanding

13

of the regulations that govern participants in the summer
flounder fishery.

SUMMER FLOUNDER FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN

The Middle Atlantic Fishery Management Council began
formally preparing the Summer Flounder FMP in 1981.

Many of

the objectives and recommendations were based on the plan
adopted by the ASMFC, but unlike the ASMFC FMP, the Council
plan would institute regulations which permit holders would
be legally obligated to comply with.

The draft plan was

published on October 29, 1987, and the Council adopted the
FMP on April 16, 1988 (MAFMC, 1987 P 7).

Following the

public comment period, the Council dropped the proposal to
impose a minimum mesh regulation from the final draft,
citing increased enforcement costs and industry opposition
(Christian, p 2).

NMFS approved the FMP on September 19,

1988, with an effective date of November 3, 1988 (50 FR
39475) .
Objectives of the Plan included:
1) Reduce fishing mortality on immature summer flounder
2) Increase yield from the fishery
3) Promote compatible management regulations between
state waters and the EEZ
4) Minimize regulations to achieve the management
objectives recognized above
14

The following regulations were adopted:
1) Possession or landing of summer flounder, or parts
thereof, less than 13 inches total length is illegal
2) Vessels possessing federal summer flounder permits
must abide by the rules set forth in this FMP,
except for the case in which they land in a state
with larger minimum size limits, in which case, the
more stringent rule prevails
3) There is no possession of summer flounder by foreign
fishermen
4) All vessels which sell summer flounder commercially,
as well as recreational party and charter boats
possessing over 100 pounds, must obtain an annually
renewable permit
5) States having minimum size limits larger than those
in the FMP and minimum mesh size regulations are
encouraged to maintain them
6) The Council must annually determine fishing
mortality of 2-year-old summer flounder, three years
after implementation of this plan. The minimum fish
length will be increased to 14 inches if fishing
mortality increases

Section 303.a.3 of the Magnuson Act mandates that FMPs
include a definition of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)

(16

USC 1853); however, the Summer Flounder FMP could not
specify this quantity because several critical data
requirements could not be fulfilled (MAFMC, 1987 P 21).
Section 303.a.3 also mandates that FMPs specify OSY, and
that it be based on MSY.

Since MSY could not be quantified,

Optimum Spawning Yield (OSY) was simply defined as, "all
summer flounder harvested pursuant to this FMP" (Ibid P 48).

15

AMENDMENT ONE

On July 24, 1989, two of the seven National standards
of Section 301(a) of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976 were amended.

The Secretary of

Commerce issued guidelines to assist Regional Councils in
developing fishery management plans, and defined the
Secretary's criteria for approving such plans.

National

Standard 1, section 602.11, requires that Councils define
overfishing for the stock or stock complex, and to achieve
Optimum Yield based on this definition.

National Standard

2, section 602.12, mandates that FMPs be based on the best
scientific information available.

The eight Regional

Councils were required to define overfishing in all of their
existing FMPs by November 1990, and to develop measures to
prevent overfishing, in fisheries where it existed (54 FR
30834).

Overfishing had not been defined in the existing

Summer Flounder FMP, consequently, the MAFMC was obligated
to amend the Plan to include the requisite definition.
An overfishing definition for the summer flounder
fishery was adopted by the MAFMC in May 1990, as well as a
determination that the existing FMP was not preventing
overfishing.

The overfishing term is defined as any fishing

mortality (F) that will prevent the maximum yield per

16

recruit to the fishery.
Fmax level.

This is commonly referred to as the

The current F was estimated to be 1.4 in 1990,

while the fishing mortality required to achieve the maximum
yield per recruit is .23 (MAFMC, 1990 P 47).

This fishing

mortality rate corresponds to an annual exploitation rate of
approximately 65% (Moore, 1992).
The new 602 guidelines also prompted for the first
time, a joint endeavor between the Councils and the ASMFC,
to develop compatible plans for both state and federal
waters (Christian, p 3).

In addition to defining

overfishing in the draft plan of Amendment 1, the MAFMC
proposed implementing a minimum mesh size, as recommended by
the ASMFC.

This was prompted by the ASMFC's Summer Flounder

Technical Committee's determination that the 1989 and 1990
year classes were, "no better than average," and the 13-inch
minimum fish size alone would not prevent overfishing for
the 1990-91 winter trawl fishery (MAFMC, 1990 p 6).

The

Council concluded that a minimum mesh size to allow
escapement of smaller fish, as well as the minimum fish size
already established, would reduce fishing mortality to the
target level (Ibid p 3).
The public hearing document was adopted on September
29, 1990, and a final plan approved by the MAFMC, on October
31, 1990.

The Plan was submitted to NMFS for approval,

along with a request by the Mid-Atlantic, New England, and

17

South Atlantic Fisheries Management Councils, and the ASMFC,
to implement emergency regulations to impose a minimum mesh
size for the upcoming 1990-91 winter trawl fishery
(Christian, p 4).

The following regulations were proposed

in Amendment 1:
1) All otter trawl vessels fishing seaward of the
designated area must use a minimum 5 1/2-inch
diamond or 6.0-inch square mesh applied to the 1/3
terminus of their net if they are to retain more
than 500 lbs of summer flounder
2) Vessels retaining more than 500 lbs of summer
flounder may not have a net aboard that does not
meet the minimum mesh size requirements unless
properly stowed
3) The 1/3 terminus of the net cannot be obstructed
4) Those states with a larger minimum mesh size than
5.5 inch diamond / 6.0-inch square are requested to
maintain them

The overfishing definition for summer flounder was
approved by NMFS on February 15, 1991, however, the proposed
regulations contained in Amendment 1 were not.

The National

Marine Fisheries Service disagreed with the Council's
position that the minimum fish and mesh size alone would
prevent overfishing.

NMFS asserted that fully-recruited 13-

inch fish would be offered no protection against existing or
future effort, that such measures would only provide
temporary benefit to the resource.

NMFS also denied the

Council's request to impose emergency regulations for the
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same reason they partially rejected Amendment 1; no longterm benefit to the resource could be anticipated from the
proposed measures (56 FR 13303).
At this time, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Commission implemented Amendment 1 to their FMP.

It

included a recommendation for states to adopt a 5 1/2-inch
mesh cod end for directed fluke fishing in state waters, and
for states to continue imposing their minimum fish size
requirements (Christian, p 4).

CONTROL DATE

Prior to developing a final draft of Amendment 1, the
MAFMC's Demersal Species Committee proposed limiting entry
into the summer flounder fishery, on January 25, 1990.

The

Council was concerned that traditional groundfish fishermen
would shift effort into other fisheries, such as the summer
flounder fishery, in response to declining groundfish
stocks.

To prevent potential effort displacement, as well

as speculation by fishermen seeking guaranteed future access
to the summer flounder fishery, a control date of January
26, 1990 was established.

The Council recognized the

problem of controlling effort, but was not yet prepared to
develop a plan based on limited entry.

This control date

simply reserved access to the fishery for historical and
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traditional fishermen, in the event that a limited entry
plan was later established (55 FR 23265).

AMENDMENT 2

Upon disapproving Amendment 1, the Mid-Atlantic Council
and the ASMFC began developing Amendment 2 to the Summer
Flounder FMP.

Severe age truncation of the resource and the

imminent threat of a stock collapse prompted the most
stringent effort-control measures thus far proposed.

They

offered a rebuilding plan that approached a 100% probability
of achieving a 20% maximum spawning potential (MSP) by 2002
(MAFMC, 1991, vol 2 p 28).

A 20% MSP is the minimum

accepted value assigned to many species that will allow the
stock to sustain itself over time (Ibid p 29).

Proposed

measures included the establishment of annual quotas,
minimum fish and mesh sizes, mandatory reporting, and bag
limits for the recreational fishery.
The 1990-91 winter trawl fishery revealed that for the
first time, significant numbers of sea turtle takes were
occurring in coastal waters off North Carolina.

NMFS

performed a section 7 consultation and Biological Opinion in
accordance with the Endangered Species Act, prior to
implementing the first summer flounder FMP in 1988.

They

determined that future existence of sea turtles would not be
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threatened by the summer flounder FMP.

A second Biological

Opinion following the 1990-91 season drew a different
conclusion; that further unrestricted trawling activities
off the coast of North Carolina and Virginia would threaten
the Kemp's ridley sea turtles (MAFMC, 1991 App).

Following

this Opinion in August 1991, the Council adopted necessary
changes to the draft plan of Amendment 2 that would minimize
sea turtle mortality.

Unfortunately, the draft plan could

not be approved in time for the 1991-92 winter trawl season,
and several regulations had to be effected by emergency
action.

EMERGENCY INTERIM RULE

Pending a draft document, the Northeast Regional
Director, Richard Roe, requested emergency action to
implement several regulations proposed in Amendment 2.

Both

stock assessment data and virtual population analysis
revealed over-exploitation was still occurring, despite
regulations already in force for the existing FMP.

The

estimated fishing mortality of 1.56, and unacceptable
numbers of sea turtle takes were concerns that had to be
resolved immediately, and could not be postponed till the
following winter trawl season.

Amendment 2 had been adopted

by the Council, but was awaiting final revisions and
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implementation.

The Council asserted that the mortality

reduction strategy embodied in Amendment 2 would be
frustrated if the new regulations were not in force during
the 1991-92 winter trawl fishery, and that emergency
regulations would have to be implemented (56 FR 63685).
Under impending regulations proposed in Amendment 2,
fishermen retaining more than 100 pounds of fluke would not
be allowed to have fishing mesh smaller than 5 1/2 inches
aboard the boat.

Fishermen engaged in the mixed trawl

fishery in southern New England appealed to the Council to
allow an exception to the small mesh rule.

The mixed trawl

fishery targets many species which require small mesh, such
as squid and butterfish, but also retains significant
quantities of summer flounder during the course of a trip.
Forthcoming regulations offered little choice to fishermen
engaged in this mixed trawl fishery.

Many fishermen would

be compelled to continue using small mesh to catch the
targeted species, while discarding all summer flounder
harvested in excess of 100 pounds.
The minimum mesh size had been proposed to reduce
mortality on undersized fluke, however, there are certain
areas and seasons during which very few undersized fish are
in abundance.

For example, NEFC weighouts indicate that

99.8% of fluke harvested in the offshore areas 71'30" W,
72'20"

W, and the southern New England yellowtail area, are
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at least 13".

This data support claims that very few

undersized fluke are retained in the mixed trawl fishery
(MAFMC, 1991 P 76).

The Council anticipated that the

mortality of age one and two summer flounder would be
reduced only slightly if the mixed trawl fishery were
restricted to the use of large mesh.

On the other hand,

they reasoned that allowing an exemption to the large mesh
rule would reduce discard mortality and enable the mixed
trawl fishery to conduct operations more profitably (56 FR
63685).

An exempted fishing area was established, which

allowed fishermen to use small mesh during the offshore
fishing season, provided they fished only in the designated
area, and actively enrolled in the exemption program (57 FR
57369).

The discard rate for undersized fluke cannot exceed

10% by weight of all summer flounder caught in this fishery,
and must be continually monitored by sea samplers.
Emergency rules were published in the Federal Register,
effective December 2, 1991 (56 FR 63685), and imposed the
following regulations:
1) Vessels cannot use a mesh smaller than 5.5" diamond
/ 6.0" square in the 75 meshes forward of the terminus
of the net if they are in possession of more than 100
lbs of summer flounder.
There is an exemption for
those vessels using a fly net, and also for those
vessels which opt to fish in the "exempted program," in
a designated area off the coast of New England
2) Any vessel fishing for summer flounder in the EEZ
must take an observer, if the Regional Director
requests this
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3) A 75-minute tow time is required for trawlers
fishing in the EEZ, in a designated area off the coast
of North Carolina.
If tow times are found not to
sufficiently protect endangered and threatened sea
turtles, more restrictive measures may be imposed

Final rules implementing Amendment 2 were published in
the Federal Register on December 4, 1992.

Objectives,

definitions, fishing restrictions, and permitting
requirements became effective on November 30, 1992, sea
turtle conservation measures became effective on December
16, 1992, and dealer reporting requirements and the annual
quota became effective on January 1, 1993.

In addition to

the four objectives set forth in the first Plan, two more
were established and one was modified:

Established:
1) Reduce fishing mortality in the summer flounder
fishery to assure that overfishing does not occur
2) Promote uniform and effective enforcement of
regulations
Modified:
3) Reduce fishing mortality on immature summer flounder
to increase spawning stock biomass
The regulations effected to achieve these objectives were:
1) Annual quotas for the commercial fishery allocated
on a state-by-state basis
2) Minimum mesh size of 5 1/2"
the net for trawl gear
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in the 1/3 terminus of

3) A seasonal restriction for the recreational fishery
4) Bag limits on a trip basis for the recreational
fishery
5) Minimum fish size of 13" for commercial and 14" for
recreational fisheries
6) A 5-year moratorium on entry into the commercial
fishery
7) Permits for dealers wishing to purchase summer
flounder

8) Mandatory logbook reporting by permitted dealers
9) A prohibition on sale of summer flounder caught by
the recreational fishery
10) Authorization to collect application fees for
vessel and dealer permits
11) Federally permitted vessels that are fishing
commercially may not land summer flounder in a state
after the quota allocated for that state has been taken
12) Permitted dealers may not purchase summer flounder
landed in a state after its commercial quota has been
taken

Any vessel that landed and sold summer flounder between
January 26, 1985 and January 26, 1990, or was under
construction or being re-rigged between January 26, 1985 and
January 26, 1990, provided it landed fluke prior to December
4, 1992, qualified for a moratorium permit.

Permits were

open to all vessels, regardless of gear type, and
applications had to be submitted by November 30, 1993 in
order to be considered for the five-year moratorium permit
(57 FR 57370).

The decision to limit entry to historical
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participants was made to allow benefits that are likely to
occur in the future, to accrue to those that have
experienced the greatest degree of loss or sacrifice.

The

Council maintained that future opportunities should not be
shared with new entrants, but should be distributed among
those who have withstood losses during the rebuilding years
(MAFMC, 1991 P 80).

It is expected that during the years of

stock rebuilding traditional fishermen will suffer setbacks,
but should recover their losses in the long term.
Due to inadequate information on effort and age
characteristics of summer flounder, the maximum sustainable
yield estimates of summer flounder have still been rejected
(Ibid p 20).

As a result, optimum yield cannot be assigned

a numerical quantity under this plan.

Optimum yield will

vary as the fishing mortality rate target changes, and is
therefore defined as, "the summer flounder harvested
pursuant to this FMP (Ibid P 56)."
Given the current level of mortality which is between
1.4 and 2.1, a 73% reduction is required to achieve Fmax
(Ibid p 21).

In order to achieve this reduction, the Mid-

Atlantic Council and the ASMFC Management Board adopted a
strategy to reduce F to 0.53 during the first three years,
and in the years thereafter, F would be reduced to the 0.23
target level (Ibid p 22).
A minimum mesh size of 5 1/2" diamond or 6" square
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allows 50% of 13.5" fish to escape from the cod end (Ibid
p 74).

In order to meet the overfishing definition, the

Council decided the establishment of a quota, in addition to
the minimum mesh size and a minimum fish size of 13", would
be necessary.

While a minimum mesh size of 5 1/2" allows

escapement of undersized fish, it does little to control
mortality of 13" fish.

Older fish contribute more to the

spawning population; therefore, restricting mortality on
them is desirable.

The Council accomplished this through

establishment of an annual commercial quota (Ibid p 77).
All states must develop complimentary state plans which
dictate a minimum fish size of 13" for the commercial
fishery, and a 5 1/2" square or 6" diamond minimum mesh
codend.

They also must ensure that their annual quota is

not exceeded.

Amendment 2 also requires states to impose a

minimum fish size of 14" for the recreational fishery, a 6
fish bag limit, and a recreational fishing season (57 FR
57373) .
A Summer Flounder Monitoring Committee comprised of the
Middle Atlantic, New England, and South Atlantic Fishery
Management Councils, the Northeast Regional Office, the
Northeast and the Southeast Fisheries Centers, and the ASMFC
representatives are tasked with deriving the quota every
year.

An annual review of commercial and recreational

landings, current fishing mortality estimates, stock status,

27

recruitment estimates, VPA results, target mortality levels,
results of minimum fish and mesh size regulations, and level
of noncompliance by states and fishermen are used in the
Committee's analysis.

Upon reviewing the data, the

Monitoring Committee advises the ASMFC Policy Board and the
Demersal Species Committee of its findings; they in turn,
refer these findings to the MAFMC and the ASMFC.

After

consultation with the MAFMC and the ASMFC, and receiving
public comments on the proposed quota, the Regional Director
publishes the commercial quota for the upcoming year in the
Federal Register (MAFMC, 1991 P 59).
The coastwide commercial quota is set in accordance
with the fishing mortality rate reduction schedule, and is
subsequently allocated among eleven states, based on summer
flounder landings in those states between the years 1980-89.
The Committee selected this period because it was the
longest time series with reliable landings data, and a
shorter time frame might have favored or penalized a state
that had an anomalous good or bad year (Ibid p 67).

Each

state's quota applies to all summer flounder commercially
harvested in both state and federal waters.

All summer

flounder landings by all gear types will count towards a
state's quota, and upon reaching that quota, the Regional
Director will publish a notice in the Federal Register
prohibiting summer flounder landings in that state for the
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remainder of the year.

Weekly landings will be monitored by

NMFS, and states will be kept informed of their status (Ibid
p 60).

states are expected to devise a plan that assures

their quota will not be exceeded, and submit it to the
Regional Director.

When all states have reached their

quota, the Regional Director will close the entire EEZ to
summer flounder fishing (Ibid p 61).
It is important to note that the landings data used to
establish state shares include only the number of pounds of
summer flounder that were landed in each state between the
years 1980-89.

Information regarding the state of

registration of vessels that landed summer flounder was not
included in the analysis, and is therefore considered
irrelevant for purposes of distributing the quota among the
eleven states.

Consequently, the quota granted to a state

is not reserved for the vessels registered to that state,
but is simply the quantity of summer flounder that can be
landed at any port in that state by any federally permitted
vessel (assuming they possess the necessary state landing
licenses).

AMENDMENT 3

Prior to the passage of Amendment 3, any vessel in
possession of more than 100 pounds of summer flounder could
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not have mesh less than 5 1/2-inch diamond or 6-inch square
in their codend, or have 3 feet mending pieces aboard the
boat.

Permit holders excluded from this rule included those

engaged in the fly net fishery, or fishermen who received
special exemption permits to use a smaller mesh between
November 1 and April 30, provided they fished in the
designated area (57 FR 57374).

The designated area was

located east of a line originating at Point Judith, Rhode
Island, and followed a southerly course along longitude
71'30" until it intersected an area formerly referred to as
Area III, or the Southern New England Yellowtail Area.
Because large mesh had already been mandated for fishermen
retaining yellowtail flounder in Area III, under Amendment 4
to the Multispecies Plan, the Council decided to use the
already-existing coordinates for the sake of convenience, in
delineating the small mesh exemption area for summer
flounder (MAFMC, 1992 P 7).

The demarcation line continued

to run an easterly, southerly, and then westerly course
around Area III, until it bisected longitude 72'30,"

and

then proceeded due south, to the North Carolina I South
Carolina border (57 FR 57354).

Emergency interim rules were

published, effective December 2, 1991 (56 FR 63685), and
again on March 6, 1992 (57 FR 8582), to allow fishermen to
fish in the exemption program in this designated area.
The irregular dimensions of the summer flounder
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exemption area made enforcement by Coast Guard officials a
difficult prospect.

Fishermen also appealed to the Council

to shift the line westward, because the 72'20.0" W. line
bisected Hudson Canyon and it was preferable to have the
entire Canyon included in the exempted fishing area (MAFMC,
1992 P 7).

Emergency interim rules were published,

effective December 4, 1992 (57 FR 58150) and March 10, 1993
(58 FR 13560), and final rules implementing Amendment 3 were
published, effective August 26, 1993.

These new regulations

simplified the exempted fishing area.

The new area is

bounded on the west by a line originating at Shinnecock
Inlet, New York, and maintains a southerly course along
72'30" until it reaches the North Carolina / South Carolina
border.

Fishermen may fish east of the line with a small

mesh if enrolled in the program (and still retain in excess
of the maximum allowable by-catch of summer flounder), and
can only cross the 72'30" line if transitting the area.
They must return to port and terminate their enrollment in
the exemption program before they can fish west of the line,
regardless of whether they are fishing with a large mesh.
Amendment 3 also increased the threshold level that triggers
the large mesh requirement, to 200 pounds during the
offshore fishery, from November 1 - April 30 (58 FR 40072).
This rule was supported by sea sampling data, which
indicated that discards could be minimized further without
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encouraging a targeted small mesh summer flounder fishery,
during the fall and winter fishing season (MAFMC, 1992 P 7).

AMENDMENT 4

In the event fishing privileges are assigned, National
Standard 4(a) requires that they be, "fair and equitable to
all such fishermen (16 USC 1851)."

Under Amendment 2,

states' shares are based on historical landings in that
state, so the condition of fairness has been met in
assigning allocations (MAFMC, 1991 P 67).

The condition of

fairness has also been met with respect to harvesting
potential, as anyone fisherman is free to catch as much of
the quota as any other fisherman, because quotas apply only
to the state of landing (Ibid p 68).

Average summer

flounder landings for the eleven states were calculated
using the years 1980-89.

The percentage of the coastwide

quota that each state receives remains constant throughout
the moratorium period, with the percentages totalling 100%.
While each state's percentage will not change from year to
year, its allocation likely will, as the annual quota is
adjusted every year (57 FR 57358).
One of the issues raised during plan implementation of
Amendment 2, was the inconsistency with which states
collected landings.

During the time series 1980-89, most
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states had voluntary reporting systems that varied in degree
of reliability from state-to-state.

For example, North

Carolina had state port agents, Massachusetts had federal
port agents, while Connecticut had neither.

Most of the

summer flounder landed in New York is sold on consignment
(Ibid p 83), as are many of the landings from Connecticut,
making it difficult to accurately track all of the landings
(CDEP, 1992).

While Council members recognized the

disparity in data collection procedures from state-to-state,
they had not been aware of the large omission of landings
from the state of Connecticut.

This called into question

whether the condition of fairness had been met in assigning
Connecticut's allocation.
During the years 1980-83, Connecticut lacked the
authority to collect vessel landings for boats fishing
outside of state waters.

There was also no port agent to

collect trip tickets during this time.

From 1984-86, the

state had gained authority to collect landings from all
vessels landing in the state; however, it was still unclear
to many permit holders that they were required to submit
landings, and as a result, many state-permitted vessel
operators were still not reporting.

It was not until 1987,

when the state increased mailings to permit holders, as well
as boosted enforcement efforts, that compliance greatly
increased (Smith).
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The large omission of recorded landings for Connecticut
was first noted in the fall of 1991, by its state
representative (Smith).

A Summer Flounder subcommittee was

formed in September 1992 to address Connecticut's problem,
and to review other options for allocating state shares.
Unfortunately, a re-allocation required a full amendment to
the Summer Flounder FMP, and proposed rules for such an
amendment were not available for comment until May 26, 1993
(58 FR 30140).

Connecticut's quota for 1993 lasted only

seven weeks before it was filled, and commercial landings
were prohibited for the remainder of the year (58 FR 8557).
The Council recognized the urgency with which Amendment 4
warranted approval, and implemented an emergency interim
rule, effective May 4, 1993 (58 FR 27214).

The rule was

again extended, effective August 6, 1993 (58 FR 39680),
until the final rule was issued, effective October 25, 1993
(58 FR 49938, 58 FR 52685).
Connecticut's most accurate reporting period for summer
flounder landings was between 1987 and 1991.

The Council

and ASMFC used this time series to re-allocate a larger
percentage of the commercial quota to Connecticut, and a
concomitant smaller share to the other ten states.

The

ratio of Connecticut landings to the combined landings in
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts during
the years 1987-91, was 4.94%.

The subcommittee believed
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that fishermen from these four states exhibited similar
fishing and landing patterns as fishermen from Connecticut.
It was posited that the ratio of landings in Connecticut to
landings in the other four states between 1987 and 1991
would be similar to the ratio that existed between 1980 and
1986 (Smi th) .

The value 4.9% was multiplied by the combined

landings in the four states that occurred between 1980 and
1986, to increase Connecticut's historical landings during
This gave Connecticut a larger

the years 1980-86.

historical average for summer flounder landings during the
time series 1980-89.

The remaining ten states' allocations

had to be redistributed, because all states received a
slightly reduced percentage of the total share.

The

following table lists each states' original share, and their
revised shares (58 FR 49938):

Table 1.

Revised State Quota Shares

Slate
Maine
New Hampshif8

Revised

:.........•..........•.•....••..•...•...••_ _. _ . _ . _••_.__.. _•••• __
_ ..
_ _••.._

Massachusetts .•..................•......•..••••••••_••••_•....•••.•.•••
Rhode Island ....................................................••.••._ _..._.-'

•

•••._•._._.....
._...•••.•
.•

Connec1:eut ...............................................•.•.•••••....•..•••....__._••_
New YOl1< ••....•••....•..•....•.....•...•..•.•.•.••_•••••.••••••••••• _ _ ~
New Jersey
__.•__._.

...

Delaware .......•....................................•.••.•.......•..•••;.•.••.••.•••••.;

__

Maryland

._~_..

__ •

_..•..•••.•...........•..•.••...,..

Vl'llinia
North GaroJina .•.•.•.•......••....•...............•••••••..•.•.••••••.••.•.•••••__.
Total

....._.._
....__ ••..:..

_••.•• _........••..

••..•••....•....•........
.._•..__...........•.......

0.04756
0.00046

6.82046
15.68296
2.25708
7.64699
16.72499
0.01 T79
2.03910
21.31676
1--_--=2.:..:.7.44564-=~

Otlglnal

(pe~l)

0.0482

0.0005
6.9111
15.8914
0.9532
7.7486

16.9473
0.0180
2.0662

21.6001
27.8155

Dlffe,ence
-0.00064
-0.0Q004

-0.09064
-0.20642
.1.30388
-0.10161
-0.22231
-0.00021
-0.0271
-0.26334
-0.36967

100.0ססoo
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AMENDMENT 5

The Regional Director sets the quota in accordance with
the mortality reduction schedule.

It was anticipated that

during the first few years, the quota would be set low so
that all states would experience reductions in summer
flounder landings, over previous years' landings.

Given

that all fishermen have equal access to a state's quota,
fishermen from one state are expected to experience equal
hardships and sacrifices as those from all other states
(MAFMC, 1991 P 56).
Assigning state shares based on historical landings
averages seemed the fairest method for assigning fishing
privileges, and intuitively, the least disruptive.

However,

several circumstances arose during the first year which
challenged the strict allocation of quotas to individual
states.

Several instances occurred during which captains

were forced to land their catch because of poor weather
conditions or mechanical failure, in states that had
prohibited landing of summer flounder (MAFMC, 4/93 P 6).
Oftentimes, the prohibition on landing was only temporary,
because some states divided their annual quotas into subperiods, and closed the state when sub-period quotas had
been filled, only to re-open when the next sub-period began.
There were also problems further south, as the southern
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fleet was faced with limited flexibility in landing their
catch.

Virginia's quota was filling quickly in early 1993,

as many of the boats preferred to land their catch in
Virginia rather than North Carolina (to be discussed in
chapter 4).

The Mid-Atlantic Council recognized the

constraints that state-assigned quotas were placing on the
industry, and were prepared to help resolve some of these
problems.
Amendment 5 became effective on January 18, 1994 (58 FR
65936).

It attempts to resolve some of the quandaries

described above, by allowing two or more states under mutual
agreement to transfer all or part of a state's quota, or to
create an overall regional quota by combining the quotas of
two or more states.

Twice this rule was implemented by

emergency action during 1993, first on August 23 (58 FR
45075), and again on November 24 (58 FR 62556).

The

principal marine fisheries official in each participating
state must request in writing to the Regional Director, the
amount to be transferred, the states involved, and verify
that all applicable state requirements have been fulfilled,
before the transfer will be considered.

The Regional

Director has ten working days after receiving the letters,
to inform state officials of his decision to accept or
reject the transfer (58 FR 65938).
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AMENDMENT 6

Amendments 2 and 3 specified that boats retaining more
than 100 or 200 pounds of summer flounder (depending on the
season) could not have mesh less 5 1/2 inch diamond or 6.0
inch square in the codend (unless enrolled in the exemption

program or using a fly net).

Operators would be in

violation if larger pieces were found aboard the boat

(except 3 feet mending pieces), regardless if they were
properly stowed and unavailable for immediate use.

The one-

mesh-on-board rule was especially restrictive to fishermen
not enrolled in the exemption program, and to all fishermen
between the months of May and October, when the exemption
program is not in effect.

The mixed trawl fishery relies on

different mesh sizes to harvest the variety of species
encountered during the course of a fishing trip.

For

instance, fishermen may use a 5 1/2 inch codend while
fishing for fluke, change the codend to a 2 1/2 inch mesh
while fishing for whiting, or insert a liner while fishing

for squid, all during the course of one trip.

Amendment 2

not only greatly hampered the flexibility of the mixed trawl
fishery, but failed to recognize that vessel owners store
large quantities of netting aboard their boats.

Most vessel

owners stow nets aboard the boat for safekeeping, and
keeping them at the dock is not a practical option.
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The

prospect of constantly loading and offloading nets to remain
in compliance was considered dangerous, and left vessel
owners vulnerable to theft (MAFMC, 9/93 P 7).

The Mid-

Atlantic Council recognized the potential disruption to a
large segment of the fishing industry, and responded by
adopting Amendment 6, effective May 31, 1994 (59 FR 28809).
This rule allows small mesh to be kept aboard the boat even
after the threshold level of 100 or 200 pounds of fluke is
retained, provided it is properly stowed (59 FR 28810).
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CHAPTER THREE
STATE MANAGEMENT ISSUES

MINIMUM LANDING SIZES

One of the most controversial aspects of state-by-state
quotas, was the percentage allocations which were based on
historical landings in each state.

During the time series

1980-89, certain states had not only enacted regulations
recommended by the ASFMC, but had also imposed additional
rules to govern state fisheries.

The issue that stirred the

most debate, was whether or not states had imposed minimum
landing sizes, and to what extent this influenced a
captain's decision to land in a given state.

States that

had effected minimum sizes believed their unilateral efforts
had only served to penalize them, while less conservationoriented states had benefitted.
States such as Maine, New Hampshire, and Delaware have
historically had minimal summer flounder landings.
Understandably, these states never passed fishing and
landing laws to regulate summer flounder, with any sense of
urgency.

On the other hand, states such as Massachusetts,

Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, and North
Carolina have had significant summer flounder landings for
decades, but not all attained comparable husbandry of the
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resource prior to Amendment 2.

Some states offered

additional protection which could not be administered under
the federal government's jurisdiction, by establishing
restrictions within state waters, or by regulating boats
landing in-state.

Certain states had voluntarily initiated

minimum landing sizes on their own, the motivations for
doing so often differing from state-to-state.

For example,

New York implemented a minimum landing size for the
recreational fishery, to allow younger fish to grow to a
size preferred by anglers (Schaeffer).

This measure was

prompted by recreational fishing interests that wanted to
extend the summer fishing season and allow fish to recruit
to the fishery, during a time when growth rate is most rapid
(Mason, Ristori).

The recreational landing size prompted a

minimum commercial size several years later

(Zawacki).

Massachusetts established a minimum commercial size that was
in accordance with their management policy of adopting
regulations that are at least as restrictive, if not more,
than those in neighboring states (Pierce, 1993).

Rhode

Island's establishment of a minimum size was initiated by
requests from processors in the state that found it easier
to fillet 14" fish (Sisson).
The following table chronicles the minimum commercial
summer flounder landing sizes established by the eleven
states, for fish harvested by otter trawl:
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Maine

13" - 1988

New Hampshire

14" - 1992

Massachusetts

14" - 1983

Rhode Island

14" - 1987

Connecticut

14"

-

1975

New Jersey

12"

-

1985

New York

14" - 1965

Delaware

13" - 1992

Maryland

10" - 1980
12" - 1981
13" - 1992 with 5% tolerance
13" - 1993 no tolerance

Virginia

12" - 1970 with 10% tolerance
13" - 1988 with 10% tolerance
13" - 1993 no tolerance

North Carolina

11" - 1979 with 5% tolerance
13" - Sept 1988

13"

-

14" - 1987

1986

Some state directors declared that states with a
smaller minimum fish size or no minimum size at all, had
benefitted over states with larger minimum sizes.

They

reasoned that commercial fishing boats were much more likely
to land in states with smaller minimum sizes, and that this
had probably occurred throughout the 1980's.

They

postulated that their landings would have been higher if
their minimum landing size were smaller or non-existent, and
as a result, they would have a larger historical share of
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the quota (57 FR 57365).
Members of the recreational and commercial fishing
industry in Virginia demanded to know why they were not
rewarded for banning trawling in state waters and imposing a
bag limit, and suggested they wait until all states
established the recreational measures mandated under
Amendment 2, before they enact theirs.

The response from

the Virginia Marine Resource Commission was that if a wait
and see attitude was advocated by all states, the decline of
the summer flounder stock would be accelerated, and more
severe restrictions would have to be established in future
years (VMRC, p 4).
Massachusetts suggested that the Council adjust their
percentage allocation by estimating the fluke that fishermen
would not have discarded, but would have brought to the dock
if Massachusetts had an II" or 12" minimum fish size during
the period 1983-89 (the time period when their 14" minimum
size was in effect).

They maintained that this would give

Massachusetts a proportionate share of the quota, bringing
them in line with some of the southern states that had
ineffectual minimum sizes during this same time series
(Coates).

Other suggestions included subtracting landings

of fluke under 13" or 14" from North Carolina and Virginia
during the years when other states had larger minimum
landing sizes (Bryson, 1991).
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Several alternatives to state-by-state quotas had been
proposed during planning of Amendment 2, including an
overall quota (MAFMC, 1991 P 67), trip limits (Ibid App),
seasonal closures (MAFMC, 1991 vol 2 P 69), state-by-state
quotas regulated by the vessel's home port (JDC and ASMFC),
and state-by-state quotas for a one-year trial period
(Gibson, 7/16/92).

Trip limits were rejected despite the

moratorium to control new entrants, because estimates of
trips per unit of time could not be predicted, given the
large number of participants in the fishery (MAFMC, 1991
App).

Seasonal closures were not favored because mortality

reduction could not be guaranteed if shifts in effort
occurred during times when the fishery was open (MAFMC, 1991
vol 2 p 69).

Overall or regional quotas might have granted

advantages to some states over others, by allowing
participants fishing in the beginning of the year that have
more of the quota available to them, over those fishing
later in the year that have less quota available to them
(MAFMC, 1991 P 67).

Member states conceded that passage of

Amendment 2 was the only means of requiring all states to
adopt realistic minimum landing sizes, and failure to agree
on a quota strategy would only prolong the planning process
(Pierce, 1993).

State directors eventually agreed to put

their differences aside, regarding it as the right decision
for conservation's sake (Coates).

44

All member states

unanimously approved adoption of the ASMFC plan, which was
identical to Amendment 2 to the federal plan (MAFMC, 1991 P
68).

Given the level of state involvement in the planning

process, the Council expected full cooperation with stateby-state quotas, in spite of the objections that had been
raised by some states during the planning process.
Some state directors are now questioning the merits of
an aggressive state summer flounder management program,
asserting that their rigorous approach has only hindered
them.

While sympathetic to their convictions, other

fisheries planners have asked these states to consider the
ease with which they were able to persuade their industry to
accept voluntary management proposals, and whether they
realistically believe the southern states could have
accomplished this same feat.

Possibly one of the reasons

northern states were able to impose minimum landing sizes,
is the scarcity of small fish encountered by vessels landing
in their ports.

These fishermen fish in waters where larger

fish are abundant, and opposition to instituting a minimum
landing size would likely be less from the fishing industry
in the northern states, than opposition from industry in
southern states whose percentages of landings sizes are
smaller (Bryson, 1991).
A comparison between the northern and southern
fisheries might help to understand why some states
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and winter months, their overall landings for the year
include a much greater proportion of smaller fluke.

This is

in contrast to northern states such as Massachusetts, where
the majority of landings occur during the summer.

The

following table and corresponding chart list the areas
fished and the frequency with which these areas are fished,
by vessels landing in each state.

The figures represent

landings in any given state, not the state of residency of
boats landing summer flounder.

For example, boats from all

states could have theoretically contributed to Massachusetts
landings, the majority of their fishing activity occurring
in areas 526, 537, and 538.
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Table 4.

Summer Flounder Landings by State and
Fishing Area, 1983-89 Combined
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The following table lists the distribution of summer
flounder landings by month, from state to state.

Table 5. Distribution (%) of Summer Flounder Commercial
Landings by Month by State, All Gear, 1980-89 Mean
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In conclusion, a larger percentage of the summer
flounder landed in northern ports is larger in size, because
most of the fish is caught in inshore and offshore areas
from late spring to early fall, after fish have grown.

The

converse is true for southern states, whose majority of
landings are harvested from nearshore waters, during late
fall and winter.

Not only are the fish smaller during this

time, but a greater quantity of fluke is harvested per trip
in the nearshore fishery, than the offshore fishery.

For

example, the average number of pounds of fluke per trip
harvested in the nearshore fishery is 11,783 pounds, while
51

the average number of fluke caught in the offshore fishery
is 6,690 pounds (MAFMC, 1991 P 117).
One final note regarding minimum fish sizes.

If larger

minimum landing sizes had been imposed in southern states
during the 1980's, fishing pressure on summer flounder would
likely have been greater.

More larger fish would have been

landed in southern ports (more mediums, larges, and jumbos),
but more fish would have been thrown overboard dead, as they
would not have met the minimum landing sizes (Bryson, 1991).
These discard rates would have been even higher without a
minimum mesh size to select for larger fish.

Discard rates

would be higher in certain areas, such as the areas further
south and nearshore, where the southern fleet traditionally
fishes.

The Council favored a 13-inch minimum commercial

landing size over a 14-inch size for all states, because the
discard rate would be less when used in conjunction with the
5 1/2-inch minimum diamond mesh size.

The discard rate for

a 13-inch minimum fish size is approximately 22%, while that
of a 14-inch minimum fish size is about 35% (MAFMC, 1991 P
77) .
The basis for appropriating shares of the overall quota
to states is decidedly unfair.

Any state that imposed

stricter regulations which potentially lowered their
landings during the time series that allocations were based
on, will be at a distinct disadvantage.
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These states were

very likely to have had lower landings during periods when
their neighboring states had more lenient regulations.
While there is no documented evidence to support this
statement, and a comparison of historical landings between
all states would do nothing more than provide speculative
proof, the premise is a valid one.

The following table

reveals that there were differences in summer flounder
landings between neighboring states, both before neighboring
states had comparable minimum fish sizes, and after similar
sizes were in effect:
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Table 6. Summer Flounder Commercial Landings
(thousands of lbs) by State, 1940-1989
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A survey of both vessel operators and dealers buying
summer flounder between the years in question, would be
necessary to confirm the theory, that differences in
landings were attributed to fishermen's desire to land where
minimum size limits were smaller.

Because all states agreed

to set their differences aside so that Amendment 2 could be
finalized, the debate is no longer open for discussion.

The

recent passage of the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Management
Act (to be discussed in Chapter 7) should insure that states
will have comparable management plans in the future, which
may prevent some states from having disproportionate shares
of an overall quota, if state-by-state quotas are to be used
to manage other species.

The ASMFC does not have a role in

managing all species, however, and those species which they
have not developed plans for, will once again, be up to the
individual states to manage as they see fit.

After this

experience, it should come as no surprise to see states such
as Massachusetts undertake state fisheries management with a
more cautious approach, one that does not incorporate the
aggressive ideology they have embraced in the past.

SUB-PERIODS

Many individual states encountered the same dilemma the
Council faced, when attempting to plan a state quota
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strategy that would allow equal access to the quota by all
segments of the fishery.

They established sub-periods

within the calendar year to insure offshore and inshore
fisheries, summer, fall, winter and spring fisheries, and
dayboats and trip boats would have equal ability to harvest
a portion of the state's quota.

These sub-periods in

effect, became several sub-quotas within a larger overall
quota.

As long as a state did not exceed its overall quota

for the year, they were free to sub-divide it to best
accommodate the needs of their industry (57 FR 57373).
Distributing an annual quota among sub-periods gives
equal opportunity of landing summer flounder to different
sectors of the fleet that operate during different times of
the year.

It also provides a continuity of supply to

dealers throughout the year.

States that chose to adopt

sub-periods as part of their management program were
typically states with significant summer flounder landings
and an active year-round fishery.

They devised discrete

time intervals or sub-periods, based on seasonal fisheries
in their state.

Sub-quotas were then assigned to each sub-

period based on historical landings in the state, during
that time interval.
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POSSESSION LIMITS

While sub-periods insure that a state's quota will not
be filled during the first few months of the year, it does
little to control how quickly the sub-quotas are filled
during each sub-period.

To further boost efforts to prevent

gluts and shortages in the marketplace, landing or
possession limits were established by some states.
Together, these measures were designed to prevent derby
style fishing, and sustain the fishery as long as possible.
Most state directors consulted industry members within
their states to determine appropriate trip limits.

Limits

set too high might prompt early closures, while limits set
too low could prevent fishermen from making profitable
trips.

Some states established elaborate schedules that

raised or lowered trip limits based on the level of landings

that were coming into the state (Sisson, Mason, McKiernan).
States publicized their plans so that industry was aware of
the schedules, and would have an idea of what they could
expect throughout the year.

As many state directors learned

time and time again, adhering to their plan was not a simple
task.

As many industry members discovered, keeping informed

of the changes and planning a course of action accordingly,
was equally as challenging a feat.
1993 was the first year states administered their
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plans, and found there were many lessons to be learned in
monitoring quotas effectively, establishing appropriate trip
limits, and fostering open communication between management
and industry.

Some states made changes to their original

schedules many times during the course of the year, others
initially had no plans but quickly developed them after
witnessing the effects of Amendment 2, still others, made no
changes at all.

The following is a summary of how each

state managed its quota during the first year Amendment 2
was in effect, as well as changes they made to their state
plans for 1994.

MAINE

Maine's commercial quota allocation for 1993 was 5,874
pounds, or .04756% of the total coastwide quota (58 FR
49938).

There is no directed fluke fishery in the state,

but small quantities are landed as by-catch from vessels
fishing in the Gulf of Maine.

Given the state's small

allocation and lack of landing activity, the Department of
Marine Resources did not establish sub-periods or trip
limits, nor do they have plans to do so in the future
(Langton).

Commercial landings were prohibited on April 20,

1993 for the remainder of the year, with the quota being
slightly exceeded by 149 pounds (58 FR 21261).
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NEW HAMPSHIRE

New Hampshire has a mere eighteen miles of coastline,
and no directed fishery for summer flounder (Grout).

With a

negligible history of landings, they scarcely qualified for
a percentage share of the commercial quota.

New Hampshire

was allotted .00046% of the east coast quota, or 57 pounds
of summer flounder in 1993.

Upon learning of their

minuscule allocation, the New Hampshire Fish and Game
Department banned the landing of commercially harvested
fluke in the state, indefinitely (NHCAR Fis 603.09).

The

burden of requiring dealers to submit weekly fluke reports
was eliminated, and no hardship to the industry was foreseen
in a state which essentially has no commercial summer
flounder fishery.

Incidentally, New Hampshire was

anticipating that Amendment 2 would allow boats to continue
landing a lOO-pound by-catch throughout the year, aside from
their commercial quota.

This proposed alternative was

dropped from the final rule of Amendment 2 much to the
dismay of state directors, who were relying on this
tolerance for boats landing in their state (Grout).
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MASSACHUSETTS

Massachusetts was given 6.82046% of the coastwide
quota, which amounted to 842,327 pounds of summer flounder
for 1993 (58 FR 49938).

Massachusetts allocated 30% of the

quota between January and May and the remaining 70% between
the months of June and December, a plan which was based on
historical summer flounder landings in the state.

The state

directors anticipated that dividing the quota as such would
be the most effective way to minimize the effects of the
newly imposed quota (McKiernan).

The following is the

initial plan submitted by the DMR for 1993:

Initial Proposal:
Jan 1 - May 31

500 pounds until 50% of the subperiod quota is reached
100 pounds after 50% of the subperiod quota is reached

On January 7, the following changes were made to the plan:
Jan 1 - May 31

5,000 pounds until 80% of the subperiod quota is reached
100 pounds after 80% of the subperiod quota is reached

On June 8, the following changes were made to the plan:
Jan 1 - May 31

500 pounds until 50% of the subperiod quota is reached
100 pounds after 50% of the subperiod quota is reached
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Initial Proposal:
June 1 - Dec 31

1,000 pounds until 50% of the subperiod quota is reached
500 pounds after 50% of the subperiod quota is reached
100 pounds after 100% of the entire
quota is reached

On June 8, the following changes were made to the plan:
June 1 - Dec 31

500 pounds until the entire quota
is reached
100 pounds after 100% of the entire
quota is reached

On Sept 7, the following changes were made to the plan:
June 1 - Dec 31

o pounds after 100% of the entire
quota is reached

The state initially established a 500-pound landing /
possession limit, effective January 1, 1993.

Within the

first week, the industry appealed to the Division of Marine
Resources to raise the limit.

They claimed the 500 pound

limit would drive boats out-of-state to land, where landing
limits were higher (Pierce, 1993 p 2).

The state responded

by raising the maximum to 5,000 pounds, on January 7, 1993,
by emergency action (MDMF 322 CMR).

The DMR predicted the

sub-period quota would be 80% filled by March 28, and a
notice was issued on March 18, announcing the reduction to
100 pounds.

A miscommunication between the DMR and the

office responsible for issuing the notice led to a
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publishing error, which reported the change effective April
1, not March 28 (McCarron).

This relatively short delay

proved to be costly, as an additional 150,000 pounds of
summer flounder were landed during these four days.

Many of

the landings between March 28 and April 1, as well as the
last few weeks in March, were attributed to Rhode Island
boats.

This was because the state of Rhode Island dropped

its limit to 3,000 pounds on March 3, and again on March 15,
to 200 pounds, further encouraging boats to land in their
neighboring state, where the limit was more favorable.
June 1 began a new sub-period, and a new possession
limit of 1,000 pounds, which lasted only seven days.

The

150,000 pound overage from the first sub-period had to be
subtracted from the summer/fall sub-period, and the summer
inshore fleet was concerned that the quota would be rapidly
filled with a 1,000-pound trip limit.

The Massachusetts

Inshore Draggermen's Association petitioned the state to
drop the limit to 500 pounds in an attempt to prolong the
season (Pierce, 1991 p 3), and the DMR effected emergency
regulations to reduce the limit to 500 pounds, effective
June 8 (MDMF 322 CMR).
The 500-pound possession limit lasted until September
7, at which point, landing of summer flounder in
Massachusetts was prohibited for the remainder of the year.
State directors had the understanding that boats could
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continue landing a 100-pound by-catch, once their quota was
reached, and had intended to implement this change on
September 7 (McCarron).

As previously mentioned, this

alternative was contemplated during the planning of
Amendment 2, in an attempt to alleviate discard problems
that might have persisted after states reached their quotas,
but was later rejected.

Using estimates from NMFS weighout

data, the Council would have deducted an estimated 5% of the
total coastwide quota, prior to allocating state shares, if
this option had been implemented (MAFMC, 1991 App).

The

proposal was dropped from the final rule because the Council
decided to allow individual states to manage their quota in
the manner that best suited their needs.

Unaware of the

interpretation of the final rule, Massachusetts had planned
to allow boats to land up to 100 pounds per trip, after
their quota had been filled.

Unfortunately, they learned of

this interpretation too late to accommodate their industry,
and further summer flounder landings were prohibited until
1994.
The following changes were made for 1994:
Jan 1 - May 31

5,000 pounds until the sub-period
quota is 50% reached, 100 pounds
after 50% of the sub-period quota
is reached

June 1 - Dec 31

500 pounds until 100% of the entire
quota is reached
o pounds after 100% of the entire
quota is reached
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RHODE ISLAND

Rhode Island's percentage share of the commercial quota
is 15.68298%, which gave them an initial total of 1,936,851
pounds for 1993 (58 FR 49938).

Sub-periods are based on

historical landing trends, while trip limits are set
according to industry input (Sisson).

Their schedule for

1993 is as follows:
Jan 1 - April 30

5,000 Ib trip limit until 60% of
sub-period quota is reached, then a
limit between 200-10,000 Ibs per
trip

May 1 - Oct 31

5,000 Ibs trip limit until 60% of
sub-period quota is reached, then a
limit between 200-10,000 Ibs per
trip

Nov 1 - Dec 31

5,000 Ibs per trip to be modified
according to balance of quota

Rhode Island started the year with a 5,000 pound
possession limit that lasted until March 2, when 60% of the
winter sub-period quota was predicted to be landed.

The

limit was reduced to 3,000 pounds which lasted until March
10, when the limit was dropped to 200 pounds.

As planned,

the possession limit was raised to 5,000 pounds on May 1.
Not according to plan, the limit was changed to 3,000 pounds
on May 19 (RI DEM 7.07-2).

The Rhode Island Marine Fishery

Council received requests from the industry to drop the
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limit, and did so, declaring that both biological and
economic interests were at stake (Sisson).

Trip limits were

again reduced during the second sub-period on October 6, to
1,000 pounds.

The third sub-period opened with a 5,000

pound-trip limit, and was reduced to 2,000 pounds on
November 24.

Rhode Island effected their final trip limit

change to 200 pounds on December 17.

They were 4,400 pounds

short of filling their quota for 1993, after receiving
10,000 pounds from North Carolina (59 FR 3321).

CONNECTICUT

Connecticut initially chose not to establish trip
limits for 1993, regretfully so.

Several options including

sub-periods and possession limits were offered and publicly
voted on, but were vetoed by the industry in the state
(Smith).

Granted a quota of only 117,720 pounds for 1993,

it was quickly filled, and the state was closed to all fluke
landings on February 19, 1993 (58 FR 8557).

Connecticut was

reopened on May 4, 1993, after Amendment 4 to the Summer
Flounder FMP was passed by emergency interim rule (58 FR
27214).

Their state percentage share was increased from

0.9532% to 2.25708%, which amounted to an additional 161,029
pounds for 1993 (58 FR 49938).

The emergency rule was

extended again on August 6, 1993 (58 FR 39680), and
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published as a final rule in the Federal Register effective
October 25, 1993.

As previously mentioned, Amendment 4

adjusts states' shares of the annual quota, and all states
except Connecticut had their percentage shares deducted from
the overall quota.

Accordingly, all states except

Connecticut, had pounds subtracted from their 1993 quota (58
FR 49937).

Having seen the consequences of unlimited trip

limits, the Connecticut Department of Environmental
Protection established the following sub-periods and
possession limits through emergency regulations, effective
June 7, 1993:
Jan - April

5,000 lbs until 30% is reached, then
3,000 lbs until 50% is reached, then 200
lbs until end of period

May - July

200 lbs until 62% is reached, then 100
lbs until end of period

Aug - Oct

300 lbs in August, 500 lbs in Sept, 300
lbs in October until 75% is reached,
then 100 lbs until end of period

Nov

3,000 lbs until 87% is reached, then 200
lbs until end of month

Dec

5,000 lbs until 95% is reached, then 200
lbs until end of month

NOTE:

If 80% of the annual quota has not been
landed by Nov 15, trip limits will be
5,000 lbs until 95% is landed, then 200
lbs.
If 80% of the annual quota has not
been landed by Dec 1, no trip limits
until 95% of the quota is landed, then
200 lbs
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connecticut re-opened on May 4 with a 300-pound trip
limit, which lasted until November

I, at which point the

limit was increased to 3,000 pounds.

They kept the limit at

3,000 pounds for the remainder of 1993, yet ended the year
54,129 pounds short of filling their quota.
Final regulations were implemented effective late April
1994, with the following adjustments:
Aug - Oct

500 Ibs in August, 700 Ibs in September,
500 lbs in October until 75% of annual
quota is reached, then 100 Ibs

Nov

Same as above, but if less than 80% of
quota has not been reached by Nov IS,
5,000 Ibs until 95% of the annual quota
is reached

NEW YORK

New York has an annual percentage share of 7.64699%,
and received 944,405 pounds for 1993 (58 FR 49938).

Their

quota was divided into sub-periods and trip limits as
requested by the industry in that state (Mason).
1993 schedule is as follows:
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Their

Jan - April

240,000 lbs

After 150,000 lbs is
projected to be reached,
trip limits cannot exceed

500 Ibs
May - July

240,000 lbs

After 150,000 lbs is
projected to be reached,
trip limits cannot exceed
300 lbs

Aug - Oct

320,000 lbs

700 lbs per trip until
Sept 1, then no limit
until 240,000 lbs is
projected to be reached,
then trip limits cannot
exceed 200 lbs

Nov - Dec

156,952 lbs

Trip limits cannot exceed
500 lbs until Dec 1, then
limit will be adjusted
according to remaining
quota

New York began 1993 with unlimited trip limits until
60% of the quota was reached, whereupon a 500-pound trip
limit was effected on March 10.

Trip limits were lowered

again to 200 pounds, in an attempt to allow landings through
the end of the sub-period, on March 31.

Possession limits

were unlimited once again on May 1, but were restricted to
300 pounds on June 20, when the quota was projected to be
60% filled.

New York was scheduled to raise the trip limit

on August 1, to 700 pounds, when their third sub-period
began.

Anticipating that the third sub-period quota would

not be filled by October 31, they raised the trip limit to
700 pounds, one week early, on July 25.
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As the end of

August drew near, it became evident that the third subperiod quota would not be filled, so the state instituted
unlimited trip limits again, effective August 29.

Despite

unlimited possession limits for the remainder of the year,
New York was unable to fill their 1993 quota, falling short
by 95,029 pounds.

New York retained the same sub-periods

for 1994, allowing unlimited trips at the beginning of
January and May, but modifications to trip limits later in
the four sub-periods have been made (NYCRR 40.1).

NEW JERSEY

New Jersey receives 16.72499% of the coastwide quota
every year, giving them an initial allocation of 2,065,539
pounds in 1993 (58 FR 49938).

The industry in New Jersey

recommended the following sub-periods, while the percentages
assigned to each sub-period were based on historical
landings (McCloy).

The schedule for 1993 is as follows:

Jan - April

39.28% of annual quota

May - Aug

16.83% of annual quota

Sept - Dec

43.89% of annual quota

The state had unlimited trip limits at the outset of
1993, but by early February, an early closure was imminent.
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On February 12, 1993, fluke landings were prohibited until
May 1.

The state issued a letter on February 19, informing

the industry that they had actually fallen short of the
first period sub-quota by 198,000 pounds, and re-opened the
first sub-period again on March 6.

They projected the sub-

period quota would be reached by March 17, and notified the
industry that it would be closed once again on this date.
They re-opened the second sub-period with unlimited trip
limits on May 1, which continued through July 7, whereupon
they closed the second sub-period.

The third sub-period was

not scheduled to re-open until September 1, but was opened
early in August, in an effort to ease the hardship caused by
the early closure of the second sub-period.

The third sub-

period lasted for five weeks, and the state was closed on
October 7 for the rest of the year (58 FR 65134).
Several weeks into the third sub-period, summer
flounder started coming into the ports at an unexpectedly
rapid rate.

Because New Jersey has a policy of giving

industry no less than one week's notice when effecting trip
limit changes, nearly three weeks had passed before the
state was able to effect a closure.

When all dealers

reports were finally tallied, New Jersey was found to have
exceeded their annual quota by 393,098 pounds.

At the

request of the state of New Jersey, North Carolina
transferred 250,000 from their 1993 quota on December 31,
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1993 (59 FR 3320).

Incidentally, North Carolina also

transferred 7,815 pounds on November 23, 1993, to cover
fluke landed by two out-of-state boats that were forced to
make emergency landings in New Jersey, because of mechanical
problems (Halgren).

Any quota that is transferred from one

state to another is applied to the balance of the receiving
state's quota.

The receiving state must have a positive

balance before it can re-open, otherwise, the amount
transferred will simply reduce the receiving state's overage
by the amount transferred (Goodale).

The 257,815 pounds was

applied to New Jersey's overage of 393,098 pounds, and they
ended 1993, 143,098 pounds over quota.

DELAWARE

Delaware has the second smallest share of the summer
flounder commercial quota.

Their share is .01779% of the

total, which amounted to 2,197 pounds in 1993 (58 FR 49938).
Fluke is primarily landed as incidental by-catch in the
inshore shad and weakfish gillnet fishery, which takes place
a few weeks during the month of April.

There is no concern

over out-of-state boats filling the commercial quota,
because the only vessels allowed to commercially land fluke
in Delaware are those with a state gillnet license, which
has been controlled through a limited entry scheme, since
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1984 (Cole).

For this reason, no sub-periods or trip limits

are in force, but if necessary, emergency action can be
initiated if excessively large trips become a threat to
managing the state's quota (Leffer).
Delaware was notified by the Regional Director on July
27,

1993, that their quota would be filled on July 29, and

further landings would be prohibited (Roe, 7/27/93).
Unfortunately, late dealer reports revealed the quota had
actually been filled by April, and Delaware's final tally
brought them 4,206 pounds over their quota (Leffer).
Delaware's initial quota for 1994 was 2,847 pounds (59
FR 10586).

After subtracting their overage of 4,206 pounds

from 1993, they were still 1,359 pounds short of allowing
any fluke to be commercially landed in the state.

They

requested quota transfers from several states, with
Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Connecticut
responding by transferring a total of 4,679 pounds to
Delaware, whereupon the state was allowed to open.

They

closed the state for 1994, on April 30, and despite falling
short of their quota by 1,700 pounds, they decided not to
re-open.

This is because Delaware has adopted an annual

closing date of May 10, and they did not anticipate further
commercial landings in 1994, after learning of their
surplus.

Incidentally, this closing date coincides with the

time which all gillnets must be removed from state waters
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(Cole).
Delaware is seeking Di Minimus status from the ASMFC.
Some states have such a minimal level of fishing activity
for certain species, that refraining from some aspects of
the planning process is desirable.

If granted Di Minimus

status, state directors may be relieved of time-consuming
plan development and ongoing participation, to focus their
efforts on fisheries which are more prevalent in their state
(Christian).

Delaware would also like to be relieved of

labor-intensive weekly monitoring requirements, as mandated
under Amendment 2 (ASMFC, P 117).

While the Commission has

approved the request from Delaware (Ibid p 317), the
National Marine Fisheries Service has yet to sanction this
request (Leffer).

MARYLAND

Maryland receives 2.0391% of the commercial quota every
year, giving them 251,829 pounds of summer flounder for 1993
(58 FR 49938).

They initially had no quota schedule, but

two months into 1993, Maryland divided their quota evenly
into quarters through emergency action.

They distributed

56,100 pounds among each quarter, and reserved 30,600 pounds
for commercially harvested fluke from the Chesapeake Bay and
its tributaries.

Gear types typically employed to harvest
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summer flounder in these inshore areas include pound nets
and haul seines (Speir).
Maryland announced its first trip limit on April 14,
effective April 16, restricting boats to 1,500 pounds.

On

May 8, trip limits were further decreased to 500 pounds, and
quarterly quotas were eliminated, indefinitely.

The

commercial quota was boosted by 17,400 pounds on August 30,
from an unharvested portion of the Chesapeake Bay quota.
The 500-pound limit carried Maryland through October 12, at
which point the state closed for the remainder of 1993
(COMAR 08.02.05).
In 1994, Maryland continued to enforce trip limits,
beginning the year with a 3,500-pound limit, lowering it to
700 pounds on March 19, and raising it again to 5,000 pounds
on October 1, after realizing they were not filling their
quota as expected.

The state plans to continue using trip

limits as a means of managing their quota, but has
completely abandoned the use of sub-periods (Speir).

VIRGINIA

Virginia has the second largest share, with 21.31676%
of the coastwide quota, or an initial allocation of
2,632,623 pounds for 1993 (58 FR 49938).

The industry in

Virginia (mostly fish packers) requested that the state
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institute sub-periods and possession limits, which are based
on historical landings (Boyd).

Their sub-periods are

divided into even quarters, with the quotas allocated to
each quarter as follows:

Jan - Mar

1,092,110 pounds

Apr - June

63,006 pounds

July - Sept

63,006 pounds

Oct - Dec

861,087 pounds

**Inshore Quota:

Trip limits of 1500 Ibs
are effective Apr - Sept
for non-inshore landings

567,401 pounds

**Pound net fishery - Virginia does not allow trawling in
state waters
Trip limits were unlimited for the first quarter of
1993, resulting in a state closure on February 10, effective
until April 1.

The state believed that the industry would

suffer immense hardship if the closure remained in effect
until April, so they borrowed 500,000 pounds from their
fourth quarter quota (Boyd).

The Virginia Resource Marine

Commission transferred 500,000 pounds, and re-opened the
state on February 24.

A notice was issued on March 8,

announcing a closure of the first sub-period on March 15,
based on projected landings of summer flounder.

This

closure was never effected because landings fell short of
predictions, and on March 15, another notice was issued,
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rescinding the scheduled closure (VMRC 450-01-0081).
Unlimited trips continued to be landed through the end of
March.
For the next six months, relatively small trips were
landed in the state, as boats were held to a maximum of
1,500 pounds per trip.

Offshore boats were back to landing

large trips in October; however, the remaining 361,087
pounds did not last long.

The state had harvested its

annual quota by October 28, and closed the state to further
landings for the year.
Virginia requested a transfer of 125,000 pounds from
the state directors in North Carolina.

The Regional

Director approved the transfer (58 FR 61844), and Virginia
re-opened on November 12.

Anticipating another closure,

Virginia requested an additional 125,000 pounds from North
Carolina, and again the Regional Director approved this.
The transfer was instituted on November 19, 1993 (58 FR
62050), which allowed the state to remain open for the rest
of the year.
Virginia made a few changes to their 1994 schedule,
including a more generous allocation to the first quarter, a
larger quota between April and September, and concurrent
larger trip limits between April and September.

The inshore

quota is not monitored on a weekly basis, instead, mandatory
monthly trip tickets are submitted by vessels.
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The

allocation is purposely set high, with the expectation that
it will not be reached, and the remaining quota can be
transferred to the fourth quarter (Harris).

The following

schedule was submitted for the 1994 season:

Jan - Mar

2,000,000 pounds

Apr - June

200,000 pounds

July - Sept

200,000 pounds

Oct - Dec

711,000 pounds

Trip limits of 2500 lbs
are effective Apr - Sept
for non-inshore landings

Inshore Quota: 300,000 pounds
Between Jan - Mar and Oct - Dec, after 85% of the sub-period
quota is filled, a 2500-pound trip limit will be imposed

One final note on Virginia's fluke management plan.
For the first time, Virginia instituted trip limits in 1994
for the offshore fishery, from October 25 through November
23, restricting vessels to 12,000 pounds.

Their most recent

proposal allots sub-period quotas by percentages rather than
pounds, the figures being comparable to those specified in
the table above.

It also mandates a 12,OOO-pounds trip

limit that will be effected at the beginning of the fourth
quarter, in subsequent years (VMRC 450-01-0081).
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NORTH CAROLINA

North Carolina receives the largest percentage of the
coastwide quota every year, which is 27.44584% of the total.
They did not have sub-periods or possession limits during
1993, nor do they have plans to initiate them in the future.
The state remained open for the entire year of 1993, with
unlimited trip limits for boats.

They were allocated

3,389,565 pounds for 1993, but transferred a total of
517,815 pounds, giving them a year-end quota of 2,871,750
pounds (58 FR 27214).

They exceeded their quota by 23,085

pounds because of late reports submitted by dealers, reports
that were received after they had made the year-end transfer
to New Jersey on December 31.
Paralichthys_dentatus, or summer flounder, Paralichthys
lethostigma, or southern flounder, and Earalichthys
albigutta, or gulf flounder, are all Paralichthys species
commonly found in waters of North Carolina.

The Council

requested that North Carolina provide information regarding
the characteristics of their fishery during planning of
Amendment 2.

The request was made in order to ascertain

whether or not other species of flounders known to be landed
along with summer flounder, had been included in the total
summer flounder landings that served as the basis for North
Carolina's allocation (Harris).
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North Carolina estimates that of all otter trawl trips
landing ParalichthKd flounders, 99.9% are summer flounder,
while the remaining .1% is southern flounder.

This is

counter to the inshore pound net fishery, whose species
composition of Paralichthyd flounders include 90.1% southern
flounder, 1.9% summer flounder, and .8% gulf flounder
(Hogarth, 1991).

Commercial and recreational fishermen find

it difficult to distinguish the difference between southern
and summer flounders, and they are commonly sold and
marketed as one species (Daniels).

During the years 1980-

89, port agents had not separated the species, and landings
of all three species from inshore and offshore landings were
initially submitted to the Council.

The state had to re-

calculate the percentage of landings that were not
Paralichthys dentatus, or summer flounder, to accurately
reflect the landings that occurred between 1980-89
(Spitsbergen).

The first table includes landings from the

state for all three Paralichthyd species and the
corresponding share for North Carolina, while the second
table includes only Paralichthys dentatus, which was used in
determining North Carolina's share of the coastwide quota
(Moore, 1991):
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Table 7. The Percent of Summer Flounder landed by
Commercial Fishermen in each State. North Carolina
landings include all Paralichthyd Species
1980-89

tH:

Nil

H/\

0.0438

00004

6.2812

I~ t

14.44l0

f,T

rfY

NJ

OE.

Hrl

Vf\

o 866l

7.0424

15.4026

0.0164

1.8779

19.6l1l

Nf:

34.3948

Percentages equal 100%

Table 8. The Percent of Summer Flounder landed by
Commercial Fishermen in each State. North Carolina
landings have been adjusted by NCDMF Personnel to
estimate the amount of Summer Flounder landed
1980-89

HI:

Nil

0.0482

0.0005

6.9114

RI

CT

NY

NJ

DE

HO

15.8922

0.9532

7.7490

16.~481

0.0180

2.0663

VA
21.6011

NC

27.6119

Percentages equal 100%

In monitoring their quota, North Carolina applies all
Paralichthyd species commercially harvested from waters
beyond three miles, but does not apply any Paralichthyd
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species harvested in inshore fisheries, to their annual
quota.

Because it is difficult to distinguish between the

three species, and very little summer flounder is caught in
state waters, it is easier to manage the quota as described
above.

The state maintains that the percentage of summer

flounder not applied to the quota from inshore harvested
fish, is approximately the same quantity of non-summer
flounder fish which is applied to the quota from 'non-inshore
fisheries (Harris).

The purpose for briefly outlining each state's strategy
for managing its quota, is to reveal the myriad of different
regulations that can exist at anyone time from state-tostate.

These summaries not only relate how differently

states have approached the management of quotas, but also,
how difficult it can be for the people monitoring the quota,
to adhere to their management plans.

Although it is not the

responsibility of fishermen to monitor weekly landings, it
is often in their best interest to know how much of the
state's quota has been filled, and the target values which
will trigger changes in possession limits.

This should

theoretically allow fishermen to plan their trips
appropriately, as they will be aware of impending changes.
For fishermen that land in one of several states, the burden
of knowing the current status of each state's possession
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limit is even greater.

Many fishermen that were polled,

indicated they had to call local fisheries officials, or
check with their buyer to determine the current trip limits,
upon returning to the port after every fishing trip.

Often,

the fisheries representatives were aware that changes were
imminent, but could not state with certainty when these
changes would be effected.

For fishermen who have limited

time ashore, this often meant keeping frequent radio contact
with dealers and fellow fishermen during the course of their
trip, to know when these changes would take place.
In addition to knowing the present status of each
state's quota, it is also beneficial for fishermen to be
aware of each state's itinerary for the following week.
This should allow them to plan their fishing trips
accordingly, minimizing the possibility of running afoul of
landing limit laws.

The preceding summaries should leave no

doubt that regardless of whether fishermen are abreast of a
state's management plan, and know the current status of the
quota, there is no guarantee that the plan will be followed.
As more fisheries become depleted, they will continue
to come under management authority of federal and state
agencies.

Many of the new management plans have become

increasingly complex, and the burden to remain in compliance
with them has become much greater.

Prior to Amendment 2,

the number of changes in state summer flounder regulations
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were far less than after its inception.

Changes tended to

be those which pertained to minimum fish landing sizes, gear
stipulations, or other fishing restrictions within state
waters.

Whether these changes were seasonal or permanent in

nature, they allowed ample time for careful consideration by
state planners, public input, and sufficient notice to the
public.

Upon implementing Amendment 2, states had new

regulations to contend with, such as sub-periods and
possession limits.

Gone were the days of methodical

planning and advanced notice to the industry.

A new type of

management was ushered in with the passage of Amendment 2,
one which included the standard practice of providing at
best, one weeks notice of changes in regulations.
As states become more proficient with managing quotas
by sUb-periods and trip limits, it is likely they will make
less annual changes to their overall plans, as well as
effect less changes by emergency action.

Without question,

the first year was chaotic for fishermen and dealers alike.
Trip limits are not a novel concept to fishermen, as many
species have been regulated by this mechanism by fisheries
managers in the past.

What has not been seen before, is the

myriad of trip limits set by each state, and the frequency
with which they change.

At a time when regulations effected

by emergency action seem to be the current mode for managing
species under other federal FMPs, the relatively short
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notice provided to the industry by states only adds more
uncertainty during this tumultuous time.

It would be

advantageous if all states adopted a minimum notification
period, and adhered to this policy, so as to alleviate much
of the hardship caused to the industry from emergency rules.
Some states have adopted policies which ensure ample
notice to the industry, whenever trip limit changes are to
be effected.

For example, New Jersey regulations require

the state to give seven days notice to all New Jersey
dealers and permit holders, including first-class mailings
(25 N.J.R. 308).

Virginia attempts to give at least five

days notice by sending notices to all twelve dealers in the
state, Marine Patrol Officers distribute notices along the
docks, and the Coast Guard broadcasts these changes (Boyd).
New York gives a minimum of 72 hours notice to industry
whenever a change to possession limits are made (Mason).
Rhode Island makes a concerted effort to give a minimum of
three days notice via faxes and telephone calls to industry
(Sisson).

States are clearly aware of the importance of

granting sufficient notice, and are making every attempt to
accommodate the industry, which is evidenced by the
provisions included in their management plans.
The author believes a minimum of five working days
notification should be given whenever possession limit
changes are made.

Given most states' experiences during the
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first year, this may seem like an unreasonable suggestion,
but the researcher believes that many of the problems which
prompted emergency rules in the first place, can be
remedied.

One problem that may have been responsible for

effecting early closures, is the inexperience of individual
states with implementing measures such as sub-quotas and
trip limits.

States' proficiency will likely improve in

future years, as they learn how to counter some of the
unforeseen circumstances that arose during the first few
years.

While time and experience should greatly improve the

states' ability to manage their quotas, the following
factors seem to be partly responsible for the plethora of
changes effected through emergency action, and the
researcher offers suggestions to help provide a more stable
and predictable environment for the industry.

WEEKLY REPORTING

Some state directors reported that there were weeks in
which elevated summer flounder landings occurred, which they
had not anticipated.

Sometimes it was the result of a

fortuitous run of fish, while other times it was the result
of late weekly dealer reports.

In addition to receiving one

week's worth of landings from dealers, states often received
a backlog of several weeks or months of landings, which
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quickly boosted their total landings.

Receiving timely

weekly summer flounder landings reports is at the heart of
managing the state's quota successfully.

This can hinge on

several factors: 1) permitted dealers must be reporting all
landings purchased during the one-week reporting period on
time, 2) the agent collecting the landings must accurately
compile such landings, and 3) weekly landings summaries must
promptly be transmitted to state agencies so they can make
appropriate adjustments, if necessary.

Any breakdown in

this process can lead to misreporting or late reporting,
which in turn, can compel a state to make emergency
adjustments to their schedule.
Amendment 2 requires all federally permitted summer
flounder dealers to report weekly purchases of summer
flounder.

They must report the landings to the Regional

Director, or the official designee (usually a federal port
agent), within three days following the reporting week.

Any

dealer receiving summer flounder for commercial purposes
must supply the official designee with the number of pounds
purchased, price paid to vessel, vessels purchased from,
dates of purchases, and the port where the fish was landed.
Additional information may be submitted at the end of each
month (57 FR 57358).

If a dealer has not purchased summer

flounder during the reporting week which begins on Sunday
and ends on Saturday, he must submit a negative report
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stating so.

This allows NMFS to distinguish between dealers

that have not made purchases, and dealers that have
disregarded the reporting requirements (59 FR 11934).
Dealers are required to submit landings to agents on
Tuesday of every week, and agents in turn, compile the
weekly totals no later than Thursday of the same week.
Because of problems encountered from dealers unaccustomed to
weekly mandatory reporting, it was often an arduous task for
port agents to compile the final report before Thursday,
during the first year of mandatory reporting.

Often, state

directors responsible for adjusting trip limits did not
receive the weekly landings report until Thursday afternoon.
This gave them one full working day prior to the weekend to
reach a decision with other state directors, regarding any
changes that needed to be made.
It was not uncommon for the port agent collecting the
weekly reports, to receive landings totals from dealers that
were several days, weeks, or even months late.

Late reports

could be the result of dealers attempting to avoid
detection, or businesses closing for vacation that neglected
to submit a report prior to departing.

They were also the

result of dealers that were simply not accustomed to
preparing landings reports every week, that either forgot to
submit the report, or minimized the importance of delivering
the report in a timely manner.

87

There were instances in

which a dealer's initial report submitted to the fisheries
service, included several months of landings which were
purchased during the time when the dealer was unaware of the
reporting requirements.

Connecticut, Rhode Island, and

Massachusetts were all too familiar with this problem, and
had no choice but to apply the landings to their total.

In

the instances when the landings were negligible, there was
little disruption to the state.

When the landings were

significant, the states often had to make quick changes to
their trip limits.

Because federal officials responsible

for collecting weekly reports are expressly forbidden to
either pick up the reports, or continually remind dealers,
many reports were never received from dealers.

Compounded

with the lack of dealers being held accountable for late
reporting, there has been no deterrent to prevent this
problem from reoccurring.
It is strongly suggested that the National Marine
Fisheries Service bring sanctions against dealers that
continually submit late reports, a practice that can no
longer be tolerated if states are to provide advanced notice
to industry when changes are to be effected.

By

disciplining violators, the fisheries service will make
clear the importance of receiving timely information, which
is crucial if states are to monitor their quotas
efficiently.
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There are many unforeseen circumstances that can arise
which prompt state directors to make sudden changes to their
plans.

Late dealer reports, an unanticipated decrease in

the trip limit in an adjacent state, inclement weather
driving boats to port, or many other factors can bring about
quick changes.

States usually have two choices to make upon

learning of these unexpected events.

They can drop the trip

limit with very little notice to the industry, which may
result in boats being unable to reach port before the change
takes place.

State directors also have the option of giving

more advanced notice, while keeping a larger trip limit in
effect or leaving the sub-period open longer.

There will

likely be a greater chance that the sub-period quota will be
exceeded, which may be an equally unpopular decision.

This

may result in having to subtract the overage from the next
sub-period's quota, which may create resentment among the
sector which fishes during the next sub-period.

They may

feel they have lost a portion of "their" quota to the sector
which fishes earlier in the year (this is especially true
when states divide their quotas to accommodate both the
inshore and offshore fleets), and that they should not have
to bear the brunt of what they view as favoritism or
mismanagement on the part of the state.

The incident which

arose in New Jersey illustrates the worst possible
repercussion resulting from keeping current regulations in
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effect until sufficient notification can be given to the
industry.
Because there will always be instances in which summer
flounder landings exceed that which is expected, changes
will have to be made sooner than a plan calls for.

The

author suggests that states reserve a portion of their quota
for emergencies, to help reduce overages that have to be
deducted from subsequent sub-periods, or to prevent the
annual quota from being exceeded.

This will minimize the

hardship to fishermen and dealers by allowing state's to
maintain their policy of providing one week's notice, or
whatever time period they have deemed appropriate.
As states become more proficient at managing species
monitored on a weekly basis, their ability to predict
changes should improve.

One final note on the subject of

possession limits changes.

It is critical for states that

implement swift changes, to be sure to notify all state
permitted dealers and fishermen, resident and non-resident,
with the aame information, lest they find themselves in the
predicament that Rhode Island did.

On February 4, 1994,

Rhode Island scheduled a decrease in the landing limit from
5,000 pounds to 2,000 pounds, effective February 8.

They

instituted this emergency action because of the sudden
decrease in the trip limit in the neighboring state of
Massachusetts.

Some captains received notification
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immediately, cut their trips short, and were able to return
to Rhode Island to land their catch by the 7th.

Others did

not receive word so promptly, and were unsure that they
would be able to offload before midnight of the 7th.
Because the state prohibits fishermen from having fluke in
excess of the trip limit aboard the vessel, regardless of
whether they offload it in the state, they must not only be
at the dock before the more restrictive trip limit takes
effect, but must also have the summer flounder removed from
the boat.

Sudden changes can also be burdensome to dealers,

as they must pay their offloading crews to remain at the
dock until midnight if necessary, to offload the incoming
boats.

Rhode Island state fisheries managers were

sympathetic to the industry's predicament, and were willing
to show leniency for boats and fish buyers that made every
attempt to comply with the new rule.

They informed local

port agents, who in turn informed dealers that, provided
boats were at the dock by February 7, they would allow the
dealers to offload summer flounder from the boats on the
8th.

Enforcement officers were instructed not to begin

enforcing the change until the 10th, which meant that boats
could actually pack out on the 9th without penalty.

The

initial announcement regarding the change in trip limits was
an official written notification, while the latter notice
pertaining to the enforcement aspect was verbal.
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It seems that a few boats received word via on-board
faxes, that boats had until the night of the 9th to offload
without penalty.

Because not all dealers and boats were

notified of the information regarding when the possession
limit would actually be enforced by state officials,
accusations of favoritism became widespread.

Boats that

returned to port promptly, but would have preferred to stay
out longer before completing their trip, were irate to learn
of the delay in enforcement.

They brought less fish to the

dock than those fishermen that received word of the delayed
enforcement, and as a result, received less money.

The

dealers who had the understanding that boats had to be in no
later than the 7th (that the delay in enforcement was
nothing more than a courtesy, not to be abused), were
equally as upset.

February 8th was a non-stop barrage of

phone calls to local federal port agent officials, from
dealers demanding to know why they had not been fully
informed.

Some went so far as to inquire if their boats

could slip out again for 24 hours, to catch an additional
day's worth of fluke, as long as their fish was offloaded by
midnight of the 9th.

Others demanded written verification

that the new possession limit would not be enforced until
the 10th.

One can only speculate what out-of-state boats

were saying about Rhode Island's covert attempt to take care
of their own.
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Following this fiasco, state agents declared they would
not show tolerance in the future.

It was a difficult lesson

to learn, but from now on, Rhode Island will issue a rule,
carry it out, and those caught in violation will be
prosecuted (Sisson).

Given the short time span between

issuing and implementing emergency regulations, it is often
difficult to disseminate the information to everyone,
especially out-of-state permit holders, and offering a grace
period is the state's way of doing everything it can to work
with the industry during these difficult times.
Unfortunately, it seems that grace periods do little more
than augment the problems they attempt to resolve.

Given

the short span of time that states have to work with when
effecting emergency actions, it is often difficult to
dispatch the information to everyone.

Federal fisheries

officials have been known to show leniency when enacting
regulations, both emergency rules, and those effected by
routine manner.

For example, when the exemption program

ends every year on April 30, fishermen are no longer allowed
to fish with mesh smaller than 5 1/2" if retaining more than
100 pounds of summer flounder.

The customary practice over

the last few years, has been to allow any vessel that has
departed before the April 30 date (must have receipts to
provide documentation), to continue fishing under the
provisions of the exemption program until the trip is
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which they had previously landed.

Some of these occurrences

have been longstanding, while others have been more recent.
The following developments have occurred apart from the
passage of Amendment 2, while the subsequent chapter
describes those which have occurred as a result of Amendment
2.

Their influence on traditional landing patterns along

the east coast is challenging the fixed state shares that
remain the same from year to year (unless a quota transfer
takes place).
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plans to construct two jetties at the mouth of the inlet
were proposed.

Encouraged by the jetty proposal and a

federal project to create an industrial park on Roanoke
Island, the Wanchese Fish Company began expanding their
business in the 1970's, in anticipation of a revitalized
Oregon Inlet.

As time passed, the jetties began to draw

more criticism from environmentalists and scientists, and
construction was continually delayed.

The funds for the

industrial park never materialized, and dealers and
processors were reluctant to establish operations in a port
whose future was uncertain.

Many businesses, including the

Wanchese Fish Company, built additional offloading
facilities or relocated entire establishments north to
Virginia, realizing that the ongoing debate over the jetties
could take years to resolve, and possibly would not be
decided in their favor (Bates, p 5).
Oregon Inlet is a federally authorized navigational
channel, which makes it eligible for federal funds to
support ongoing dredge efforts.

The entrance is constantly

migrating southward, as the south shore erodes at a rate of
100 feet per year, depositing sand along the north shore of
Bodie Island (Dolan, p 31).

The Army Corps of Engineers

attempts to maintain the channel at a minimum depth of 14
feet, at a cost of $4 to $5 million every year.

The Army

Corps employs two types of dredges at Oregon Inlet, the

98

Schweitzer dredge and a hopper dredge.

The Schweitzer

dredge operates year round, weather permitting, casting sand
60 feet,

from side-to-side.

It typically operates between

the port of Wanchese and the ebb shoal that accumulates
along the ocean side of the barrier island.

The hopper

dredge is used to maintain the navigational channel,
depositing dredge spoils on nearby Pea Island.

An aerial

survey is performed annually to locate areas of heavy
shoaling, and the hopper dredge is deployed to these areas
as needed (Miller).
According to local fishermen who have used the inlet
for many years, the problem is greater for larger boats that
have joined the fleet over the last ten to fifteen years.
These larger boats (90 feet) displace more water than the
smaller vessels (60 feet)

(Spitsbergen), requiring a channel

up to 20 feet deep for safe navigation (Bates, p 5).
Despite the Army Corps' best attempt to maintain the channel
at a minimum depth of 14 feet, it is not possible to sustain
this depth 365 days a year, given the rapid rate at which
sands can shift in the inlet.

A large swell in the inlet

makes crossing a relative impossibility.

There must be a

calm sea present to prevent vessels from being plunged into
underlying sand bars.

There is also the problem of knowing

exactly where the maximum depth in the channel lies, and
charts for this purpose are unavailable.
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Such charts would

be outdated overnight, and the only aid to guide seafarers
are the channel markers.

These only delineate the

boundaries of the channel, and captains who have traversed
this inlet will be the first to caution that following a
course midway between two channel markers is a proven
technique for running aground.

The way to cross without

incident seems to simply be familiar with the inlet, a task
that is not mastered overnight.
Changes in the inlet from year-to-year do not go
unnoticed, as people working in and around the harbor will
verify.

More crossings than usual were observed by some

local residents (Daniels), during the 1993 season, when
strong westerly winds off the coast of North Carolina, moved
the large ebb shoal that typically builds up outside of the
inlet, further offshore.

This in turn, made less sand

available to wash shoreward to obstruct the inlet.

Even the

Corps reported less activity of the Schweitzer dredge during
this year (Miller).
While some captains regard the hazards of Oregon Inlet
as part of their day-to-day operations, others have decided
the risk is too great, and choose to land their catch
elsewhere.

According to one vessel insurer from North

Carolina, there is little doubt the inlet is causing some
captains to land in Virginia, but they have continued to
maintain coverage to all of their clients, regardless of the

100

state of the inlet (Cooper).
The Daniels family has owned and operated a large
commercial fishing operation for many years, in North
Carolina, Virginia, and Massachusetts.

Conditions had

deteriorated at the inlet so severely by 1981, that their
insurer made it clear their vessels would not be covered if
lost on a sand bar, while navigating the inlet.

The added

threat of uninsured losses to their boats, was the decisive
basis the Daniels needed to look for more accessible
locations in Virginia.

They set up packing facilities out-

of-state to minimize chances of losing their vessels in
Oregon Inlet.
North Carolina possesses the largest share of the
commercial summer flounder quota.

Industry members concede

that most of North Carolina's landings, as well as a large
percentage of Virginia's historical summer flounder
landings, were landed by boats whose primary situs is North
Carolina (Holmes 20A).

Captains from North Carolina have

traditionally enjoyed the flexibility of landing in Virginia
when conditions at Oregon Inlet do not allow safe
navigation, or during the winter trawl season when they are
fishing in waters closer to Virginia.

Many of the dealers

in Virginia serve as nothing more than offloading
facilities, where a packout fee is paid to employees at the
site.

Most of the summer flounder landed in Virginia is
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boxed and transported to North Carolina, to be processed and
shipped to its destination (Daniels).
Fishermen and vessel insurers agree that Oregon Inlet
has held longstanding notoriety among the fishing community,
and that the prudent vessel operator unfamiliar with the
inlet's tides and shifting sands would think twice before
making the crossing.

Over a dozen fishermen have died in

the last 25 years, while trying to navigate Oregon Inlet
(Glass 12A).

It is no wonder the Coast Guard deemed Oregon

Inlet, "the most difficult channel on the east coast" in
1983 (Bates, p 6).

It is untimely for fishermen, but when

summer flounder are most plentiful offshore during the fall
and winter, it is also the time when it is most difficult to
dredge the inlet (Miller).

While these conditions are only

a few of the hazards that exist at Oregon Inlet, they are
not temporary events, and will likely continue.

The concern

held by the author is that there is now an additional
determinant that fishermen may incorporate into their
choices regarding where they can land summer flounder, one
that may cause them to take risky chances.

This new

component is the realization by the southern fleet that once
the Virginia quota is filled, they will likely have to land
summer flounder in North Carolina.

Fishermen may

reluctantly land in North Carolina (ignoring safety
concerns), to reserve as much of the North Carolina quota
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for later in the year.

In the event the Virginia quota is

filled before the end of the year (or between April and
September when trip limits are low), fishermen may no longer
have a choice, and will land at Oregon Inlet, despite their
best judgment not to do so.

The author believes that

fishermen must maintain their flexibility to land in
Virginia as they have done in the past, for both the sake of
convenience and safety.

TURTLE EXCLUDER DEVICES

All sea turtles of the western Atlantic ocean are
classified as either threatened or endangered, as defined in
the Endangered Species Act of 1973.

Section 7 of the Act

mandates that a consultation be initiated between federal
agencies and NMFS, if there is any likelihood that
threatened or endangered marine species will be affected by
any activities (16 USC 1531).

Turtles begin their annual

southerly and offshore migration when water temperatures
begin to drop in early fall and winter, at the same time
when commercial trawlers are
flounder fishery.

actively engaged in the summer

Numerous occurrences of sea turtle /

fishing vessel interactions have been documented in coastal
waters of North Carolina, prompting ongoing monitoring of
sea turtle deaths in the area, since 1982.
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During the

winter fishery of 1982, 144 sea turtle strandings were
recorded, along North Carolina beaches.

This prompted the

first consultation required under section 7, and NMFS issued
a biological opinion concluding that future existence of sea
turtles was not threatened by the summer flounder fishery.
The opinion also required that all future captures by the
summer flounder fishery be recorded (56 FR 63687).
Following the 1990-91 winter trawl season, there were
75 documented sea turtle strandings along the coast of North
Carolina (57 FR 53603), prompting a second Biological
Opinion.

This time, NMFS concluded that further

unrestricted trawling in the summer flounder fishery would
threaten future existence of the Kemp's ridley sea turtle
(57 FR 53603).
A

90-day emergency interim rule was initiated in

response to the Biological Opinion, establishing tow time
restrictions in the summer flounder trawl fishery on
December 2, 1991.

Summer flounder fishermen fishing in

waters between Cape Charles (37'05") and the North Carolina
/ South Carolina border (33'35"), seven miles from the
shoreward boundary of the EEZ, were required to observe 75minute tow times.

The emergency rule was modified on

December 27, shifting the northern boundary to Oregon Inlet
(35'45").

This change was supported by the monitoring and

assessment program's determination that there were
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insignificant numbers of sea turtles north of 35'45" to
justify tow-time restrictions (57 FR 213).

Another 90-day

emergency extension was issued, effective March 6, 1992, and
continued the 75-minute tow time until June 3, 1992 (57 FR
8582).

Incidentally, North Carolina had already closed

state waters to trawling for 19 days, in December of 1990
because of potential sea turtle encounters (MAFMC, 1991 P
80), and imposed emergency regulations from October 28, 1991
to April 1992 (56 FR 63685).
Observers reported 83 incidental catches of sea turtles
and a 26% level of compliance with the tow time
restrictions, during the 1991-92 winter trawl season.

NMFS

and NCDMF concluded that the future existence of sea turtles
would be jeopardized if more rigorous measures were not
imposed.

Tow times had been instituted because NMFS had yet

to certify a TED suitable for the summer flounder fishery
(56 FR 63688).

Three NMFS-approved TEDs had been approved

in time for the 1992-93 season, and a temporary 30-day rule
was issued effective November 15, 1992, requiring all
fishermen fishing in the summer flounder trawl fishery in
all waters between Cape Charles (37'05"), virginia and the
North Carolina / South Carolina border (33'35"), to tow a
TED (57 FR 53603).

Several more temporary rules were

issued, one 30-day rule, effective December 16 (57 FR
60135), and another, effective January 7, which relocated
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the northern boundary to Oregon Inlet (35'46")

(58 FR 4088).

A 60-day interim rule was issued February 10, 1993, and
established a sea turtle protection area from Cape Charles
(37'05") to the North Carolina / South Carolina border
(33'35"), but allowed for modifications to boundaries if
data supported these changes.

Consequently, the northern

boundary was temporarily re-established at 35'46" (Oregon
Inlet), in response to recorded lower sea surface
temperatures, and the recognition that summer flounder
fishermen were more apt to trap greater quantities of bottom
debris in their trawls north of Oregon Inlet.

TEDs in

current use were found to have excessive clogging problems,
and pending improvement of the devices, NMFS relocated the
northern boundary (58 FR 8554).
Amendment 2 to the summer flounder FMP imposes a wide
range of sea turtle conservation measures, but they remain
suspended if temporary rules are published in the Federal
Register, as they have been since 1991 (57 FR 57358).
Temporary rules give the Regional Director flexibility to
adjust time and area restrictions to conform to the presence
or absence of sea turtles.

The 1993-94 trawl season opened

with the northern boundary at Cape Charles (37'05")

(59 FR

48797), and was relocated southward to Oregon Inlet on March
1 (35'46").

Once again, the likelihood of sea turtle

encounters north of 35'46" had diminished to nearly zero,
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with the prevailing water temperatures (59 FR 10584).
Reducing the size of the regulated areas when
conditions support it, still has not changed the opinions of
many fishermen's attitudes towards TEDs, as many are still
reluctant to use them.

Some report that they break while at

sea (Spitsbergen), that they are dangerous while trying to
maneuver, they create additional costs for the fishermen,
and that the loss of finfish prevents them from making a
profitable trip (Carltillet).

It was not until October

1993, that NMFS approved two new TEDs that, in addition to
satisfying a turtle escapement of 97% or greater, they also
specifically conformed to the needs of the summer flounder
trawl (58 FR 54066).
Given the low compliance rate of tow time restrictions
prior to mandatory TEDs use, it should have come as no
surprise that fishermen would relocate to other fishing
grounds, to avoid using what they perceived to be a
hindrance to productive fishing operations.

In a memo

issued by North Carolina's state director, prior to
implementation of Amendment 2, it was speculated that
fishermen would do just this.

They suspected fishermen

might not only fish north of the regulated area to avoid
using a TED, but would also land north of the area to avoid
traveling the extra distance (Hogarth, 1992).

In fact, this

is exactly what was observed during the 1992-93 winter trawl
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season, as trawlers reported that they had fished further
north during the 1992-93 trawl season than in previous
years.
Many fishermen have informed state directors, the
press, or anyone else willing to listen, that mandatory TEDs
use is driving them northward (Stevens 2/94, Harris).
Labelled as a nightmare by one fisherman (Carltillet), he
made it precisely clear that he was fishing north of the
regulated area, for the sole reason of avoiding the use of a
TED.

Fishermen reported that all other things being equal,

such as abundance of fish in the area, they simply did not
want to tow a TED and would continue working a little
further north to avoid using one.
The final rule for sea turtle conservation is still
pending, and the northern boundary will likely be
established at Cape May, New Jersey during certain months of
the year (Coogan).

While this new boundary will probably be

shifted southward during times of moderate to negligible
summer flounder fishing activity, it might influence
fishermen much in the same manner as it did when the
regulated areas were further south.

In an effort to avoid

using TEDs, fishermen will fish even further north than they
have in the past.

If the landing limits at that time are

favorable in states further north, they may opt to land in
these states, because they are closer to their fishing
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location.

Again, their flexibility to do so will be

dictated by the current trip limits in the northern states.
More than likely, they will not be as favorable as those in
North Carolina, so they will head south to land their catch,
adding needless extra time at sea to do so.

STOCK SHIFT

There are many factors that affect concentrations of
fish populations, including salinity, wind speed and
direction, ocean currents, upwellings, and presence of
predators (Glantz).

Presence or absence of particular

species in certain areas are known to be a direct function
of water temperature fluctuations, and prevalence can often
be predicted by these temperatures, among other factors
(Murawski & Finn).

There is growing interest in the effects

of temperature "anomalies" on the distribution of species.
Much of what has been studied so far, has been in response
to global warming predictions, and what impacts it will have
on marine life as sea surface temperatures begin to rise
(Glantz p 40).
Certain species are very sensitive to bottom and
surface water temperature changes (Murawski, P 654), while
others, such as summer flounder, appear to exhibit moderate
variation in distribution.

It is unlikely that fishermen
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detect subtle changes in salinity or upwellings when
fishing; however, most modern vessels are equipped to
monitor surface water temperature, and many fishermen log
temperature readings during the course of their trips.
Because many species are driven by changes in temperature,
it is important for fishermen to note how abundance is
affected by temperature.

Many captains will fish

traditional grounds during certain times of the year when
prevailing temperatures support optimal conditions for the
fish.

Recording these temperatures from year to year,

allows fishermen to predict when fish will migrate to a
given area, based on these optimal temperatures.
During the 1992-93 winter trawl season, fishermen from
North Carolina reported that summer flounder were more
abundant in areas slightly north of where they had
traditionally fished in previous years.

The availability of

fish was not as great in fishing grounds further south where
they had historically fished, and many fishermen noted the
presence of warmer than usual water temperatures
(Spitsbergen, et. al.,).

Upon reviewing their log books

from previous years, they found the temperatures that had
brought fluke to fishing grounds in the south, were the same
temperatures they were observing in waters further north.
Many believed the warmer than normal water temperature was
the reason the stock had migrated further north.
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While Oregon Inlet and TEDs have a strong influence on
fishermen's fishing

and landing patterns,

they may have a

choice of other options with respect to these influences (ie:
they don' t

have to fish north of the regulated area,

but

simply choose to).

The same cannot be said for the relative

abundance of fish.

Fishermen's fishing patterns will always

be a direct function of the locale of the summer flounder
stock.

It seems there is no choice on the part of fishermen

with respect to this factor

-

wherever the fish

are,

the

fishermen will follow.
There are many reasons fishermen choose the location they
do to harvest and land their catch.

Whether the decision is

influenced by a belief that they have discovered the optimal
fishing

grounds,

or

because

they

have

secured

a

special

arrangement with a fish buyer in another state, fishermen are
constantly striving for a competitive advantage over other
fishermen.
notable

Recent environmental and political changes had a

impact on the manner

in which the

southern fleet

operated during the 1992-93 winter trawl season.

The New

England Fishery Management Council recognized this phenomenon
several months after Plan implementation,

identifying both

Oregon Inlet and the current TEDs regulations as factors that
were

driving

(Marshall).

North

boats

to

land

in

virginia

If these events serve to illustrate anything, it

is that vessel
changes

Carolina

operators can be counted on to respond to

in the fishery;

that past
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behavior should not be

considered evidence of what will occur in the future.

Many

will break from past tradition to gain the competitive edge
that has allowed them to prosper in the past.
The

intent of

sUb-dividing the

overall quota was

to

apportion it such that all permit holders would have equal
access to the seasonal fisheries, as eleven states could micro
manage their quota to accommodate various interests.

Using

landings patterns from the last ten years was the fairest
means of allocating the shares, but it also provided a useful
indicator

of

the

frequency with which

landed in each of the eleven states.

summer

flounder

Hypothetically,

1S

the

percentages shares assigned to each state should cause the
least amount of disruption to the industry.

Landings will be

reduced over historical landings during the rebuilding years
because the quota will be set low, and boats will not be able
to land the same quantity as they previously had,
percentage

shares

will

supposedly

insure

that

proportion will be landed from state-to-state.

but the
the

same

This seems to

be the most logical approach, but so many changes have taken
place

in

the

last

introduction of
breaking

from

few

the
their

years,

Plan

some

itself,

traditional

of

which

that many
landing

include

the

fishermen

are

practices.

The

concern held by the author ~s that fishermen's choices may be
guided less by their common sense for security and safety, and
more by the narrow options they now have.
chapter

will

reveal

that

fishermen
112

have

The following
indeed,

changed

traditional landing patterns in response to fewer options, and
the degree to which they have changed.

113

CHAPTER FIVE
THE SURVEY

FREQUENCY OF OUT-OF-STATE LANDINGS

In addition to biological influences such as shifts in
abundance of fish populations, management measures including
TEDs, and the physical constraints of landing at Oregon
Inlet year-round, there are many other factors that compel
fishermen to land summer flounder out-of-state.

For

example, many respondents indicated that both before and
after Amendment 2, they had landed out-of-state because the
area they were fishing was closer to that state, and have
been doing so for many years to save both money and time
spent at sea.

Almost all respondents related that inclement

weather had at one time or another, forced them to land
summer flounder outside their home state.

Others indicated

that a more competitive price had been offered by dealers in
another state, prompting them to land out-of-state.

While

there are innumerable reasons that collectively influence
fishermen's choice of where to land summer flounder, the
researcher sought to determine if the newly imposed state
landing limits had become a new component in their
decisions, and to what degree.
There are clearly differences in the manner in which
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states have chosen to manage their commercial quota.
Because all eleven states have implemented different
schedules, the likelihood that different trip limits will
exist from state-to-state at any given time of the year, is
quite good.

One of the hypotheses proposed in the research

suggests that fishermen land in different states at
different times of the year, to take advantage of more
favorable possession limits.

The researcher offered survey

participants several choices as to why they had landed
summer flounder out-of-state before Amendment 2, and after
Amendment 2 was implemented.

While the survey did not

attempt to identify all of the reasons that fishermen land
their catch out-of-state, it did attempt to determine if
fishermen are now doing so because more opportune landing
limits exist elsewhere, a condition that did not exist prior
to Amendment 2.
All 17 fishermen from Massachusetts, and all 8
fishermen from Rhode Island indicated that they were landing
summer flounder out-of-state to take advantage of more
favorable trip limits in other states, after Amendment 2 had
been passed.

Both of these states impose a range of

possession limits throughout the year, and the participants'
responses revealed that they were landing out-of-state when
the limits in their home state were not as beneficial as
those in other states.
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In contrast to the fishermen from New England, none of
the 7 fishermen from North Carolina specified better landing
limits as a reason for landing fluke out-at-state.

This is

logical if one recalls that North Carolina is the only state
that does not impose trip limits throughout the year, which
means that there is no other state that offers more
advantageous possession limits than North Carolina.

MOTIVATIONS FOR LANDING OUT-OF-STATE

After identifying opportune landing limits as a reason
for landing summer flounder out-of-state, the researcher
sought to determine if fishermen were landing out-of-state
more often than they had in previous years, for this reason.
It was believed that captains had not only been influenced
by the establishment of new landing limits, but that their
out-of-state landings had dramatically increased because
they were taking advantage of better trip limits elsewhere.
The questionnaire revealed that fishermen from all
three states were landing fluke more often in a state other
than their home state, during 1993 and 1994.

Seventeen

respondents from Massachusetts, 8 from Rhode Island, and 6
from North Carolina related that they were landing out-ofstate with greater frequency because of possession limits.
For example, the average of all Massachusetts fishermen
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polled indicated that they were landing out-of-state five
times more often per year after Amendment 2 was passed,
because of preferable trip limits in other states (this
figure would likely have been higher if the survey had been
administered at the end of 1994).

The willingness of

Massachusetts fishermen to land out-of-state to take
advantage of more favorable possession limits, is also
evidenced by the number of fishermen who had never landed
summer flounder at a port outside of Massachusetts before
Amendment 2, but did so for the first time following the
establishment of state-by-state quotas.

Out of 17

Massachusetts respondents, 13 had never landed fluke out-ofstate before.

Of these 13 fishermen that had landed out-of-

state for the first time, 12 cited higher trip limits as the
sole reason.
In addition to most of the Massachusetts fishermen
never having landed out-of-state, many had very little
participation in the summer flounder fishery prior to
Amendment 2, but the dwindling groundfish fishery and the
new regulations contained in Amendment 5 to the Multispecies
Plan had prompted them to target summer flounder.

Former

rules required a minimum mesh size of 5 1/2" in the
restricted mesh areas to retain regulated groundfish
species, but new regulations effected in early 1994,
increased the mesh size to 6.0".
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Many fishermen had not

purchased the required gear to fish for species regulated
under Amendment 5 to the Multispecies Plan, and switched to
summer flounder, because they already had the legal nets
mandated under the Summer Flounder FMP.
While survey participants revealed the degree to which
their out-of-state landings have increased, landings data
obtained from the National Marine Fisheries Service and the
state of Rhode Island also support these claims.

During the

month of February 1994, Massachusetts reduced its possession
limit from 5,000 pounds to 100 pounds on February 5.
Despite Rhode Island effecting emergency regulations to
curtail out-of-state landings by reducing their limit from
5,000 to 2,000 pounds on February 7, Massachusetts boats
continued to land summer flounder in Rhode Island.

National

Marine Fisheries Service weighouts indicate that over
160,000 pounds of fluke was landed in Rhode Island by
Massachusetts boats alone, between February 5 and February
26 (RIDEM, 3/16/94).

Further supporting the claim that

fishermen land out-of-state when trip limits are more
favorable elsewhere, is the number of Massachusetts boats
that offloaded only fluke, and no other species, in Rhode
Island.

During the last three weeks of February, at least

60 trips were documented for Massachusetts boats that had
sold only their fluke in Rhode Island, and landed all other
species in Massachusetts.

These 60 trips represent
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Massachusetts boats that offloaded their fluke to
Massachusetts dealers at a site in Rhode Island, who then
transported the fluke by truck back to Massachusetts.
Because all other species were not regulated by trip limits
at the time, it was more cost-effective for dealers to
transport only the fluke from Rhode Island to Massachusetts,
and allow the boats to bring the rest of the catch to the
dealer's site in Massachusetts (Gouvea).
The average increase in out-of-state landings for Rhode
Island respondents was four times greater after Amendment 2.
As with Massachusetts fishermen, the Rhode Island fishermen
that were polled had rarely landed fluke out-of-state during
the three years before Amendment 2, but all had done so
after.

Only 3 of the respondents had landed out-of-state

prior, while all 8 had landed out-of-state after.

Of the 3

that landed out-of-state before, their incentives for doing
so varied (ie: closer to fishing location, inclement
weather), while 7 of the 8 that landed fluke after Amendment
2, had landed out-of-state exclusively because more
favorable trip limits had compelled them to do so.
Upon discussing motivations with Rhode Island
fishermen, many indicated that higher trip limits would be
contemplated under the following circumstances.

If

neighboring states had higher limits, they might land outof-state regardless of whether they were engaged in a
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directed fishery (catching large quantities of fluke), or
participating in an incidental fishery (catching moderate
quantities of fluke).

However, the instances when

neighboring states have higher limits than Rhode Island is
not as often as with Massachusetts, therefore the incentive
to land summer flounder out-of-state in a neighboring state
was not as high as it was with Massachusetts fishermen.
Incidentally, Massachusetts has since enacted a rule which
states that at no time will their limit be higher than a
neighboring state's limit (MDMF 322 CMR).

Landing out-of-

state in a state much further away from where they normally
would have landed to take advantage of higher trip limits
(usually unlimited), was only contemplated by fishermen
engaged in a directed fishery.

Vessels fishing in a mixed

trawl fishery typically did not retain large quantities of
fluke (ie: 10,000 or more pounds), and travelling to distant
states was not cost-effective, considering the amount of
fluke they had to sell.

Directed fisheries however, harvest

enough fluke to make the distance travelled worthwhile, and
some Rhode Island fishermen in a directed fishery had
travelled as far away as North Carolina to offload.
One Rhode Island respondent's story is especially
poignant, but the consequences experienced by he and his
crew resulting from landing out-of-state, are not unique.
Engaged in a directed summer flounder fishery in offshore

120

southern New England waters, the captain's state of
preference to land would normally have been Rhode Island,
but trip limits were in effect.

The only state with

unlimited landing limits at that time of the year was North
Carolina, so the fisherman made plans to land his catch in
the port of Wanchese for the first time during his fishing
career.

To avoid the risk of receiving less money from an

out-of-state dealer, an arrangement between the captain and
a Rhode Island dealer was made prior to the fishing trip.
While in North Carolina, the Rhode Island dealer had to pay
an offloading -fee to an on-site dealer.

The captain

estimated that the offloading costs he usually paid when
engaging in business in Rhode Island, were comparable to the
unloading fee that was passed along to him by the Rhode
Island dealer, at the North Carolina site.

Incidentally,

this offloading fee that he customarily paid when selling to
a dealer in Rhode Island, incorporated trucking costs.
Because the boat was offloaded in North Carolina, the dealer
incurred additional trucking and selling costs, costs that
were previously not borne by the Rhode Island boat.

These

additional expenses had to be recouped by the dealer, and
some of the costs were passed along to the boat.

The

captain estimated that he received 5 to 10 cents less per
pound for his fluke, or $1650-$3300 less for the trip,
because of these extra costs.
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There were other economic costs that were sustained by
the vessel, including added fuel and crew expenses.

Had the

fisherman landed in Rhode Island, his trip itinerary would
have consisted of 1/2 day to steam to the fishing grounds,
3-4 days fishing, and 1/2 day to return to port in Rhode
Island.

His trip to North Carolina commenced with a 1/2 day

steam to the fishing grounds, 4 1/2 days fished, 2 1/2 days
steam to North Carolina, 2 days detained in port due to
unfavorable conditions for leaving (this is a common
occurrence in Oregon Inlet, as it must be daylight and a
calm sea in order to depart), and 2 1/2 days steam home.
The captain and crew were away from home 7 days longer than
they would normally have been had they landed in Rhode
Island, incurred 7 additional day's expenses to feed the
crew, spent an extra 4 1/2 days burning fuel, and received
less money while incurring additional costs.
If lost income and needless time away from home had not
created sufficient hardship, running aground three times in
Oregon Inlet guaranteed that this trip was to be anything
but routine.

The difficulties in navigating Oregon Inlet

are a challenge to any experienced captain that does not
customarily traverse this waterway, and the unavailability
of charts (sands shift too rapidly) ensure that trial and
error may be the only means for a novice to find the safest
route to the port in Wanchese.
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Asked if he would subject

himself and his crew to such a taxing ordeal in the future,
the captain responded that it was quite possible - where
else can one offload 10,000-15,000 pounds of summer flounder
in one trip?
North Carolina respondents also had higher occurrences
of out-of-state landings not due to more favorable trip
limits, but rather, because of more unfavorable trip limits
in other states.

While the average of all North Carolina

respondents was a fourfold increase, there were some
respondents whose out-of-state landings were much greater
than the average, and others whose out-of-state landings had
dropped to zero.

Many North Carolina fishermen indicated

that they had landed out-of-state in the past, when their
fishing grounds were closer to the state they were landing
in.

Regardless of whether they were fishing in coastal

waters of Massachusetts during the spring fishery, or
offshore fishing during the winter months, their trip
lengths were consistent throughout the year - between 8 to
10 days.

Prior to Amendment 2, they landed in northern

states during the spring and summer fishery, and in southern
states during the fall and winter fishery, but continued to
maintain their average trip length.

With the institution of

trip limits, they were often limited to 500 pounds per trip
if landing in Massachusetts during the spring and summer
fishery, or 300 pounds when landing in New York during the
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summer months.

For those fishermen who decided to continue

targeting summer flounder as they had always done, some were
now making at least 22 trips per month, compared to their
previous 2 to 3 trips per month.

Fishermen were not just

landing daily, but sometimes twice a day, depending on how
close their fishing destination was to their offloading
site.

Of the 6 fishermen polled, 4 had taken up the

practice of making daily or twice daily landings in 1993 in
the states of Massachusetts and New York, during the spring
and summer fishery.

By 1994, 3 of the 4 had stopped landing

in Massachusetts, but all 4 were still making the frequent
trips out of New York.

Incidentally, New York has recently

ended the ability of captains to land more than once, during
a 24-hour period.

This new rule was prompted by the

numerous occurrences of twice daily landings in the state
(Mason).
The 2 North Carolina fishermen whose out-of-state
landing occurrences dropped after Amendment 2, noted that
they could not make profitable trips under this plan because
of higher fixed costs, or were simply unwilling to succumb
to the nuisance of landing once or twice per day, and
diverted their effort to other species.

For them, it meant

targeting shrimp in Pamlico Sound or monkfish offshore,
other species which are heavily overfished.
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HIGHER COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH LANDING OUT-OF-STATE

The costs of maintaining a vessel are either fixed or
variable, the variable costs being directly related to the
amount of activity the boat engages in.

Fixed costs may

include vessel insurance, debt, depreciation, and routine
repairs.

Fuel, maintenance, wages, ice, food, sales and

unloading fees are all variable costs, directly proportional
to the amount of time spent at sea.

This may include both

time spent fishing, and the time travelling in-between
fishing grounds, and to and from port (MAFMC, 1991 P 46).
The researcher sought to answer whether or not there
were higher costs associated with landing summer flounder
out-of-state more often, and to identify what some of these
costs were.

Respondents were asked to identify certain

costs which were incurred as a result of landing out-ofstate, both before and after Amendment 2 was implemented.
Survey participants were offered several choices including:
1) out-of-state permit costs, 2) operational costs (fuel,
ice, etc.,), 3) receiving less money from an unfamiliar outof-state dealer, 4) waiting longer to be paid from an outof-state dealer, 5) increased costs to pay an out-of-state
lumper, and 6) other.

The options offered to the

respondents were ones which the researcher believed to be
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the major costs, but were certainly not inclusive of all
possible costs.

The choice "other" was offered to allow

respondents to reference any other costs which were not
listed.
Of the 16 Massachusetts permit holders polled, the
majority indicated that they had accrued higher permit costs
and higher operational costs.

Twelve of the 16 permit

holders had never landed fluke out-of-state before, so it
stands to reason that their permit costs would increase with
their decision to land in a state outside of Massachusetts.
Permits were obtained from Rhode Island, Connecticut, New
York, and North Carolina, permits which these fishermen had
previously never purchased.

Even more dramatic than the

changes in permit costs, was the increase in operational
costs.

Fourteen permit holders indicated that their fuel,

and maintenance costs were higher as a result of offloading
in a state further away than Massachusetts.
"Other" costs cited by Massachusetts fishermen include
5 respondents who indicated they received less money from a
familiar dealer, namely a dealer they had done business with
in Massachusetts, as a result of the dealer incurring higher
costs to offload the boat in a state other than
Massachusetts.

Six captains also wished to emphasize the

hardships associated with having to stay at sea longer when
travelling to out-of-state locations, including more time
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spent away from family, and the unprofitable time spent
aboard the boat for the crew members.

The hazards

associated with less sleep were noted by several captains,
who are now spending more time running back-and-forth daily
from the fishing grounds with no more than 500 pounds per
trip.

Previously, they were able to bring in several

thousand pounds per trip, and remain in port for a day or
two before returning to fish again, a routine that allowed
time for rest between trips.
As with the Massachusetts permit holders, Rhode Island
respondents also had large increases in their permit and
operating costs.

Five of the 8 respondents that cited

increased permit costs, purchased their new permits from the
states of MassaChusetts, Connecticut, New York, and North
Carolina.

Six Rhode Island respondents also specified fuel,

ice, and extra wear on the vessel as additional costs they
had accrued, as a result of decisions to land outside of
Rhode Island when possession limits were favorable
elsewhere.
"Other" costs cited by Rhode Island respondents
included two captains who felt they had received less money
for their product from a dealer they had routinely dealt
with in Rhode Island, because the dealer had incurred higher
costs as a result of offloading the boat out-of-state.
Again, four captains noted the added time spent at sea,
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which had taxed the crew's spirits and sleep schedule, with
no added financial gain to compensate them.
The only notable changes in costs that took place for
North Carolina fishermen, were increased operational costs.
Recalling the increased frequency with which North Carolina
fishermen are now landing in New York, and to a lesser
extent in Massachusetts, this should be expected.

The daily

or twice daily trips to offload fluke has increased their
fuel and maintenance bills considerably.

Of the costs that

actually decreased to North Carolina fishermen, 2 were
fishermen that no longer land in Massachusetts because the
limits were set too low, and their licensing and lumping
costs were reduced accordingly.

One captain cited increased

"other" costs that included receiving less money from a
North Carolina dealer that offloaded his summer flounder in
New York, who passed along his higher costs to the boat.
While the cost of purchasing a state landing license
has increased to many permit holders, the cost is fixed, and
does not vary with the activity of the fishing vessel.

So,

while many fishermen indicated that their out-of-state
landings have increased (more time spent at sea), the cost
of the license itself remains the same, regardless of how
active or inactive the vessel is.

Once the license has been

purchased for a given year, the cost is the same whether the
fisherman lands in the state a dozen times, or never lands
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there at all.

Because permit costs are expenditures usually

borne by the owner of the vessel, any increase in these
costs would typically not be passed along to the crew.

The

chapter on State Licensing (discussed in Chapter 6) reveals
that the actual cost of a landing license is not prohibitive
from state-to-state, but expenses can add up, especially if
a vessel must secure several licenses.

Based on the survey

responses, permitting costs have increased to the permit
holders as a result of state-by-state quotas.

However,

given the moderate cost of purchasing landing licenses, and
the fact that the costs do not vary with the amount of
landing activity once the permit has been purchased, the
researcher does not believe that these costs are financially
constraining to the fishermen that were polled.
Variable costs which include fuel, food, vessel
maintenance, and ice, are the costs which have increased the
most to respondents, from all three states.

Because more

time is now being spent at sea, more gallons of fuel must be
burned, more money spent to feed the crew, more ice
purchased to keep fish fresh in fish holds longer, and
greater costs expended to maintain the vessel that is now
working longer hours.

Fishermen that incurred increased

operational costs appear to be divided into one of two
categories.

The first group are fishermen who are now

travelling much further distances to land in a state with
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very large landing limits, and the second group consists of
fishermen who are continuing to land where the trip limits
are small, prompting them to make daily landings.

Both of

these circumstances require the vessel operator to spend
more time at sea.

Since many fishermen will fall into one

or both of these groups, depending on the time of year they
are fishing, it seems inevitable that they are going to
spend more time aboard their vessel, and pay the higher
costs for doing so.
Other variable costs which increased with less
frequency, but are equally as important, are costs
associated with price received for the product.

Price

received for fish is primarily influenced by a variety of
factors, including availability of supply, size and quality
of fish, and demand for the product (MAFMC, 1991 P 45).
This study has focused only on the implications to
fishermen, but the buyers and processors of summer flounder
have undoubtedly been affected by Amendment 2.

Added costs

to dealers and processors may include increased leasing fees
for out-of-state landing sites, out-of-state landing
licenses, out-of-state inspection licenses, out-of-state
incorporation fees, and certainly the additional cost to
transport the product back to the dealer's home state.
order to properly document the effects to dealers and
processors as a result of state-by-state quotas, another
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In

full study would be required.

Despite the absence of such a

study, the researcher believes there is ample testimony from
conversations with fishermen and dealers, to declare that
greater costs have been incurred by dealers that are buying
summer flounder from fishermen in out-of-state locations.
Many captains that were interviewed indicated the price
received for their product was less than it would have been
had they offloaded in their home state.

Most fishermen

believed they received less because they sold to a home
state dealer in an out-of-state location, while several
respondents received less because they had to sell to an
unfamiliar out-of-state dealer.

It should be noted that

fishermen may not always know the costs involved to dealers,
and the reasons they were paid less for their fish than they
had anticipated.

However, a pattern of fishermen being paid

less money per pound from a dealer receiving fluke out-ofstate, on the same day that another boat received more money
from an in-state dealer, has become evident.

Many captains

were able to specify the differences, which were typically
.05 to .10.

One captain of particular interest who

offloaded alongside another boat, received .40 less per
pound than the other fisherman, the only difference being
that he was selling to his home state dealer, who had to
truck his fluke back across state lines, while the other
boat was selling to an in-state dealer.
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Dealers offloading fluke do not necessarily transport
all of the fish back to their place of business in their
home state.

For example, if a dealer from North Carolina

typically ships some of his summer flounder to Fulton Fish
Market in New York, and he offloads a boat in New York, some
or all of the fluke may never leave New York, which should
defray most of the transporting costs (Daniels).

There are

many components that affect the price paid to the boat, and
in-depth survey of dealers would be required to properly
document how state-by-state quotas have increased their
costs, whether these costs are passed on to the fishermen,
and to what extent.
In summary, many permit holders that were polled not
only accrued higher costs themselves, but the dealers they
have sold to have probably incurred higher costs.

As a

result of the higher costs that dealers have likely accrued,
some of these costs have been passed along to the fishermen
selling their catch to them.

Because crew wages are

directly related to the amount of product harvested and
sold, income will remain the same regardless of how long the
crew is at sea.

Wages will be the same if a crew harvests

10,000 pounds of fluke in 7 days, or if they harvest the
same quantity in 11 days.

Many fishermen are not only

having to spend more money to bring the same quantity of
fish (or less) to the dock, but are now receiving less money
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for it when they get there - a literal double blow.
One final note regarding the increased incidences of
out-of-state landings.

Many fishermen that sold to home

state dealers in out-of-state locations, actually found
themselves arriving at their home port before the dealer had
trucked his fish back to the state.

If the dealer was

transporting the fish from a neighboring state, the
additional time spent away from the plant was not too great,
and thus the quality of the fish had not diminished
appreciably.

However, when dealers from northern states had

to transport fish from a state much further south (ie: North
Carolina), the fish stood a much greater chance of reducing
in quality by the time it arrived at the home state plant.
More time spent on the road in fish tubs, rather than
properly stored at the plant, meant the inferior quality
product would command a lower price, than if the fish had
been properly offloaded and immediately placed into cold
storage at the plant.
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CHAPTER SIX
STATE LICENSING

In order to commercially harvest summer flounder in the
EEZ, a federal fisheries permit is required.

For those

vessels fishing in state waters, a state fisheries permit
may also be required.

Regardless of where summer flounder

is harvested, the catch must eventually be landed, in which
case, a state landing permit may be necessary.

Some states

require licenses to fish in state waters, some require
licenses to land fish in the state, while others require
neither, depending on the species being harvested or landed.
Prior to 1993, there were fewer requirements that had to be
met in order to purchase a summer flounder landing license
in the eleven states.

Following Amendment 2, more states

added stringent qualifications to already-existing landing
licenses, for those attempting to secure a summer flounder
license.

Listed below are the state license requirements to

land summer flounder and the cost, prior to Amendment 2.
The license includes landing privileges only, and does not
necessarily include fishing rights:
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STATE
Maine

COST OF LICENSE
a)in-state: $89

b)out-of-state: $334
New Hampshire

a)in-state: $26
b)out-of-state: $200 minimum fee

Massachusetts

a) in-state: $130 or $195
(depending on size)
b) out-of-state: $269 or $390
(depending on size)

Rhode Island

a)in-state: $200
b)out-of-state: $200

Connecticut

a)in-state: $150
b)out-of-state: $225

New York

a)in-state: $100
b)out-of-state: $250

New Jersey

a)instate: $102
b)out-of-state: $102

Delaware

a)in-state: $150
b)out-of-state: $1500

Maryland

none

Virginia

none

North Carolina

a) in-state: based on length of
vessel
b) out-of-state: $200 or cost of
license in applicant's home state,
whichever is greater - reciprocal
agreement between RI, NJ, and VA no license required of these boats

Note:
Prior to Amendment 2, there were no special
conditions that had to be met in order to secure a summer
flounder landing license in the above states. A license
could simply be obtained by paying the cost required by each
state.
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The following table lists the current license
requirements to land summer flounder in the same states, the
cost, and the criteria used to determine eligibility for
such licenses:

STATE

COST OF LICENSE

Maine

a)in-state: same as before 1993
b)out-of-state: same as before 1993

New Hampshire

fluke can no longer be commercially
landed

Massachusetts

a)in-state: same as before 1993 +
$10 fee*
b)out-of-state: same as before 1993
+ $20 fee*

Rhode Island

a)in-state: same as before 1993**
b)out-of-state: same as before
1993**

Connecticut

a)in-state: same as before 1993***
b)out-of-state: same as before
1993***

New York

a)in-state: same as before 1993****
b)out-of-state: same as before
1993****

New Jersey

a)in-state: same as before
1993*****
b)out-of-state: same as before
1993*****

Delaware

a)in-state: same as before
1993******
b)out-of-state: same as before
1993******
none

Maryland
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Virginia

North Carolina

none

a)in-state: same as before
1993*******
b)out-of-state: same as before
1993*******

*

MA - the additional fee covers administrative costs only

** RI - the landing license is the same as before, but the
dealers license requires all permit holders to have a
permanent place of business in Rhode Island to purchase
summer flounder from a vessel
*** CT - applicant must 1) have a federal summer flounder
permit, or 2) a letter of endorsement from Connecticut
attesting that the vessel either landed summer flounder in
the Connecticut between January 1, 1985 and January 1, 1994
or 3) was under construction or being re-rigged between
January 26, 1990 and January 26, 1994 Note: the state is
proposing deleting 1), requiring that 3) be for purposes of
fishing in Connecticut waters, and that all applicants in
1994 and beyond, must have held a license issued in 1993
**** NY - all applicants must have earned at least 50% or
more of their income during anyone year from fishing,
between January 1988 to present - effective 1993. Must also
have held a license the previous year to qualify, if not,
must wait one year to receive a landing license
***** NJ - all applicants must have applied for license by
June 30, 1993, or will be denied future landing privileges
in New Jersey. To qualify, applicant must have landed at
least 1,000 pounds during two years, between 1985-92. Boats
can land up to 100 pounds without a license - effective 1993
****** DE - must have a limited entry gillnet license - no
new gillnet licenses have been issued since 1984 - effective
1994
******* NC - must obtain an endorsement to sell license
which requires applicant to have held a license the previous
year - if a license was not held the previous year,
applicant must wait one year
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Massachusetts added an additional "special license"
requirement to their already-existing landing license, which
obligates permit holders to comply with state reporting
requirements.

This license must be purchased for a nominal

fee of $10 and $20, which helps defray administrative costs
to the state.

Massachusetts has a state reporting system in

addition to the federal reporting system, and vessels with
this special permit must submit a bi-annual report to the
state, documenting all summer flounder they have landed in
Massachusetts.
Rhode Island proposed a limited entry fluke landing
license during 1994, which was abolished after evoking
severe criticism and threats of a lawsuit from
Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries.

the

Following

Massachusetts' reduction from 5,000 pounds to 100 pounds on
February 5, 33 Massachusetts vessel operators purchased
Rhode Island state licenses, who incidentally, were
fishermen that had previously not landed fluke in Rhode
Island.

Between February 5 and February 26, 1994, 162,169

pounds, or 28% of all the fluke that was landed in Rhode
Island during that sub-period, was brought in by these 33
boats.

Rhode Island was concerned that their quota would be

rapidly depleted from the unexpected increase in landings
from out-of-state boats, and devised a plan to reverse the
situation.
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Distressed by the onslaught of what the Department of
Environmental Management perceived as non-traditional
fishermen landing in Rhode Island, they attempted to limit
the landing of fluke to historical participants.

First,

they dropped the possession limit to 2,000 pounds by
emergency regulation on February 8, in what was supposed to
be a temporary measure until a more permanent strategy could
be executed.

On March 15, emergency regulations were

drafted by the state in an attempt to limit boats from
landing in Rhode Island.

The emergency proposal required

that all applicants provide documented proof that they had
sold at least 100 pounds of fluke to a Rhode Island dealer
between January 1985 and January 1990.

This was the same

time period used for federal applicants to qualify for a
federal fluke permit.

If the vessel was under construction,

being re-rigged, or was being replaced during this time, it
could also qualify (RIDEM, RS2914-1).

Upon issuing this

proposal, the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries
responded, "We will see you in court," after which Rhode
Island withdrew the proposal to avoid legal controversy.
Incidentally, an additional provision that was proposed but
later dropped in the final revision, was to limit out-ofstate permit holders to the maximum possession limit allowed
in their home state, but let in-state permit holders land
the maximum limit permitted by the state of Rhode Island
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(Sisson).

Rhode Island settled on establishing a

restrictive out-of-state dealers license, which prevents
offloadings from taking place at locations other than bona
fide facilities, a common occurrence in Rhode Island prior
to the establishment of this license.
If Connecticut succeeds with their latest proposal,
they will be the second state to institute a limited entry
summer flounder landing license.

The time series used to

determine eligibility is quite generous, however, any
captain who made the unfortunate decision of taking a hiatus
from landing in Connecticut in 1993, will be unable to
obtain a license in the future.
Both New York and North Carolina require that an
applicant have held a license the previous year, in order to
obtain a license.

If an applicant did not hold a license

during the preceding year, he must wait until the following
year to obtain one.
New Jersey currently has the only limited entry state
landing license for summer flounder.

Applicants must prove

they landed a minimum of two trips of 1,000 pounds each,
during the time period specified by the state.
Delaware granted landing rights exclusively to the
state gillnet fishery, in recognition that out-of-state
boats have rarely landed summer flounder in Delaware.
Reserving the quota strictly for the gillnet fishery has
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allowed the state to manage the quota during one month of
the year, and should not be considered a hardship to out-ofstate boats that never had a tradition of landing summer
flounder in Delaware.
A total of six states have changed their landing
license requirements since 1993, as a direct result of
Amendment 2, and it seems likely that more states will
follow suit.

Before Amendment 2 was passed, states either

required no license at all, or simply charged a fee to
vessel operators to land fluke.

Most states now have

additional prerequisites that must be met, before a license
will be issued.

New York and New Jersey were the only two

states whose new landing licenses were established to
coincide with the passage of Amendment 2, however, New
Jersey also issued a moratorium.

This has prevented any

opportunistic race by federal permit holders to secure state
landing licenses for future access, after witnessing the
repercussions of state-by-state quotas.
Despite other states that have established landings
criteria or waiting periods, many license holders that
landed out-of-state for the first time, as well as
speculative applicants, were able to obtain summer flounder
landing licenses.

This is because most states did not issue

their licensing requirements until after Amendment 2 became
effective, allowing fishermen to secure licenses they might
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otherwise not have been able to, had these states done as
New Jersey did.

Regardless of whether fishermen are

procuring licenses to actually land their fish, or to secure
future landing privileges, it appears that many more summer
flounder landing licenses are being purchased by fishermen
in particular states (those with favorable trip limits
during certain times of the year).

It seems inevitable that

more states will issue moratoriums on summer flounder
landing licenses, which in turn may prompt more license
purchases by fishermen seeking to maintain their landing
flexibility.

Amendment 2 has currently restricted the

number of federal summer flounder licenses, and no new
entrants will be considered until 1997 (57 FR 57358).

There

will however, be more state landing licenses issued, as more
fishermen will attempt to keep as many options open to land
their catch.

Regardless of whether fishermen are obtaining

licenses because they are presently landing fluke out-ofstate, or doing so to reserve future access to landing
(present speculators may become future landers), securing a
license is likely to become increasingly difficult.
Fishermen would be wise to secure as many landing licenses
as possible, and regardless of whether they actually use it,
the license fee to simply reserve future entry will be well
worth the cost, as long as

state-by~state

effect.
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quotas remain in

The topic of state licensing would not be complete
without a brief discussion of the limitations on states to
exact license fees and establish qualifying criteria.

Many

states have historically charged higher fees from out-ofstate residents because they do not pay the same state taxes
that residents do, and charging a higher fee to recoup some
of the difference has become an accepted practice.

There

are guidelines that states must follow when setting fee
schedules for resident and non-resident licenses, and a
brief examination of them is in order.
There are numerous court cases, as well as existing
laws which the states can turn to for guidance, in helping
them develop evenhanded management plans.

Article 4,

Section 2, of the United States Constitution states that,
"The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States."

Amendment 14, Section 1, specifically instructs

the states in their rulemaking, stating that, "No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
While dissimilar treatment is permitted, the fundamental
rights entitled to all cannot be infringed upon, and
citizens must be placed on equal footing (436 U.S. 371).
Thus, if a state chooses to enact dissimiliar licensing
schemes, they must be sure that any differential treatment
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does not prevent one citizen from pursuing the same goals as
another.
The courts typically employ a two-pronged test to
determine if a person's rights have been violated by a
state's action, such as the establishment of a license with
different qualifying criteria.

They must first determine if

the citizen's rights are covered under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.

If the privilege that is being affected

is "sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation,"
then the privilege is protected by the U.S. Constitution
(O'Reilly v. Board of Appeals, 942 F.2d 281).

Secondly, the

courts must decide if such restriction on the privilege is
"closely related to the advancement of a substantial state
interest" (Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S.
59).

While disparate treatment to citizens of different

states is permitted, discrimination is not.

The state must

demonstrate that the disparity is aimed at a "source of
evil" (ie: non-residents), and that there is a substantial
reason for enacting dissimilar legislation.

The courts warn

that such evil must be exclusive to the citizens for which
the statute is directed at (Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385).

States must also demonstrate that the regulations

contained within their licensing and management plans have
conservation as their basis (Hoover), and that the means to
achieve the objectives of conservation do not violate the

144

Privileges and Immunities Clause (334 U.S. 385).
The matter of the state's discretion in issuing
licenses was addressed as early as 1824, in Gibbons vs.
Ogden, when the state of New York was found to be granting
privileges to some licensed ferry operators, while denying
the same privileges to other ferry operators.

One licensing

scheme was clearly inferior to the other, because one ferry
operator had full authority to conduct commerce in the
waters of New York, while the other operators could only
navigate these same waters.

The Court determined that

states were not allowed to deny the rights and privileges
that are conferred upon the issuance of a license, unless
such revocation is exercised equally among all licensees.
In a recent court decision, Tangier Sound Watermen's
Association, et. al. vs. William A. Pruitt, Commissioner,
Virginia Marine Resources Commission (4 F3d 264), the nonresident fee charged by the Virginia Marine Resource
Commission was deemed unconstitutional by the 4th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals.

Virginia was charging a $1,150

fee to out-of-state commercial fishing licensees, in
addition to the fees charged to resident licensees.

The

defendants in the case contended that non-residents were
benefitting from a resource for which they had not paid
their share, because some of the funds used to pay for the
expenses of management were taken from the general fund,
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revenues collected from Virginia residents.

In essence,

they believed that Virginia taxpayers were subsidizing nonresident commercial fishermen.

The appellees believed the

motive behind the state's actions, was to keep out-of-state
fishermen from taking part in the fishery in Virginia
waters.

The Court ordered the state to repeal the fee, upon

determining that the cost of the license did not serve the
state's interest of preventing the subsidy to out-of-state
fishermen (4 F.3d 264).
The Court relied on a case decided in 1947, to help
resolve the question of whether or not states could charge
separate fees to residents and non-residents.

In Toomer v.

Witsell, the Court struck down a $2,500 non-resident license
fee charged by the state of South Carolina.

While the non-

residents were still able to enjoy the same privileges
enjoyed by residents, who were only charged $25 for the same
license, the disparity of treatment between the two groups
did not satisfy a valid reason for doing so.

Recalling that

the Privileges and Immunities Clause does allow unequal
treatment when it can be demonstrated that a basis for doing
so exists, the state of Virginia had to prove that the level
of disparity (the dissimilar licensing schemes) rectified a
"source of evil" (334 U.S. 385).

Upon determining that non-

resident rights were protected under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, the Court set out to decide if the
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this measure if upheld by the courts (Pierce, 1994).

The

push for limited entry licenses among individual states
appears to be gaining momentum, and will probably continue
for quite some time.

While state-by-state quotas cannot be

blamed for the majority of state licensing schemes which
limit entrants, they seem to have convinced some state
directors that attempting to limit out-of-state landings
through this mechanism, is desirable.

The author believes

that if state-by-state quotas are employed in other
fisheries, there will be further proliferation of state
limited entry licenses.

Having witnessed the repercussions

of Amendment 2, state directors will likely do as New Jersey
did, limiting entrants the day that a plan takes effect, to
prevent fishermen that previously never landed in the state,
from obtaining access.
State directors are not necessarily striving to grant
special privileges to one group over another, but are simply
faced with the reality of a severely ovefished resource that
has too many participants.

This puts them in the

unfortunate position of having to include some parties at
the expense of excluding others, if they are to address the
overfishing crisis.

Resident fishermen will likely increase

their efforts to persuade state fisheries managers to
preserve landing rights for them, at the expense of
excluding others, a practice that threatens to only get
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worse (not to mention, create feelings of resentment between
residents and non-residents).
The recent closure of large regions of Georges Bank
will likely mean more active participants in the summer
flounder fishery.

Many of these fishermen have a federal

summer flounder permit because they met the minimum
qualifications, but may not have actively participated in
the past.

The summer flounder fishery may be one of their

few alternatives to groundfishing, and any increase in the
annual quota may be offset by newcomers who caught no more
than a handful of fluke in the past.

state fishing and

landing licensing requirements promise to become even more
exclusive, as other fisheries preclude traditional fishermen
from remaining in their fishery, who must turn to other
species, such as summer flounder, to remain viable.

State

directors will continue to confront the unpleasant choice
regarding who will be issued licenses, and who will not.
During a time when many of the federal and state agencies
are limiting entrants into various fisheries, state-by-state
quotas only seem to greatly increase license purchases by
fishermen seeking or reserving future access.

Ironically,

many of the fishermen obtaining out-of-state summer flounder
landing licenses would prefer not to purchase the licenses,
but the current situation of differing trip limits from
state to state offers them little choice.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE ATLANTIC COASTAL FISHERIES COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT ACT
"To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish
shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, and
interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a
unit or in close coordination."

Regional councils are responsible for preparing fishery
management plans for resources that reside in the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ)

(16 USC 1852).

States are given

jurisdiction to manage marine fisheries in state waters, and
establishment of federal FMPs cannot diminish this authority
(16 USC 1856).

Management responsibility is granted to

states to allow local fisheries to remain viable, in
recognition of the diversity that exists from state to
state.

The Magnuson Act mandates that species be managed as

a unit, to provide protection to the resource throughout its
range.

This is reasonable when one considers that marine

organisms do not recognize artificial boundaries, such as
state and federal waters, and certainly cannot appreciate
the different regulations that are administered in each
region.

It would be illogical to exercise a designated

level of conservation in one region, while offering no such
protection to a species once it has migrated to another
habitat.

Prior to developing the first summer flounder FMP,

fisheries managers had identified the importance of the
fishery in both federal and state waters, and concluded that
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the management unit should include both of these
geographical areas (MAFMC, 1987 P 3).

The need for

complementary state and federal plans which would provide
equitable protection to the species regardless of where they
were present, would be critical to the success of restoring
the overfished status of the resource.
The state / federal relationship presents a unique
dilemma for federal fisheries managers that have dominion
over waters from three to two hundred miles offshore, but
cannot exercise jurisdiction over waters within three miles
from land.

While state waters encompass a much smaller area

than the EEZ, both are equally important in sustaining the
summer flounder population.

Offshore waters provide

critical spawning and overwintering habitat, while coastal
waters from North Carolina to New Hampshire serve as nursery
grounds and major supplies of food sources for adult summer
flounder (MAFMC, 1991 P 25).

During the years 1980-89, the

average of all commercial summer flounder landings were
approximately 60%, while recreational landings comprised 40%
(Ibid P 44).

77% of all commercial summer flounder landings

were harvested from the EEZ (Ibid P 37), while the
recreational sector harvested the majority of its landings
in state waters (82% for party/charter boats and 97% for
private/rental boats)

(Ibid p 43).

These statistics clearly

demonstrate the importance that both state and federal
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waters serve in sustaining the summer flounder resource, and
the industry which depends on their continued existence.
Since 1982, the Atlantic states Marine Fisheries
Commission (ASMFC) has helped develop the management plan
for summer flounder.

Their objective is to make certain

that states' actions or inactions, do not frustrate the
attempts of federal fisheries officials to manage the
resource (Christian).

They have amended their summer

flounder plan several times, which until recently, had been
little more than recommendations offered to states to help
them develop their state management plans.

With the passage

of the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act
on December 20, 1993, the ASMFC was granted authority to
require states to comply with coastal fishery management
plans developed by them, and to follow through with
sanctions if states do not.

The Commission will inform the

states of the standards and procedures they must comply with
for each of the plans, by March 20, 1995.

Any state not in

noncompliance will be referred to the Secretary of Commerce,
and appropriate action will be taken, which may include
declaring a moratorium on fishing in state waters (16 USC
5101) .
There are mixed reviews regarding the new law.
Understandably, ASMFC members who have been hampered by
states that have continually disregarded their
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recommendations, have hailed the new legislation.

Fisheries

groups, including the North Carolina Fisheries Association
and the East Coast Fisheries Federation have concerns that
include a lack of public participation during plan
development, and the potential of member states to favor
measures that will benefit them, rather than the resource as
a unit (stevens, 1/94).

The Act requires a minimum of four

public hearings, as well as consideration of written
comments during plan development, but some industry members
are still uneasy with the mandatory compliance measures, and
question the Commission's growing authority over state
matters (Drumm).
The purported inequities in quota allocations that some
state directors believe they suffered under Amendment 2, are
too late to rectify at this point.

Many hope this new

legislation will prevent future discrimination among states
with dissimilar management plans which occurred under this
Plan.

The Act has promising potential to compel every state

to approach fisheries management with the fervor that some
states have consistently espoused, placing all states on
equal footing.

In part, its success may depend on the

ASMFC's response to states that are found not in compliance.
As with non-reporting federally permitted dealers that have
not been penalized, there has been little deterrent for
disregarding mandates.
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Another element that will determine the success of the
Coastal Management Act, is the degree of attention to
industry input, and the public perception of power that the
Commission has now gained.

Virginia is threatening to pull

its membership from the ASMFC, for fear of their control
over state fishery management plans.

North Carolina is

inquiring if it might be beneficial for them to do the same
(Moore).

Because the Commission has yet to exercise the new

authority granted to it, it is hard to tell just how
agreeable this new alliance between the ASMFC and state
managers will be.

Assuming that states have adequate input

and can agree on the measures put forth by the Commission,
the Act has the potential for preventing disparate
management measures from state to state, that have allowed
some states to benefit over other states (ie: state shares
based on minimum landing sizes).

The author hopes that

states will be driven to meet the agreed-upon management
measures, but also, that the general public and the state
directors will be given the proper regard they deserve when
participating in the decision-making process.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE REALITY OF AMENDMENT 5

Amendment 5 allows two or more states under mutual
agreement to transfer or combine their entire quota, or a
portion thereof.

One might doubt that a state would even

contemplate relinquishing part of its quota to another
state.

There may be equal skepticism regarding the

motivation of one state to combine its quota with other
states to form one regional quota, unless all participating
states have comparable allocations.

Despite what would

appear to be an opportunity with no willing participants,
there were five quota transfers that took place during the
first year of Amendment 2.
Fishermen and fish buyers will have the greatest
interest in quota transfers between states.

Because these

two groups may have opposing views over whether or not a
transfer should be initiated, it is often difficult for the
state directors responsible for approving or disapproving a
request to satisfy both of these groups (to say nothing
about the secondary and tertiary parties that are affected
by these decisions).

While no states have yet to combine

their quotas, five quota transfers were made in 1993.

Not

surprisingly, all five transfers came from North Carolina,
the state with the largest share of the coastwide quota.
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The transfers allowed more of the overall coastwide quota to
be landed, as less fortunate states were able to capture
some of North Carolina's allocation, which they were unable
to fill during the first year.
Of the five transfers granted by North Carolina during
1993, perhaps two could be considered inconsequential.
North Carolina transferred 7,815 pounds to New Jersey on
November 18 to cover summer flounder landed by two North
Carolina boats with mechanical problems (Halgren).

They

also made a small transfer of 10,000 pounds to Rhode Island
on December 28 (59 FR 257).

Two transfers to Virginia on

November 8 and November 19 of 125,000 pounds each were quite
sizeable, but could hardly be considered a loss by North
Carolina, as the transfers restored the ability of many of
their boats to continue landing in Virginia.

Their last

transfer of the year, by far the largest, did not rouse as
much controversy as the two transfers to Virginia.

The

250,000 pound request was approved on December 31, the last
day which North Carolina had to use any remaining portion of
their quota.

North Carolina had the option of transferring

what they were unable to use themselves to another state, or
forfeit the balance, with no one to gain.

While no direct

benefit was realized by North Carolina in fulfilling New
Jersey's request, they were able to greatly reduce New
Jersey's overage, a selfless gesture that did not go
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unappreciated.
There are several reasons that state directors may
deliberate a quota transfer.

An unselfish contribution to a

state in need, such as the transfer to New Jersey, allowed
what could not be used by North Carolina to be applied to
New Jersey's overage.

The transfer was made on the last day

of the year, therefore, North Carolina would not be
surrendering pounds that could be landed by their own boats,
because no portion of a previous year's quota can be carried
into the following year.

A transfer of this nature can have

indirect benefits in the long run, as a receiving state will
likely be more receptive to returning a favor if they are
ever called upon to do so.
states may also wish to maintain flexibility to their
fleet to continue landing in a particular state, by
transferring a portion of their quota.

The chapter

regarding the frequency with which the southern fleet lands
in both Virginia and North Carolina reveals just how
dependent these vessels are on both ports, and how important
it is to keep both states open.

In fact, the majority of

licensed trawlers that land in either Virginia or North
Carolina, are boats whose home port is in North Carolina.
As of 1993, there were 7 trawlers licensed in Virginia,
while 140 indicated North Carolina as their home state
(Holmes).

North Carolina would hardly be relinquishing
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their quota if they transferred a portion to Virginia, but
would actually be restoring the ability of their own boats
to land in Virginia when their quota had been reached.

Most

fishermen interviewed from North Carolina, attested that
they had not only landed fluke in Virginia for many years,
but had done so with great frequency.

Several motivations

for doing so have previously been discussed, the most
influential being Oregon Inlet.

Dealers from North Carolina

may also have an interest in transferring quota to Virginia.
There are offloading facilities in Virginia that simply
packout for dealers in North Carolina, which then transport
the fish back to North Carolina, or to its final destination
(Daniels).

Transferring quota to another state does not

necessarily guarantee that all fish landed will be purchased
by dealers from North Carolina with offloading sites in
Virginia or any other state, but it does allow some of the
quota to be landed by North Carolina boats and purchased by
North Carolina dealers (Holmes).
Another potential merit of transferring quota between
states, is to confront the hazardous risks being taken by
some fishermen faced with limited landing options.

As

already discussed, fishermen often take advantage of higher
trip limits in other states.

Some of the fishermen that

were polled indicated that not only did they take advantage
of more favorable trip limits in other states, but they
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planned their fishing trips according to when a particular
state was scheduled to raise its landing limit.

For

example, a vessel operator might leave from port when New
Jersey had a relatively small trip limit in effect.

He

would depart several days before the scheduled increase,
harvest the fish, and land the fluke after New Jersey had
raised its limit.

This strategy worked well if the weather

permitted, and he was able to land after the new trip limit
took effect.

If the weather turned unexpectedly poor, the

captain had several options.

Assuming the fluke aboard the

boat was in excess of New Jersey's possession limit, he
could either steam to a state that had a larger trip limit,
he could discard fluke in excess of the possession limit and
then land in New Jersey, he could keep all of the summer
flounder aboard and be arrested for violating the landing
limit, or he could remain at sea to wait out the storm.
When a trip limit is in effect, not only are fishermen
prevented from landing fluke in excess of the possession
limit, they cannot even possess fluke within state waters.
This precludes them from steaming into state waters for a
safe haven until the weather has subsided.

If the vessel

cannot remain at sea until New Jersey's higher trip limit
takes effect, the only option the captain may have is to
land in North Carolina, where trips are unlimited.
Depending on the severity of prevailing wind conditions, he

160

may be taking undue risks to do so.

Conditions may be such

that it is unsafe to follow a southwesterly course to North
Carolina from his offshore fishing location.

The additional

24 hours steam to Oregon Inlet also means that the vessel
will be at sea an extra day, with weather conditions
worsening every hour.

Another minor factor to consider, is

the fact that because the trip has been unexpectedly cut
short, the vessel may not have harvested the quantity of
fluke necessary to cover the costs of the trip.

The

captain's options may now be reduced to discarding fluke in
excess of New Jersey's limit, face a potential violation, or
stay offshore.
Discarding fluke in excess of the possession limit and
returning to the closest port is an option, albeit an
unpopular one.

Disposing fish of legal size, some of which

can command in excess of $5.00 per pound depending on size
and grade, has been compared by some fishermen to the
equivalent of throwing $100 bills into the ocean.

This

option strikes fishermen as being even more ludicrous when
they consider the fact that in 48 or 72 hours time, their
catch would not be illegal, but would earn them a
respectable trip's wages.
Another alternative, entering a state with more fluke
than is permitted, has been the option of choice exercised
by some permit holders, despite the risks involved.
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A

vessel could go undetected if the fish are never offloaded
until the larger trip limit takes effect, or offloaded, but
not discovered by enforcement officials.

One fisherman that

was interviewed, indicated he had slipped into state waters
to wait until the storm subsided, but did not dock his boat
in port, in order to avoid detection.

Fortunately, he was

not observed, and was able to resume fishing when the
weather cleared.

Another respondent described the ease with

which he could offload illegal quantities of fluke by simply
making arrangements with a buyer (not necessarily a licensed
buyer) from his cellular phone.

He estimated the total time

spent at an obscure location to offload his catch and
receive payment, was less than ten minutes.
Not all fishermen who opt to defy a state's landing
limit do so in a covert manner.

Four fishermen landing in

Connecticut decided to openly defy the state's possession
limit, in an effort to bring to light the challenges they
were encountering as a result of state-by-state quotas.
During the first eight weeks of 1994, New York had unlimited
trip limits, and landings were coming in at a rapid rate.
They implemented an 8,000 pound limit on February 27,
lowered it again on March 13, to 4,000 pounds, and again on
April 3, to 500 pounds, whereupon many boats shifted their
state of landing to Connecticut.

Connecticut's plan

dictates that it lower their quota from 5,000 to 3,000
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pounds when 30% of their quota is reached, and they did so
on March 1.

On March 1, the only states with higher

possession limits than Connecticut, were New Jersey (many
permit holders did not qualify for their limited entry
license, so landing in New Jersey was not an option),
Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina.

These conditions

prompted over 40 out-of-state vessels to land summer
flounder in Connecticut during a two day period, pushing the
state's total over 35% of their annual quota (Beckwith).
They were now depleting quota from the following Spring subperiod quota, which forced the state to institute a 200
pound trip limit, effective April 9.

The notice was made

public on April 7, via faxes to industry members, and
dealers informed vessels that they were in contact with, of
the impending change.

A request was also made to the Coast

Guard to broadcast the change on both the VHS frequency and
the long-range or sideband frequency.

The Coast Guard began

broadcasting the morning of April 8, and agreed to continue
transmitting for the next 18 hours.
Four boats that were fishing offshore, some as far away
as 170 miles, had received word of the change, but felt they
would be unable to reach a port in Connecticut before the
change took effect.

They contacted the Department of

Environmental Protection in Connecticut, to relate their
circumstances, and were told they had several choices.
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They

could go elsewhere to land their catch, they could donate
all fluke in excess of 200 pounds to charity, or they could
be arrested if they attempted to sell fluke in excess of the
trip limit, to a fish buyer.

The four boats decided to land

their catch in Connecticut and be arrested (Smith).
Upon landing their catch, the state of Connecticut
confiscated the fluke in excess of the possession limit of
200 pounds from the four fishermen, and attempted to issue
them a warning.

The fishermen insisted on more than a mere

warning, and asked to be arrested by the Department of
Environmental Protection, in an effort to publicize their
predicament.

They were arrested and charged with possessing

summer flounder in excess of the possession limit, and
released to await their hearing.

The state permitted the

four boats to sell 200 pounds of summer flounder to a
dealer, but the rest was confiscated and sold by the state
at an average cost of $2.00 per pound (Mill):
The charges were later dropped with the condition that
the captains could not commit any fisheries violations
against the state within the following year, or charges
would be brought against the guilty parties.

The money

received from the sale of the fish remains in the state
coffers, and the state has been unable to withdraw the money
from the general fund.

If fish is seized in violation of a

state statute, regardless of whether or not the charges are
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dropped, the state is entitled to these funds (Smith).

The

fishermen are still eagerly awaiting the proceeds from the
sale of their summer flounder.
An interesting side note to this story includes an
alternative that was dropped in favor of the one which the
state chose to execute.

One of the proposals considered by

Connecticut was to allow vessels to continue landing up to
the 3,000-pound limit, while maintaining an ongoing tally of
the number of pounds brought to the docks, and at the point
at which 35% of the quota had been landed, inform any
incoming boats that they could no longer bring fluke in
excess of 200 pounds into the state (Blake).

This scheme

would have prevented any boats, regardless of how close to
shore they were fishing, from making plans to land in
Connecticut before any trip changes were made, because they
would have had no prior warning.

If they were unlucky

enough to enter state waters one hour after the new limit
took effect, they would have to go elsewhere, or be
prosecuted.

The purpose of citing this proposal is not to

suggest the insensitivity of state planners in Connecticut,
but rather, to reveal the extreme lengths that some states
are compelled to consider in order to avoid exceeding their
quotas.
The worse possible choice that fishermen can exercise
when faced with limited landing options, is to remain
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offshore during weather which would otherwise prompt them to
head to port.

A few fishermen that were polled, indicated

that the severity and duration of the storm were deciding
factors in whether they stayed offshore or steamed home.
When the storm was forecasted to pass quickly, and the
intensity was predicted to be moderate, some had taken the
chance and waited out the storm.

Fortunately, no one that

was interviewed had suffered any fatal mishaps, but the
ordeal endured by captain and crew were enough to make them
consider some of the other alternatives, legal or not.
Whether a state seeks to maintain flexibility for its
fleet in another state, wishes to help a state in need, or
is responding to the hazards being taken by fishermen caught
in some of the predicaments described above, there are many
valid reasons for transferring quotas.

Regardless of the

merits for transferring quota, there is likely to be
opposition from industry members in the transferring state.
The reality of Amendment 5 is that it puts state planners
who have to approve such transfers in an onerous position.
Before they can even consider taking such a proposal to
public hearing, they must be certain that their state will
not close early because of a transfer, or that late dealer
reports will not cause an overage that would otherwise have
been covered by the transferred amount.

Even if all of

these conditions have been satisfied, the psychological
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hurdle of surrendering quota to another state does not sit
well with many industry members.
The same can be said for several states combining their
quotas into one regional quota.

None of the eleven states

have equivalent allocations, and putting one's quota into a
collective pool may be equally as unsettling.

An internal

memo issued by the Council prior to the passage of Amendment
2, in reference to alternatives to state-by-state quotas,
expressed reservations for a regional quota because it was
believed that, " ... there was no real mechanism for several
States within a region to coordinate their overall efforts
at management

II

(MAFMC, LISFA-OD-005).

Perhaps they realized

the likelihood of most states surrendering their quotas,
long before Amendment 5 was ever drafted.
North Carolina state directors discovered that the
minority opinion regarding quota transfers was not always
willing to speak out in a public forum.

The state allows

the Fisheries Association, a group comprised of industry
dealers and boat owners from the state, to influence
decisions regarding whether transfers are approved or
disapproved.

One state director found himself in the

awkward position of receiving little or no support for a
transfer at a public meeting, being literally harangued by
industry members for even suggesting a quota transfer.
Those who supported a transfer were either the minority or
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did not carry as much influence as those who were against a
transfer, and were not willing to speak out.

Instead, they

would contact the director in private, often by telephone,
requesting that the state approve the transfer.

This was

frustrating for state directors who knew they had industry
support for a transfer, and despite the slight risk involved
in such a transfer, the majority was against it, usually the
more vocal ones (Spitsbergen).
Requesting a quota transfer can be an equally difficult
prospect for potential recipient states.

Massachusetts

petitioned the state of North Carolina for 50,000 pounds in
1993, following the closure of their state in September.
Several other states had also made requests from North
Carolina, and the state was undecided over whether they
should entertain Massachusetts' request.

The minimal

possession limits established in Massachusetts led state
directors in North Carolina to believe that very few North
Carolina boats had landed summer flounder there, during
1993.

State directors were being persuaded by angry in-

state interests who had given up their longstanding summer
fishery in Massachusetts Vineyard Sound, because many were
no longer able to make profitable trips with such small
possession limits in place.

Massachusetts agreed to raise

their trip limit if they would grant the transfer, whereupon
North Carolina approved the transfer.
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Massachusetts then

learned that they had exceeded their quota by 38,600 pounds,
and would have to apply any transfer to their overage before

they could re-open (Pierce, 1993 p 3).

North Carolina

decided to put Massachusett's request aside until the end of
the year, because they perceived no benefit to their boats
from this transfer (Pierce, 1993 p 3).

Five transfers were

made later in the year from North Carolina, but
unfortunately for Massachusetts, they were not the
recipients of any of them.

Apparently, North Carolina

realized there was no benefit to their industry from this
transfer.
Any state director that is tasked with approving or
disapproving quota transfers is likely to contend with some
very avid opponents.

Regardless of whether the risks

involved in transfers are minimal, strong opposition from
the industry in North Carolina has come out in full force.
Despite the very few numbers of Virginia vessels left in
that state, one North Carolina industry member was "dead
opposed to one pound of fish going to Virginia."

The fear

held by him and others, is that over time, the
relinquishment of quota to Virginia may result in a reduced
share in future years (Holmes).

It is hard to recognize

Amendment 5 as being a solution to the fixed allocations
assigned to states.

While it can help states that have

overages at the end of the year, even this can be a
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politically charged situation, as industry members may be
reluctant to bailout a state they perceive has
irresponsibly managed their quota.

Because the transfer

must be initiated no later than December 31 of each year,
there is no way for transferring states to know if, and how
many, late dealer reports will be submitted after December
31.

North Carolina's generosity in 1993, cost them 23,085

pounds that had to be subtracted from their 1994 quota,
because of late dealer reports.

Incidences like these, make

quota transfers a hard sell to the state industry that
influences these decisions.
While Amendment 5 does allow states to modify the
percentage shares assigned to them, the most important point
to remember is that very few states are even in the position
to contribute generously.

The four transfers made to

Delaware in 1994, from Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, and
North Carolina, totaled less than 5,000 pounds, and had a
negligible impact on the relatively modest quotas of
Maryland and Connecticut.

It is likely that states with

large quotas will not make substantial transfers until the
end of the year approaches anyway, because they must insure
that they have adequate quota reserved for their own state.
It is for this reason that Amendment 5 should not be viewed
as a safety net for states that find they cannot make it
through the year without closing prematurely.
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In the event

that a transfer is initiated before the end of the calendar
year, any potential recipient state must convince the
transferring state that such action will benefit their
industry, too.

The only sizeable transfers made by North

Carolina before December 31, were made to Virginia.

There

was obviously a substantial interest in maintaining the
ability of their boats to continue landing in Virginia.

Any

large requests made from states before December 31, will
have to demonstrate that the transferring state's industry
will greatly benefit from the transfer.

Even if this

requirement has been met, the transfer will probably meet
stiff opposition if the home state "loses" a large portion
of what they have transferred.

For example, a sizeable

transfer from North Carolina to Massachusetts would likely
result in a large portion being landed by Massachusetts
boats, an unsettling prospect for industry members from
North Carolina.

However, Virginia is situated far south,

and the likelihood that out-of-state boats will capture a
large portion of the transferred quota, is less.
Realistically, no other state except Virginia has the
ability to maintain landing flexibility to North Carolina
boats, while minimizing the loss of transferred quota to
out-of-state boats.
Under extreme conditions in which fishermen must make
emergency landings in states because of mechanical problems
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or inclement weather, a transfer still cannot be initiated
before the boat reaches port.

A fisherman can take the risk

of coming to port in violation of a landing limit, and later
petitioning a state to make a quota transfer on his behalf
(this is illegal under current state management plans).

The

two vessels that had to make emergency landings in New
Jersey were fortunate enough to have had a minimal quantity
of fluke aboard, and to have been from North Carolina, a
state with ample quota to cover their landings.

Even if

Amendment 5 were modified to endorse expeditious transfers
for boats landing under emergency situations, or approval
for landings made after-the-fact, captains would still have
no way of knowing whether a state would initiate such a
transfer before they land.

The possibility of facing

prosecution if the transfer is not approved might be a
deterrent for fishermen to choose the other courses of
action discussed above, such as illegally landing the fish,
or remaining at sea under unsafe conditions.
The author suggests that vessels be allowed to possess
fluke in excess of the trip limits under circumstances of
severe weather or mechanical failure, whether it be part of
the federal plan, or included in each states' plans.

During

the time the vessel is at the dock, a decision could be
reached regarding whether or not a transfer will be
approved.

If it is not approved, the vessel should be
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allowed to continue to its planned destination with the
fluke aboard the boat, as soon as the weather permits or the
mechanical problem has been fixed.

This might remove the

risk that some boats are taking when faced with the
circumstances described above.

An appeal was made by the

East Coast Fisheries Federation ten months before Amendment
5 was approved, for states to allow the possession of fluke,
regardless of the status of their quota and trip limits
(O'Malley).

Despite enactment of Amendment 5, which allows

quota transfers, the claim is still a valid one.

Poor

weather conditions can arise quickly with little warning to
fishermen, and the time necessary to approve a quota
transfer is inadequate under these circumstances.

All

states should allow the possession of fluke, regardless of
their offloading limits, to insure that no vessel will take
unnecessary risks offshore, to avoid violating state limits.
The author understands that this clause could trigger
widespread abuse, but a system which requires verification
of mechanical failure or unsafe weather conditions, may
provide a workable solution to this problem.

173

CHAPTER NINE
FEDERAL VERSUS STATE JURISDICTION

Amendment 2 states that the Regional Director, "will
monitor state commercial quotas based on dealer reports and
other available information and shall determine the date
when a state commercial quota will be harvested."

The rule

further states that the Regional Director, "shall publish
notice in the Federal Register advising a state that,
effective upon a specific date, its commercial quota has
been harvested and notify vessel and dealer permit holders
that no commercial quota is available for landing summer
flounder in that state."

Regardless of whether state

officials have also been monitoring their weekly summer
flounder landings and effecting trip limits accordingly, it
is the federal government who has the final directive in
opening and closing states.

The issue regarding how this

decision is reached may be worth examining.
Rhode Island divides their annual quota into three subperiods, the third one occurring from November through the
end of December.

By mid-December of 1993, a 2,000-pound

possession limit was in effect, which the state anticipated
would last until the end of the year.

Upon receiving the

weekly landings report on December 16, the state decided to
reduce the possession limit to 200 pounds on December 17, to
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avoid exceeding their annual quota.

Rhode Island contacted

the state director from North Carolina, to request a 10,000pound quota transfer to carry them through the remainder of
the month, on December 20 (RIDEM, RS2194-1).

They were

contacted on December 20 by NMFS, and told that they were
expected to meet or exceed their annual quota by December
22, necessitating a closure on that day (Roe, 12/93).

The

projection by NMFS was based on the assumption that summer
flounder landings from the previous week would continue at
the same rate, throughout the following week (Goodale).
North Carolina directors immediately agreed to approve the
request on December 20, whereupon Rhode Island was contacted
again by NMFS, and informed that they had actually exceeded
their quota as of December 20, and the transfer could not be
accepted (RIDEM, RS2194-1).

A notice was published in the

Federal Register on December 28, officially closing Rhode
Island to the landing of summer flounder, effective December
22 (58 CFR 68555).
On December 22, Rhode Island received word from NMFS
that the North Carolina transfer could be applied to their
1993 quota, but that the transfer had yet to be officially
approved by the Regional Director.

Earlier in the year,

Rhode Island had requested a transfer of quota from North
Carolina for a different amount.

Because it was a separate

incident, the earlier request could not be substituted for
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their more recent appeal, and the federal approval process
had to begin anew (Sisson).

Rhode Island was also notified

that their annual quota had indeed, not been exceeded, but
since the state had already been officially closed, it had
to be officially re-opened before landings could resume.
Untimely inclement weather severely curtailed fluke
landings, resulting in a paltry total for the week prior to
December 22.

While states do not have to wait for

publication in the Federal Register to re-open a state or
apply a quota transfer (delays in publishing would make this
impractical), they must wait for official approval by the
Regional Director before they can take action (Goodale).
Formal endorsement by the Regional Director could not be
finalized before the weekend, because December 23 was a
half-work day prior to the holiday, resulting in an extended
approval process.
The transfer was approved and Rhode Island was
officially re-opened on December 28.

The prior closure was

also rescinded at this time (59 FR 257).

Despite Rhode

Island being formally closed by the Regional Director on
December 22, the state chose not to enforce the rule, and
allowed boats to continue landing up to 200 pounds per trip.
National Marine Fisheries Service officials were concerned
that this action would put fishermen at risk of violating
federal law, as many fishermen would be unaware of the
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official closed status of the state.
Rhode Island maintains they were first informed of the
Regional Director's action to close the state when they
spoke to officials on December 20.

The state felt their

authority to manage the quota had been preempted, and were
not properly called upon before a decision to close the
state had been reached by federal agents (Sisson).

While

the rule clearly states that the federal government had the
authority to close Rhode Island, but the closure was based
on a projection that did not progress as planned, must the
state wait for another official notice from federal agents
before they can re-open?

If the federal notification that

closed the state was based on projections that never
materialized, should the notice be construed as unfounded,
and therefore disregarded?

This situation left Rhode Island

at the mercy of a decision that both parties agreed was
based on erroneous information.

It would be unfair to

criticize federal agents who projected the landings that
prompted the closure; they were competent officials
employing valid predictions which simply did not
materialize.

The obstacle arises in rectifying the problem

on short notice, becoming a relative impossibility given the
nature of the approval process.

Rhode Island chose to allow

business to continue as usual during the six days it took to
legally bring them into compliance.
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It is interesting to

note that landings continued and no federal arrests were
made during those six days.

Quite possibly federal

officials sympathized with the state, recognizing that their
error might not only be costly to the industry, but could
also give them a legal battle they were not prepared for.
Another issue to consider is, who is more competent at
projecting when a state's quota will be harvested?

Do

federal agents have greater ability in predicting landings
or do state officials?

Some might be inclined to agree that

the state directors who devised their sub-periods and trip
limit allocations would be in closer contact with the
current status of their fishery than federal agents.

To be

fair, one cannot overlook one motivation that state planners
would have in favoring their authority over federal agents.
In the event that a state exceeds its annual quota, the
overage is deducted from the following year's quota.
However, if a state does not land its entire quota, the
portion not harvested cannot be recouped the following year.
The state loses that portion of their allocation, never to
be harvested in future years.

In the instance when the

state's upcoming year's allocation will be higher than their
previous year's allocation, the effects of slightly
exceeding their quota might not even impact the industry.
After the overage is deducted, they will likely still have
more quota than the previous year.
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Thus, there is little

incentive for a state to not slightly exceed its quota under
this scenario; in fact, it is advantageous.

By slightly

overharvesting a portion of the quota, the state insures
that no pound goes unused.
the balance is wasted.

If they undershoot their quota,

Given that no penalty exists for

states that exceed their quota, there may be added incentive
to do so.

Getting back to the issue of who has greater

competency in projecting closures, it is too bad that Rhode
Island could not be relied on to execute this task.

By

dropping the trip limit to 200 pounds on December 17, it
appeared that they were making a concerted effort to keep
landings within their annual allocation.

Actions by federal

officials were completely within their bounds;
unfortunately, they only seemed to create already increasing
tension between the state and federal fisheries officials.
The author proposes that states be allowed to project
their own closures, particularly when it appears they are
not only qualified to do so, but have made every effort in
the past to responsibly manage their quota.

There was no

pre-emption of Rhode Island's rights, because the rule
unambiguously states that the Regional Director has the
authority to close the state.

However, state fisheries

managers should be relied on in the future to determine when
it is appropriate to close their state, unless an incident
in the past has demonstrated that they cannot be trusted to
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do so.

It is regrettable that this situation arose during a

holiday weekend, making it difficult to expedite the
process, but Christmas will continue to come every year at a
time when states may be close to filling their quotas.
states may need quick approval of transfers and re-openings
at a time when federal employees are home for the holidays.
This is not to imply that states can act irresponsibly,
insisting that federal officials abandon their
responsibilities to quickly respond to the states' requests.
The author suggests that the approval process should be
accelerated during these crucial times, to allow all states
to maximize the availability of the commercial quota.
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CHAPTER TEN
DIRECTED FISHERY AND MIXED TRAWL FISHERY ISSUES

During the first year Amendment 2 was in effect, the
exploitation rate of summer flounder was scheduled to be
decreased by 47% (MAFMC, 1991, P 22), resulting in a very
lean quota for 1993.

Landings would be greatly reduced

compared with previous years, and many states' solution to
these reductions was to institute trip limits.

This would

prolong the fishing season for vessel operators, and allow a
continuous supply to dealers.

Most states set trip limits

according to compromises reached between their industry and
the state planners, and support for them was generally very
favorable (Sisson, McKiernan, Mason, et. al.,).

Not all

permit holders endorsed the trip limits established by their
home state, and set out to challenge them.
93% of all summer flounder landings in Rhode Island are
harvested by otter trawl (MAFMC, 1991 P Ill), either in a
directed fishery for summer flounder or for other species,
or in a mixed trawl fishery.

The term, "mixed trawl

fishery" was defined by the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management
Council in late 1993, as 1) an economic activity within the
larger framework of fisheries that is characterized by the
instantaneous selection of target species and appropriate
gear, according to environment (including weather), species
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availability, 2) is usually pursued in a relatively dynamic,
fluctuating, and unpredictable environment of both the
fishing grounds and the market, and 3) commercial otter
trawl fishermen using a single net or multiple nets with
mesh sizes ranging from 1 1/2" to 6" to catch and retain
several different species of demersal and semi-pelagic
species including mackerel, whiting, loligo, butterfish,
summer flounder, scup, black sea bass, etc., during all
seasons of the year ... in many different areas and depths
off the Northeast coast of the United States.

According to

Nils Stolpe of the New Jersey Fishermen's Association,
increasing numbers of fishermen are participating in these
fisheries in response to the narrow choices they are now
faced with.

Many FMPs currently limit entrants, and mixed

trawl fisheries provide as many options as possible in a
system that is becoming increasingly rigid (Stevens, 12/93,
12 A).

Mixed trawl fisheries trips are likely to land less

fluke per trip than directed fluke trips, but the importance
of fluke cannot be underestimated, as it is considered to be
the most commercially valuable species, price per pound,
harvested in this fishery (MAFMC, 1991 P 70).
In contrast to mixed trawl fisheries, directed summer
flounder fisheries harvest more summer flounder per trip,
and do not retain substantial quantities of squid, whiting,
scup, or butterfish, due to the large mesh size employed.
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Several summer flounder permit holders from Rhode Island
that historically engaged in a directed fishery for fluke,
felt their best interest was not being served by the stateestablished possession limits which never exceeded 5,000
pounds.

Unlike the mixed trawl fishery operating in

southern New England waters, boats which directed their
effort on fluke sometimes fished as far away as the
southeastern region of Georges Bank.

This stock was

preferred by some fishermen who had traditionally fished in
this area, because the fish tended to be larger than fluke
caught further inshore, and were worth more per pound
(McCauley, 1994).

Directed fisheries permit holders

maintained that even when they fished in southern New
England waters, they stayed at sea longer.

Because of the

large mesh size used when targeting fluke, they had to fish
longer to retain the quantity necessary to make a profitable
trip.

Directed fisheries fishermen asserted that they were

unable to make profitable trips if they had to travel long
distances or stay at sea longer, while returning to port
with no more than 5,000 pounds of summer flounder.

They

felt that they had made a significant contribution to Rhode
Island's allocation based on landings between 1980-89,
because they landed more summer flounder per trip than mixed
trawl fishery trips throughout these years.

They insisted

that they should be able to utilize the allocation granted
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to Rhode Island, in a manner which allowed them to gainfully
participate in the fishery just as other segments of the
fishery were able to.
A proposal was initiated by the Point Judith
Fisherman's Cooperative to allow certain boats that engage
in a directed fishery for fluke, to land up to a maximum of
10,000 pounds per trip, until 60% of the Rhode Island subperiod quota is caught.

In order to qualify, boats had to

demonstrate they had landed six or more trips of at least
7,000 pounds of fluke between 1991-92 (McCauley, 1993).

The

proposal was not well received by many fishermen, and some
felt it was suggestive of ITQs.

By the time the Rhode

Island Marine Fisheries Council brought the motion to public
hearing, trip limits had been reduced to 200 pounds until
the following sub-period.

The motion was tabled until the

offshore fishery resumed in the late fall (McCauley, 1994).
A second proposal was re-initiated in November by
directed fishery interests from Newport, who claimed they
were unable to continue fishing in this fishery with the
5,000 pound trip limits in force.

Nine permit holders

attested that the trip limits were threatening to end their
fishery, and some had been compelled to switch to a mixed
trawl fishery, exchanging their large mesh for small mesh
nets.

Their proposal recommended trip limits of 15,000

pounds for directed fishery boats (RIFMC, 11/30/93), between
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the months of November and April, which coincides with the
small mesh exemption period.

Enforcement of "directed" and

"mixed trawl" trips could be effected through the exemption
program.

Boats that enrolled in the exemption program,

using small mesh would be held to the 5,000 pound possession
limit.

Those boats engaged in the directed fishery would be

allowed to land up to 15,000 pounds, provided they did not
enroll in the exemption program, and harvested their fluke
with a minimum mesh size of 5 1/2".
The Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council has been
sympathetic to the requests put forth by boats that have had
an historical directed fishery, but their primary
responsibility is insuring that the quota lasts throughout
the year.

Faced with a fixed quota that has forced all

permit holders to make sacrifices, the majority opinion
seems to be that the season should be extended as long as
possible, to keep the boats fishing and dealers continuously
supplied (RIFMC, 11/93).

Some fishermen disagree with this,

pointing out that on average, directed fluke trips and mixed
trawl trips land the same quantity of summer flounder.
Average directed trips last between 8 to 10 days dock to
dock, allowing 2 to 2 1/2 trips per month.

One proposal

suggested limiting the number of directed trips to no more
than 5 in 2 months, or a total of 50,000 pounds (McCauley,
1993), while the other proposal simply capped the directed
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trip limit at 15,000 pounds (RIFMC, 11/93).

Average trip

time for vessels engaged in the mixed trawl fishery is 3 to
5 days, or approximately 6 trips per month.

Under the

status quo, these vessels might land up to 60,000 pounds in
2 months, which is precisely what the proposal recommended
limiting for the mixed trawl fishery (McCauley, 1993).
Under this scheme, directed trip boats could be counted on
to contribute no more to the quota than mixed trawl fishery
boats.
Amendment 2 requires that vessels use a minimum mesh
size of 5 1/2-inch square or 6-inch diamond mesh, except for
those enrolled in the exemption program, which was
incidentally, initiated by southern New England mixed trawl
fishery interests.

The Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management

Council agreed to allow fishermen the use of mesh smaller
than 5 1/2" or 6", provided they did not fish west of
72'30."

Exempted permit holders must agree to take sea

samplers to monitor their trips, to insure the percentage of
undersized fluke does not exceed 10% of their total catch
(57 FR 57358).

The retention of undersized fluke in the

mixed trawl fishery is considered to be slight, but
fishermen in the directed fishery contend that their fishery
retains no undersized fluke.

They believe their gear is

more conservation-oriented, and using a large mesh as the
Plan mandates, should be rewarded with the endorsement of
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Following this fiasco, state agents declared they would
not show tolerance in the future.

It was a difficult lesson

to learn, but from now on, Rhode Island will issue a rule,
carry it out, and those caught in violation will be
prosecuted (Sisson).

Given the short time span between

issuing and implementing emergency regulations, it is often
difficult to disseminate the information to everyone,
especially out-of-state permit holders, and offering a grace
period is the state's way of doing everything it can to work
with the industry during these difficult times.
Unfortunately, it seems that grace periods do little more
than augment the problems they attempt to resolve.

Given

the short span of time that states have to work with when
effecting emergency actions, it is often difficult to
dispatch the information to everyone.

Federal fisheries

officials have been known to show leniency when enacting
regulations, both emergency rules, and those effected by
routine manner.

For example, when the exemption program

ends every year on April 30, fishermen are no longer allowed
to fish with mesh smaller than 5 1/2" if retaining more than
100 pounds of summer flounder.

The customary practice over

the last few years, has been to allow any vessel that has
departed before the April 30 date (must have receipts to
provide documentation), to continue fishing under the
provisions of the exemption program until the trip is
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completed, regardless if the trip ends several days into the
month of May (Roe, 4/26/93).

Despite good intentions,

unofficial grace periods should not be contemplated by
states that find themselves in the same predicament that
Rhode Island did.

The researcher suggests that Rhode

Island's new policy for enforcing an emergency rule be the
preferred course of action (disallowing unofficial grace
periods), but allow more adequate time between the issuance
and enforcement of such rules, with a reserve quota set
aside to compensate for any overages.
Some of the preceding suggestions would likely improve
the states' ability to manage their quotas more effectively.
Enforcing compliance with weekly reporting, reserving a
portion of the quota for emergencies, and adhering to plans
which provide ample notice would all go a long way towards
promoting a more agreeable approach to state-by-state quota
management.

Another condition which limits the states

ability to manage quotas effectively, is the percentage
shares which are fixed.

This system essentially insures

that future landing ratios from state-to-state will remain
the same as past landing ratios (the exception is for those
states that are able to obtain additional quota from other
states during a given year).

This does not allow a great

deal of accommodation for changes which are compelling
fishermen to land summer flounder in states other than those
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which they had previously landed.

Some of these occurrences

have been longstanding, while others have been more recent.
The following developments have occurred apart from the
passage of Amendment 2, while the subsequent chapter
describes those which have occurred as a result of Amendment
2.

Their influence on traditional landing patterns along

the east coast is challenging the fixed state shares that
remain the same from year to year (unless a quota transfer
takes place).
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CHAPTER FOUR
FACTORS INFLUENCING LANDING PATTERNS

Amendment 2 allocates shares of the summer flounder
coastwide quota to individual states, based on historical
landings in those states, during the years 1980-89.

The

percentage assigned to each state is assumed to be an
average representation of landing patterns that occurred
during those ten years, and should be regarded as nothing
more than that.

The temptation to assume that past landing

activities are an indication of what fishermen will do in
the future, should be avoided.

Summer flounder may continue

to be landed among states on average, in the same proportion
as it has historically been, or the ratios may radically
change as fishermen decide to land their catch elsewhere.
While this statement may be considered obvious, one should
consider what the implications would be if landing patterns
were held in a static state, allowing little or no latitude
for variation.

There are many factors that compel fishermen

to alter their fishing practices, including environmental,
economic, and geographical influences.

Fishermen do not

operate on irrational impulses, and changes they make are
done so to gain a competitive advantage over one another.
If they are required to follow trends that occurred in past
years, they may be unable to respond to current changes that
compel them to modify their operations.
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Regard the

plans to construct two jetties at the mouth of the inlet
were proposed.

Encouraged by the jetty proposal and a

federal project to create an industrial park on Roanoke
Island, the Wanchese Fish Company began expanding their
business in the 1970's, in anticipation of a revitalized
oregon Inlet.

As time passed, the jetties began to draw

more criticism from environmentalists and scientists, and
construction was continually delayed.

The funds for the

industrial park never materialized, and dealers and
processors were reluctant to establish operations in a port
whose future was uncertain.

Many businesses, including the

Wanchese Fish Company, built additional offloading
facilities or relocated entire establishments north to
Virginia, realizing that the ongoing debate over the jetties
could take years to resolve, and possibly would not be
decided in their favor (Bates, p 5).
Oregon Inlet is a federally authorized navigational
channel, which makes it eligible for federal funds to
support ongoing dredge efforts.

The entrance is constantly

migrating southward, as the south shore erodes at a rate of
100 feet per year, depositing sand along the north shore of
Bodie Island (Dolan, p 31).

The Army Corps of Engineers

attempts to maintain the channel at a minimum depth of 14
feet, at a cost of $4 to $5 million every year.

The Army

Corps employs two types of dredges at Oregon Inlet, the
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Schweitzer dredge and a hopper dredge.

The Schweitzer

dredge operates year round, weather permitting, casting sand
60 feet, from side-to-side.

It typically operates between

the port of Wanchese and the ebb shoal that accumulates
along the ocean side of the barrier island.

The hopper

dredge is used to maintain the navigational channel,
depositing dredge spoils on nearby Pea Island.

An aerial

survey is performed annually to locate areas of heavy
shoaling, and the hopper dredge is deployed to these areas
as needed (Miller).
According to local fishermen who have used the inlet
for many years, the problem is greater for larger boats that
have joined the fleet over the last ten to fifteen years.
These larger boats (90 feet) displace more water than the
smaller vessels (60 feet)

(Spitsbergen), requiring a channel

up to 20 feet deep for safe navigation (Bates, p 5).
Despite the Army Corps' best attempt to maintain the channel
at a minimum depth of 14 feet, it is not possible to sustain
this depth 365 days a year, given the rapid
sands can shift in the inlet.

rat~

at which

A large swell in the inlet

makes crossing a relative impossibility.

There must be a

calm sea present to prevent vessels from being plunged into
underlying sand bars.

There is also the problem of knowing

exactly where the maximum depth in the channel lies, and
charts for this purpose are unavailable.
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Such charts would

be outdated overnight, and the only aid to guide seafarers
are the channel markers.

These only delineate the

boundaries of the channel, and captains who have traversed
this inlet will be the first to caution that following a
course midway between two channel markers is a proven
technique for running aground.

The way to cross without

incident seems to simply be familiar with the inlet, a task
that is not mastered overnight.
Changes in the inlet from year-to-year do not go
unnoticed, as people working in and around the harbor will
verify.

More crossings than usual were observed by some

local residents (Daniels), during the 1993 season, when
strong westerly winds off the coast of North Carolina, moved
the large ebb shoal that typically builds up outside of the
inlet, further offshore.

This in turn, made less sand

available to wash shoreward to obstruct the inlet.

Even the

Corps reported less activity of the Schweitzer dredge during
this year (Miller).
While some captains regard the hazards of Oregon Inlet
as part of their day-to-day operations, others have decided
the risk is too great, and choose to land their catch
elsewhere.

According to one vessel insurer from North

Carolina, there is little doubt the inlet is causing some
captains to land in Virginia, but they have continued to
maintain coverage to all of their clients, regardless of the
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state of the inlet (Cooper).
The Daniels family has owned and operated a large

commercial fishing operation for many years, in North
Carolina, Virginia, and Massachusetts.

Conditions had

deteriorated at the inlet so severely by 1981, that their
insurer made it clear their vessels would not be covered if
lost on a sand bar, while navigating the inlet.

The added

threat of uninsured losses to their boats, was the decisive
basis the Daniels needed to look for more accessible
locations in Virginia.

They set up packing facilities out-

of-state to minimize chances of losing their vessels in
Oregon Inlet.
North Carolina possesses the largest share of the
commercial summer flounder quota.

Industry members concede

that most of North Carolina's landings, as well as a large
percentage of Virginia's historical summer flounder
landings, were landed by boats whose primary situs is North
Carolina (Holmes 20A).

Captains from North Carolina have

traditionally enjoyed the flexibility of landing in Virginia
when conditions at Oregon Inlet do not allow safe
navigation, or during the winter trawl season when they are
fishing in waters closer to Virginia.

Many of the dealers

in Virginia serve as nothing more than offloading
facilities, where a packout fee is paid to employees at the
site.

Most of the summer flounder landed in Virginia is
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boxed and transported to North Carolina, to be processed and
shipped to its destination (Daniels).
Fishermen and vessel insurers agree that Oregon Inlet
has held longstanding notoriety among the fishing community,
and that the prudent vessel operator unfamiliar with the
inlet's tides and shifting sands would think twice before
making the crossing.

Over a dozen fishermen have died in

the last 25 years, while trying to navigate Oregon Inlet
(Glass 12A).

It is no wonder the Coast Guard deemed Oregon

Inlet, "the most difficult channel on the east coast" in
1983 (Bates, p 6).

It is untimely for fishermen, but when

summer flounder are most plentiful offshore during the fall
and winter, it is also the time when it is most difficult to
dredge the inlet (Miller).

While these conditions are only

a few of the hazards that exist at Oregon Inlet, they are
not temporary events, and will likely continue.

The concern

held by the author is that there is now an additional
determinant that fishermen may incorporate into their
choices regarding where they can land summer flounder, one
that may cause them to take risky chances.

This new

component is the realization by the southern fleet that once
the Virginia quota is filled, they will likely have to land
summer flounder in North Carolina.

Fishermen may

reluctantly land in North Carolina (ignoring safety
concerns), to reserve as much of the North Carolina quota
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for later in the year.

In the event the Virginia quota is

filled before the end of the year (or between April and

September when trip limits are low), fishermen may no longer
have a choice, and will land at Oregon Inlet, despite their
best judgment not to do so.

The author believes that

fishermen must maintain their flexibility to land in
Virginia as they have done in the past, for both the sake of
convenience and safety.

TURTLE EXCLUDER DEVICES

All sea turtles of the western Atlantic ocean are
classified as either threatened or endangered, as defined in
the Endangered Species Act of 1973.

Section 7 of the Act

mandates that a consultation be initiated between federal
agencies and NMFS, if there is any likelihood that
threatened or endangered marine species will be affected by
any activities (16 USC 1531).

Turtles begin their annual

southerly and offshore migration when water temperatures
begin to drop in early fall and winter, at the same time
when commercial trawlers are
flounder fishery.

actively engaged in the summer

Numerous occurrences of sea turtle /

fishing vessel interactions have been documented in coastal
waters of North Carolina, prompting ongoing monitoring of
sea turtle deaths in the area, since 1982.
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During the

winter fishery of 1982, 144 sea turtle strandings were
recorded, along North Carolina beaches.

This prompted the

first consultation required under section 7, and NMFS issued
a biological opinion concluding that future existence of sea
turtles was not threatened by the summer flounder fishery.
The opinion also required that all future captures by the
summer flounder fishery be recorded (56 FR 63687).
Following the 1990-91 winter trawl season, there were
75 documented sea turtle strandings along the coast of North
Carolina (57 FR 53603), prompting a second Biological
Opinion.

This time, NMFS concluded that further

unrestricted trawling in the summer flounder fishery would
threaten future existence of the Kemp's ridley sea turtle
(57 FR 53603).
A 90-day emergency interim rule was initiated in
response to the Biological Opinion, establishing tow time
restrictions in the summer flounder trawl fishery on
December 2, 1991.

Summer flounder fishermen fishing in

waters between Cape Charles (37'05") and the North Carolina
/ South Carolina border (33'35"), seven miles from the
shoreward boundary of the EEZ, were required to observe 75minute tow times.

The emergency rule was modified on

December 27, shifting the northern boundary to Oregon Inlet
(35'45").

This change was supported by the monitoring and

assessment program's determination that there were
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insignificant numbers of sea turtles north of 35'45" to
justify tow-time restrictions (57 FR 213).

Another 90-day

emergency extension was issued, effective March 6, 1992, and
continued the 75-minute tow time until June 3, 1992 (57 FR
8582).

Incidentally, North Carolina had already closed

state waters to trawling for 19 days, in December of 1990
because of potential sea turtle encounters (MAFMC, 1991 P
80), and imposed emergency regulations from October 28, 1991
to April 1992 (56 FR 63685).
Observers reported 83 incidental catches of sea turtles
and a 26% level of compliance with the tow time
restrictions, during the 1991-92 winter trawl season.

NMFS

and NCDMF concluded that the future existence of sea turtles
would be jeopardized if more rigorous measures were not
imposed.

Tow times had been instituted because NMFS had yet

to certify a TED suitable for the summer flounder fishery
(56 FR 63688).

Three NMFS-approved TEDs had been approved

in time for the 1992-93 season, and a temporary 30-day rule
was issued effective November 15, 1992, requiring all
fishermen fishing in the summer flounder trawl fishery in
all waters between Cape Charles (37'05"), Virginia and the
North Carolina / South Carolina border (33'35"), to tow a
TED (57 FR 53603).

Several more temporary rules were

issued, one 30-day rule, effective December 16 (57 FR
60135), and another, effective January 7, which relocated
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the northern boundary to Oregon Inlet (35'46")

(58 FR 4088).

A 60-day interim rule was issued February 10, 1993, and
established a sea turtle protection area from Cape Charles
(37'05") to the North Carolina / South Carolina border
(33'35"), but allowed for modifications to boundaries if
data supported these changes.

Consequently, the northern

boundary was temporarily re-established at 35'46" (Oregon
Inlet), in response to recorded lower sea surface
temperatures, and the recognition that summer flounder
fishermen were more apt to trap greater quantities of bottom
debris in their trawls north of Oregon Inlet.

TEDs in

current use were found to have excessive clogging problems,
and pending improvement of the devices, NMFS relocated the
northern boundary (58 FR 8554).
Amendment 2 to the summer flounder FMP imposes a wide
range of sea turtle conservation measures, but they remain
suspended if temporary rules are published in the Federal
Register, as they have been since 1991 (57 FR 57358).
Temporary rules give the Regional Director flexibility to
adjust time and area restrictions to conform to the presence
or absence of sea turtles.

The 1993-94 trawl season opened

with the northern boundary at Cape Charles (37'05")

(59 FR

48797), and was relocated southward to Oregon Inlet on March
1 (35'46").

Once again, the likelihood of sea turtle

encounters north of 35'46" had diminished to nearly zero,
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with the prevailing water temperatures (59 FR 10584).
Reducing the size of the regulated areas when

conditions support it, still has not changed the opinions of
many fishermen's attitudes towards TEDs, as many are still
reluctant to use them.

Some report that they break while at

sea (Spitsbergen), that they are dangerous while trying to
maneuver, they create additional costs for the fishermen,
and that the loss of finfish prevents them from making a
profitable trip (Carltillet).

It was not until October

1993, that NMFS approved two new TEDs that, in addition to
satisfying a turtle escapement of 97% or greater, they also
specifically conformed to the needs of the summer flounder
trawl (58 FR 54066).
Given the low compliance rate of tow time restrictions
prior to mandatory TEDs use, it should have come as no
surprise that fishermen would relocate to other fishing
grounds, to avoid using what they perceived to be a
hindrance to productive fishing operations.

In a memo

issued by North Carolina's state director, prior to
implementation of Amendment 2, it was speculated that
fishermen would do just this.

They suspected fishermen

might not only fish north of the regulated area to avoid
using a TED, but would also land north of the area to avoid
traveling the extra distance (Hogarth, 1992).

In fact, this

is exactly what was observed during the 1992-93 winter trawl
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season, as trawlers reported that they had fished further
north during the 1992-93 trawl season than in previous
years.
Many fishermen have informed state directors, the
press, or anyone else willing to listen, that mandatory TEDs
use is driving them northward (Stevens 2/94, Harris).
Labelled as a nightmare by one fisherman (Carltillet), he
made it precisely clear that he was fishing north of the
regulated area, for the sole reason of avoiding the use of a
TED.

Fishermen reported that all other things being equal,

such as abundance of fish in the area, they simply did not
want to tow a TED and would continue working a little
further north to avoid using one.
The final rule for sea turtle conservation is still
pending, and the northern boundary will likely be
established at Cape May, New Jersey during certain months of
the year (Coogan).

While this new boundary will probably be

shifted southward during times of moderate to negligible
summer flounder fishing activity, it might influence
fishermen much in the same manner as it did when the
regulated areas were further south.

In an effort to avoid

using TEDs, fishermen will fish even further north than they
have in the past.

If the landing limits at that time are

favorable in states further north, they may opt to land in
these states, because they are closer to their fishing
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location.

Again, their flexibility to do so will be

dictated by the current trip limits in the northern states.
More than likely, they will not be as favorable as those in
North Carolina, so they will head south to land their catch,
adding needless extra time at sea to do so.

STOCK SHIFT

There are many factors that affect concentrations of
fish populations, including salinity, wind speed and
direction, ocean currents, upwellings, and presence of
predators (Glantz).

Presence or absence of particular

species in certain areas are known to be a direct function
of water temperature fluctuations, and prevalence can often
be predicted by these temperatures, among other factors
(Murawski & Finn).

There is growing interest in the effects

of temperature "anomalies" on the distribution of species.
Much of what has been studied so far, has been in response
to global warming predictions, and what impacts it will have
on marine life as sea surface temperatures begin to rise
(Glantz p 40).
Certain species are very sensitive to bottom and
surface water temperature changes (Murawski, p 654), while
others, such as summer flounder, appear to exhibit moderate
variation in distribution.

It is unlikely that fishermen
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detect subtle changes in salinity or upwellings when
fishing; however, most modern vessels are equipped to
monitor surface water temperature, and many fishermen log
temperature readings during the course of their trips.
Because many species are driven by changes in temperature,
it is important for fishermen to note how abundance is
affected by temperature.

Many captains will fish

traditional grounds during certain times of the year when
prevailing temperatures support optimal conditions for the
fish.

Recording these temperatures from year to year,

allows fishermen to predict when fish will migrate to a
given area, based on these optimal temperatures.
During the 1992-93 winter trawl season, fishermen from
North Carolina reported that summer flounder were more
abundant in areas slightly north of where they had
traditionally fished in previous years.

The availability of

fish was not as great in fishing grounds further south where
they had historically fished, and many fishermen noted the
presence of warmer than usual water temperatures
(Spitsbergen, et. al.,).

Upon reviewing their log books

from previous years, they found the temperatures that had
brought fluke to fishing grounds in the south, were the same
temperatures they were observing in waters further north.
Many believed the warmer than normal water temperature was
the reason the stock had migrated further north.

110

While Oregon Inlet and TEDs have a strong influence on
fishermen's

fishing

and landing patterns,

they may have a

choice of other options with respect to these influences (ie:

they don't have to fish north of the regulated area,

but

simply choose to).

The same cannot be said for the relative

abundance of fish.

Fishermen's fishing patterns will always

be a direct function of the locale of the summer flounder
stock.

It seems there is no choice on the part of fishermen

with respect to this

factor

-

wherever the fish

are,

the

fishermen will follow.
There are many reasons fishermen choose the location they
do to harvest and land their catch.

Whether the decision is

influenced by a belief that they have discovered the optimal
fishing

grounds,

or

because

they

have

secured

a

special

arrangement with a fish buyer in another state, fishermen are
constantly striving for a competitive advantage over other
fishermen.
notable

Recent environmental and political changes had a

impact on the manner

in which the

southern fleet

operated during the 1992-93 winter trawl season.

The New

England Fishery Management Council recognized this phenomenon
several months after Plan implementation,

identifying both

Oregon Inlet and the current TEDs regulations as factors that
were

driving

(Marshall).

North

Carolina

boats

to

land

in

Virginia

If these events serve to illustrate anything, it

is that vessel operators can be counted on to respond to
changes

in the

fishery;

that past behavior
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should not be

considered evidence of what will occur in the future.

Many

will break from past tradition to gain the competitive edge
that has allowed them to prosper in the past.
The

intent of

sUb-dividing the

overall quota was

to

apportion it such that all permit holders would have equal
access to the seasonal fisheries, as eleven states could micro
manage their quota to accommodate various interests.
landings patterns from the

Using

last ten years was the fairest

means of allocating the shares, but it also provided a useful
indicator of

the

frequency

with which

landed in each of the eleven states.

summer

flounder

Hypothetically,

is
the

percentages shares assigned to each state should cause the
least amount of disruption to the industry.

Landings will be

reduced over historical landings during the rebuilding years
because the quota will be set low, and boats will not be able
to land the same quantity as they previously had,
percentage

shares

will

supposedly

insure

that

proportion will be landed from state-to-state.

but the
the

same

This seems to

be the most logical approach, but so many changes have taken
place

in

the

last

introduction of
breaking

from

the
their

few

years,

Plan

some

itself,

traditional

of

which

that many
landing

include

the

fishermen

are

practices.

The

concern held by the author js that fishermen's choices may be
guided less by their common sense for security and safety, and
more by the narrow options they now have.
chapter

will

reveal

that

fishermen
112

have

The following
indeed,

changed

traditional landing patterns in response to fewer options, and
the degree to which they have changed.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE SURVEY

FREQUENCY OF OUT-OF-STATE LANDINGS

In addition to biological influences such as shifts in
abundance of fish populations, management measures including
TEDs, and the physical constraints of landing at Oregon
Inlet year-round, there are many other factors that compel
fishermen to land summer flounder out-of-state.

For

example, many respondents indicated that both before and
after Amendment 2, they had landed out-of-state because the
area they were fishing was closer to that state, and have
been doing so for many years to save both money and time
spent at sea.

Almost all respondents related that inclement

weather had at one time or another, forced them to land
summer flounder outside their home state.

Others indicated

that a more competitive price had been offered by dealers in
another state, prompting them to land out-of-state.

While

there are innumerable reasons that collectively influence
fishermen's choice of where to land summer flounder, the
researcher sought to determine if the newly imposed state
landing limits had become a new component in their
decisions, and to what degree.
There are clearly differences in the manner in which
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states have chosen to manage their commercial quota.
Because all eleven states have implemented different
schedules, the likelihood that different trip limits will
exist from state-to-state at any given time of the year, is
quite good.

One of the hypotheses proposed in the research

suggests that fishermen land in different states at
different times of the year, to take advantage of more
favorable possession limits.

The researcher offered survey

participants several choices as to why they had landed
summer flounder out-of-state before Amendment 2, and after
Amendment 2 was implemented.

While the survey did not

attempt to identify all of the reasons that fishermen land
their catch out-of-state, it did attempt to determine if
fishermen are now doing so because more opportune landing
limits exist elsewhere, a condition that did not exist prior
to Amendment 2.
All 17 fishermen from Massachusetts, and all 8
fishermen from Rhode Island indicated that they were landing
summer flounder out-of-state to take advantage of more
favorable trip limits in other states, after Amendment 2 had
been passed.

Both of these states impose a range of

possession limits throughout the year, and the participants'
responses revealed that they were landing out-of-state when
the limits in their home state were not as beneficial as
those in other states.
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In contrast to the fishermen from New England, none of
the 7 fishermen from North Carolina specified better landing
limits as a reason for landing fluke out-of-state.

This is

logical if one recalls that North Carolina is the only state
that does not impose trip limits throughout the year, which
means that there is no other state that offers more
advantageous possession limits than North Carolina.

MOTIVATIONS FOR LANDING OUT-OF-STATE

After identifying opportune landing limits as a reason
for landing summer flounder out-of-state, the researcher
sought to determine if fishermen were landing out-of-state
more often than they had in previous years, for this reason.
It was believed that captains had not only been influenced
by the establishment of new landing limits, but that their
out-of-state landings had dramatically increased because
they were taking advantage of better trip limits elsewhere.
The questionnaire revealed that fishermen from all
three states were landing fluke more often in a state other
than their home state, during 1993 and 1994.

Seventeen

respondents from Massachusetts, 8 from Rhode Island, and 6
from North Carolina related that they were landing out-ofstate with greater frequency because of possession limits.
For example, the average of all Massachusetts fishermen
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polled indicated that they were landing out-of-state five
times more often per year after Amendment 2 was passed,
because of preferable trip limits in other states (this
figure would likely have been higher if the survey had been
administered at the end of 1994).

The willingness of

Massachusetts fishermen to land out-of-state to take
advantage of more favorable possession limits, is also
evidenced by the number of fishermen who had never landed
summer flounder at a port outside of Massachusetts before
Amendment 2, but did so for the first time following the
establishment of state-by-state quotas.

Out of 17

Massachusetts respondents, 13 had never landed fluke out-ofstate before.

Of these 13 fishermen that had landed out-of-

state for the first time, 12 cited higher trip limits as the
sole reason.
In addition to most of the Massachusetts fishermen
never having landed out-of-state, many had very little
participation in the summer flounder fishery prior to
Amendment 2, but the dwindling groundfish fishery and the
new regulations contained in Amendment 5 to the Multispecies
Plan had prompted them to target summer flounder.

Former

rules required a minimum mesh size of 5 1/2" in the
restricted mesh areas to retain regulated groundfish
species, but new regulations effected in early 1994,
increased the mesh size to 6.0".
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Many fishermen had not

purchased the required gear to fish for species regulated
under Amendment 5 to the Multispecies Plan, and switched to
summer flounder, because they already had the legal nets
mandated under the Summer Flounder FMP.
While survey participants revealed the degree to which
their out-of-state landings have increased, landings data
obtained from the National Marine Fisheries Service and the
state of Rhode Island also support these claims.

During the

month of February 1994, Massachusetts reduced its possession
limit from 5,000 pounds to 100 pounds on February 5.
Despite Rhode Island effecting emergency regulations to
curtail out-of-state landings by reducing their limit from
5,000 to 2,000 pounds on February 7, Massachusetts boats
continued to land summer flounder in Rhode Island.

National

Marine Fisheries Service weighouts indicate that over
160,000 pounds of fluke was landed in Rhode Island by
Massachusetts boats alone, between February 5 and February
26 (RIDEM, 3/16/94).

Further supporting the claim that

fishermen land out-of-state when trip limits are more
favorable elsewhere, is the number of Massachusetts boats
that offloaded only fluke, and no other species, in Rhode
Island.

During the last three weeks of February, at least

60 trips were documented for Massachusetts boats that had
sold only their fluke in Rhode Island, and landed all other
species in Massachusetts.

These 60 trips represent
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Massachusetts boats that offloaded their fluke to
Massachusetts dealers at a site in Rhode Island, who then
transported the fluke by truck back to Massachusetts.
Because all other species were not regulated by trip limits
at the time, it was more cost-effective for dealers to
transport only the fluke from Rhode Island to Massachusetts,
and allow the boats to bring the rest of the catch to the
dealer's site in Massachusetts (Gouvea).
The average increase in out-of-state landings for Rhode
Island respondents was four times greater after Amendment 2.
As with Massachusetts fishermen, the Rhode Island fishermen
that were polled had rarely landed fluke out-of-state during
the three years before Amendment 2, but all had done so
after.

Only 3 of the respondents had landed out-of-state

prior, while all 8 had landed out-of-state after.

Of the 3

that landed out-of-state before, their incentives for doing
so varied (ie: closer to fishing location, inclement
weather), while 7 of the 8 that landed fluke after Amendment
2, had landed out-of-state exclusively because more
favorable trip limits had compelled them to do so.
Upon discussing motivations with Rhode Island
fishermen, many indicated that higher trip limits would be
contemplated under the following circumstances.

If

neighboring states had higher limits, they might land outof-state regardless of whether they were engaged in a
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directed fishery (catching large quantities of fluke), or
participating in an incidental fishery (catching moderate
quantities of fluke).

However, the instances when

neighboring states have higher limits than Rhode Island is
not as often as with Massachusetts, therefore the incentive
to land summer flounder out-of-state in a neighboring state
was not as high as it was with Massachusetts fishermen.
Incidentally, Massachusetts has since enacted a rule which
states that at no time will their limit be higher than a
neighboring state's limit (MDMF 322 CMR).

Landing out-of-

state in a state much further away from where they normally
would have landed to take advantage of higher trip limits
(usually unlimited), was only contemplated by fishermen
engaged in a directed fishery.

Vessels fishing in a mixed

trawl fishery typically did not retain large quantities of
fluke (ie: 10,000 or more pounds), and travelling to distant
states was not cost-effective, considering the amount of
fluke they had to sell.

Directed fisheries however, harvest

enough fluke to make the distance travelled worthwhile, and
some Rhode Island fishermen in a directed fishery had
travelled as far away as North Carolina to offload.
One Rhode Island respondent's story is especially
poignant, but the consequences experienced by he and his
crew resulting from landing out-of-state, are not unique.
Engaged in a directed summer flounder fishery in offshore
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southern New England waters, the captain's state of
preference to land would normally have been Rhode Island,
but trip limits were in effect.

The only state with

unlimited landing limits at that time of the year was North
Carolina, so the fisherman made plans to land his catch in
the port of Wanchese for the first time during his fishing
career.

To avoid the risk of receiving less money from an

out-of-state dealer, an arrangement between the captain and
a Rhode Island dealer was made prior to the fishing trip.
While in North Carolina, the Rhode Island dealer had to pay
an offloading "fee to an on-site dealer.

The captain

estimated that the offloading costs he usually paid when
engaging in business in Rhode Island, were comparable to the
unloading fee that was passed along to him by the Rhode
Island dealer, at the North Carolina site.

Incidentally,

this offloading fee that he customarily paid when selling to
a dealer in Rhode Island, incorporated trucking costs.
Because the boat was offloaded in North Carolina, the dealer
incurred additional trucking and selling costs, costs that
were previously not borne by the Rhode Island boat.

These

additional expenses had to be recouped by the dealer, and
some of the costs were passed along to the boat.

The

captain estimated that he received 5 to 10 cents less per
pound for his fluke, or $1650-$3300 less for the trip,
because of these extra costs.
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There were other economic costs that were sustained by
the vessel, including added fuel and crew expenses.

Had the

fisherman landed in Rhode Island, his trip itinerary would
have consisted of 1/2 day to steam to the fishing grounds,
3-4 days fishing, and 1/2 day to return to port in Rhode
Island.

His trip to North Carolina commenced with a 1/2 day

steam to the fishing grounds, 4 1/2 days fished, 2 1/2 days
steam to North Carolina, 2 days detained in port due to
unfavorable conditions for leaving (this is a common
occurrence in Oregon Inlet, as it must be daylight and a
calm sea in order to depart), and 2 1/2 days steam home.
The captain and crew were away from home 7 days longer than
they would normally have been had they landed in Rhode
Island, incurred 7 additional day's expenses to feed the
crew, spent an extra 4 1/2 days burning fuel, and received
less money while incurring additional costs.
If lost income and needless time away from home had not
created sufficient hardship, running aground three times in
Oregon Inlet guaranteed that this trip was to be anything
but routine.

The difficulties in navigating Oregon Inlet

are a challenge to any experienced captain that does not
customarily traverse this waterway, and the unavailability
of charts (sands shift too rapidly) ensure that trial and
error may be the only means for a novice to find the safest
route to the port in Wanchese.
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Asked if he would subject

himself and his crew to such a taxing ordeal in the future,
the captain responded that it was quite possible - where
else can one offload 10,000-15,000 pounds of summer flounder
in one trip?
North Carolina respondents also had higher occurrences
of out-of-state landings not due to more favorable trip
limits, but rather, because of more unfavorable trip limits
in other states.

While the average of all North Carolina

respondents was a fourfold increase, there were some
respondents whose out-of-state landings were much greater
than the average, and others whose out-of-state landings had
dropped to zero.

Many North Carolina fishermen indicated

that they had landed out-of-state in the past, when their
fishing grounds were closer to the state they were landing
in.

Regardless of whether they were fishing in coastal

waters of Massachusetts during the spring fishery, or
offshore fishing during the winter months, their trip
lengths were consistent throughout the year - between 8 to
10 days.

Prior to Amendment 2, they landed in northern

states during the spring and summer fishery, and in southern
states during the fall and winter fishery, but continued to
maintain their average trip length.

With the institution of

trip limits, they were often limited to 500 pounds per trip
if landing in Massachusetts during the spring and summer
fishery, or 300 pounds when landing in New York during the
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summer months.

For those fishermen who decided to continue

targeting summer flounder as they had always done, some were
now making at least 22 trips per month, compared to their
previous 2 to 3 trips per month.

Fishermen were not just

landing daily, but sometimes twice a day, depending on how
close their fishing destination was to their offloading
site.

Of the 6 fishermen polled, 4 had taken up the

practice of making daily or twice daily landings in 1993 in
the states of Massachusetts and New York, during the spring
and summer fishery.

By 1994, 3 of the 4 had stopped landing

in Massachusetts, but all 4 were still making the frequent
trips out of New York.

Incidentally, New York has recently

ended the ability of captains to land more than once, during
a 24-hour period.

This new rule was prompted by the

numerous occurrences of twice daily landings in the state
(Mason).
The 2 North Carolina fishermen whose out-of-state
landing occurrences dropped after Amendment 2, noted that
they could not make profitable trips under this plan because
of higher fixed costs, or were simply unwilling to succumb
to the nuisance of landing once or twice per day, and
diverted their effort to other species.

For them, it meant

targeting shrimp in Pamlico Sound or monkfish offshore,
other species which are heavily overfished.
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HIGHER COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH LANDING OUT-OF-STATE

The costs of maintaining a vessel are either fixed or
variable, the variable costs being directly related to the
amount of activity the boat engages in.

Fixed costs may

include vessel insurance, debt, depreciation, and routine
repairs.

Fuel, maintenance, wages, ice, food, sales and

unloading fees are all variable costs, directly proportional
to the amount of time spent at sea.

This may include both

time spent fishing, and the time travelling in-between
fishing grounds, and to and from port (MAFMC, 1991 P 46).
The researcher sought to answer whether or not there
were higher costs associated with landing summer flounder
out-of-state more often, and to identify what some of these
costs were.

Respondents were asked to identify certain

costs which were incurred as a result of landing out-ofstate, both before and after Amendment 2 was implemented.
Survey participants were offered several choices including:
1) out-of-state permit costs, 2) operational costs (fuel,
ice, etc.,), 3) receiving less money from an unfamiliar outof-state dealer, 4) waiting longer to be paid from an outof-state dealer, 5) increased costs to pay an out-of-state
lumper, and 6) other.

The options offered to the

respondents were ones which the researcher believed to be
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the major costs, but were certainly not inclusive of all
possible costs.

The choice "other" was offered to allow

respondents to reference any other costs which were not
listed.
Of the 16 Massachusetts permit holders polled, the
majority indicated that they had accrued higher permit costs
and higher operational costs.

Twelve of the 16 permit

holders had never landed fluke out-of-state before, so it
stands to reason that their permit costs would increase with
their decision to land in a state outside of Massachusetts.
Permits were obtained from Rhode Island, Connecticut, New
York, and North Carolina, permits which these fishermen had
previously never purchased.

Even more dramatic than the

changes in permit costs, was the increase in operational
costs.

Fourteen permit holders indicated that their fuel,

and maintenance costs were higher as a result of offloading
in a state further away than Massachusetts.
"Other" costs cited by Massachusetts fishermen include
5 respondents who indicated they received less money from a
familiar dealer, namely a dealer they had done business with
in Massachusetts, as a result of the dealer incurring higher
costs to offload the boat in a state other than
Massachusetts.

Six captains also wished to emphasize the

hardships associated with having to stay at sea longer when
travelling to out-of-state locations, including more time
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spent away from family, and the unprofitable time spent
aboard the boat for the crew members.

The hazards

associated with less sleep were noted by several captains,
who are now spending more time running back-and-forth daily
from the fishing grounds with no more than 500 pounds per
trip.

Previously, they were able to bring in several

thousand pounds per trip, and remain in port for a day or
two before returning to fish again, a routine that allowed
time for rest between trips.
As with the Massachusetts permit holders, Rhode Island
respondents also had large increases in their permit and
operating costs.

Five of the 8 respondents that cited

increased permit costs, purchased their new permits from the
states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and North
Carolina.

Six Rhode Island respondents also specified fuel,

ice, and extra wear on the vessel as additional costs they
had accrued, as a result of decisions to land outside of
Rhode Island when possession limits were favorable
elsewhere.
"Other" costs cited by Rhode Island respondents
included two captains who felt they had received less money
for their product from a dealer they had routinely dealt
with in Rhode Island, because the dealer had incurred higher
costs as a result of offloading the boat out-of-state.
Again, four captains noted the added time spent at sea,
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which had taxed the crew's spirits and sleep schedule, with
no added financial gain to compensate them.
The only notable changes in costs that took place for
North Carolina fishermen, were increased operational costs.
Recalling the increased frequency with which North Carolina
fishermen are now landing in New York, and to a lesser
extent in Massachusetts, this should be expected.

The daily

or twice daily trips to offload fluke has increased their
fuel and maintenance bills considerably.

Of the costs that

actually decreased to North Carolina fishermen, 2 were
fishermen that no longer land in Massachusetts because the
limits were set too low, and their licensing and lumping
costs were reduced accordingly.

One captain cited increased

"other" costs that included receiving less money from a
North Carolina dealer that offloaded his summer flounder in
New York, who passed along his higher costs to the boat.
While the cost of purchasing a state landing license
has increased to many permit holders, the cost is fixed, and
does not vary with the activity of the fishing vessel.
while many fishermen indicated that their

So,

out~of-state

landings have increased (more time spent at sea), the cost
of the license itself remains the same, regardless of how
active or inactive the vessel is.

Once the license has been

purchased for a given year, the cost is the same whether the
fisherman lands in the state a dozen times, or never lands
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there at all.

Because permit costs are expenditures usually

borne by the owner of the vessel, any increase in these
costs would typically not be passed along to the crew.

The

chapter on State Licensing (discussed in Chapter 6) reveals
that the actual cost of a landing license is not prohibitive
from state-to-state, but expenses can add up, especially if
a vessel must secure several licenses.

Based on the survey

responses, permitting costs have increased to the permit
holders as a result of state-by-state quotas.

However,

given the moderate cost of purchasing landing licenses, and
the fact that the costs do not vary with the amount of
landing activity once the permit has been purchased, the
researcher does not believe that these costs are financially
constraining to the fishermen that were polled.
Variable costs which include fuel, food, vessel
maintenance, and ice, are the costs which have increased the
most to respondents, from all three states.

Because more

time is now being spent at sea, more gallons of fuel must be
burned, more money spent to feed the crew, more ice
purchased to keep fish fresh in fish holds longer, and
greater costs expended to maintain the vessel that is now
working longer hours.

Fishermen that incurred increased

operational costs appear to be divided into one of two
categories.

The first group are fishermen who are now

travelling much further distances to land in a state with
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very large landing limits, and the second group consists of
fishermen who are continuing to land where the trip limits
are small, prompting them to make daily landings.

Both of

these circumstances require the vessel operator to spend
more time at sea.

Since many fishermen will fall into one

or both of these groups, depending on the time of year they
are fishing, it seems inevitable that they are going to
spend more time aboard their vessel, and pay the higher
costs for doing so.
Other variable costs which increased with less
frequency, but are equally as important, are costs
associated with price received for the product.

Price

received for fish is primarily influenced by a variety of
factors, including availability of supply, size and quality
of fish, and demand for the product (MAFMC, 1991 P 45).
This study has focused only on the implications to
fishermen, but the buyers and processors of summer flounder
have undoubtedly been affected by Amendment 2.

Added costs

to dealers and processors may include increased leasing fees
for out-of-state landing sites, out-of-state landing
licenses, out-of-state inspection licenses, out-of-state
incorporation fees, and certainly the additional cost to
transport the product back to the dealer's home state.
order to properly document the effects to dealers and
processors as a result of state-by-state quotas, another
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In

full study would be required.

Despite the absence of such a

study, the researcher believes there is ample testimony from
conversations with fishermen and dealers, to declare that
greater costs have been incurred by dealers that are buying
summer flounder from fishermen in out-of-state locations.
Many captains that were interviewed indicated the price
received for their product was less than it would have been
had they offloaded in their home state.

Most fishermen

believed they received less because they sold to a home
state dealer in an out-of-state location, while several
respondents received less because they had to sell to an
unfamiliar out-of-state dealer.

It should be noted that

fishermen may not always know the costs involved to dealers,
and the reasons they were paid less for their fish than they
had anticipated.

However, a pattern of fishermen being paid

less money per pound from a dealer receiving fluke out-ofstate, on the same day that another boat received more money
from an in-state dealer, has become evident.

Many captains

were able to specify the differences, which were typically
.05 to .10.

One captain of particular interest who

offloaded alongside another boat, received .40 less per
pound than the other fisherman, the only difference being
that he was selling to his home state dealer, who had to
truck his fluke back across state lines, while the other
boat was selling to an in-state dealer.
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Dealers offloading fluke do not necessarily transport
all of the fish back to their place of business in their
home state.

For example, if a dealer from North Carolina

typically ships some of his summer flounder to Fulton Fish
Market in New York, and he offloads a boat in New York, some
or all of the fluke may never leave New York, which should
defray most of the transporting costs (Daniels).

There are

many components that affect the price paid to the boat, and
in-depth survey of dealers would be required to properly
document how state-by-state quotas have increaseq their
costs, whether these costs are passed on to the fishermen,
and to what extent.
In summary, many permit holders that were polled not
only accrued higher costs themselves, but the dealers they
have sold to have probably incurred higher costs.

As a

result of the higher costs that dealers have likely accrued,
some of these costs have been passed along to the fishermen
selling their catch to them.

Because crew wages are

directly related to the amount of product harvested and
sold, income will remain the same regardless of how long the
crew is at sea.

Wages will be the same if a crew harvests

10,000 pounds of fluke in 7 days, or if they harvest the
same quantity in 11 days.

Many fishermen are not only

having to spend more money to bring the same quantity of
fish (or less) to the dock, but are now receiving less money
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for it when they get there - a literal double blow.
One final note regarding the increased incidences of
out-of-state landings.

Many fishermen that sold to home

state dealers in out-of-state locations, actually found
themselves arriving at their home port before the dealer had
trucked his fish back to the state.

If the dealer was

transporting the fish from a neighboring state, the
additional time spent away from the plant was not too great,
and thus the quality of the fish had not diminished
appreciably.

However, when dealers from northern states had

to transport fish from a state much further south (ie: North
Carolina), the fish stood a much greater chance of reducing
in quality by the time it arrived at the home state plant.
More time spent on the road in fish tubs, rather than
properly stored at the plant, meant the inferior quality
product would command a lower price, than if the fish had
been properly offloaded and immediately placed into cold
storage at the plant.
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CHAPTER SIX
STATE LICENSING

In order to commercially harvest summer flounder in the
EEZ, a federal fisheries permit is required.

For those

vessels fishing in state waters, a state fisheries permit
may also be required.

Regardless of where summer flounder

is harvested, the catch must eventually be landed, in which
case, a state landing permit may be necessary.

Some states

require licenses to fish in state waters, some require
licenses to land fish in the state, while others require
neither, depending on the species being harvested or landed.
Prior to 1993, there were fewer requirements that had to be
met in order to purchase a summer flounder landing license
in the eleven states.

Following Amendment 2, more states

added stringent qualifications to already-existing landing
licenses, for those attempting to secure a summer flounder
license.

Listed below are the state license requirements to

land summer flounder and the cost, prior to Amendment 2.
The license includes landing privileges only, and does not
necessarily include fishing rights:
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STATE
Maine

COST OF LICENSE
a)in-state: $89

b)out-of-state: $334
New Hampshire

a)in-state: $26
b)out-of-state: $200 minimum fee

Massachusetts

a) in-state: $130 or $195
(depending on size)
b) out-of-state: $269 or $390
(depending on size)

Rhode Island

a)in-state: $200
b)out-of-state: $200

Connecticut

a)in-state: $150
b)out-of-state: $225

New York

a)in-state: $100
b)out-of-state: $250

New Jersey

a)instate: $102
b)out-of-state: $102

Delaware

a)in-state: $150
b)out-of-state: $1500

Maryland

none

Virginia

none

North Carolina

a) in-state: based on length of
vessel
b) out-of-state: $200 or cost of
license in applicant's home state,
whichever is greater - reciprocal
agreement between RI, NJ, and VA no license required of these boats

Note:
Prior to Amendment 2, there were no special
conditions that had to be met in order to secure a summer
flounder landing license in the above states. A license
could simply be obtained by paying the cost required by each
state.
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The following table lists the current license
requirements to land summer flounder in the same states, the
cost, and the criteria used to determine eligibility for
such licenses:

STATE

COST OF LICENSE

Maine

a)in-state: same as before 1993
b)out-of-state: same as before 1993

New Hampshire

fluke can no longer be commercially
landed

Massachusetts

a)in-state: same as before 1993 +
$10 fee*
b)out-of-state: same as before 1993
+ $20 fee*

Rhode Island

a)in-state: same as before 1993**
b)out-of-state: same as before
1993**

connecticut

a)in-state: same as before 1993***
b)out-of-state: same as before
1993***

New York

a)in-state: same as before 1993****
b)out-of-state: same as before
1993****

New Jersey

a)in-state: same as before
1993*****
b)out-of-state: same as before
1993*****

Delaware

a)in-state: same as before
1993******
b)out-of-state: same as before
1993******
none

Maryland
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Virginia

North Carolina

none

a)in-state: same as before
1993*******
b)out-of-state: same as before
1993*******

* MA - the additional fee covers administrative costs only
** RI - the landing license is the same as before, but the
dealers license requires all permit holders to have a
permanent place of business in Rhode Island to purchase
summer flounder from a vessel
*** CT - applicant must 1) have a federal summer flounder
permit, or 2) a letter of endorsement from Connecticut
attesting that the vessel either landed summer flounder in
the Connecticut between January 1, 1985 and January 1, 1994
or 3) was under construction or being re-rigged between
January 26, 1990 and January 26, 1994 Note: the state is
proposing deleting 1), requiring that 3) be for purposes of
fishing in Connecticut waters, and that all applicants in
1994 and beyond, must have held a license issued in 1993
**** NY - all applicants must have earned at least 50% or
more of their income during anyone year from fishing,
between January 1988 to present - effective 1993. Must also
have held a license the previous year to qualify, if not,
must wait one year to receive a landing license
***** NJ - all applicants must have applied for license by
June 30, 1993, or will be denied future landing privileges
in New Jersey.
To qualify, applicant must have landed at
least 1,000 pounds during two years, between 1985-92. Boats
can land up to 100 pounds without a license - effective 1993
****** DE - must have a limited entry gillnet license - no
new gillnet licenses have been issued since 1984 - effective
1994
******* NC - must obtain an endorsement to sell license
which requires applicant to have held a license the previous
year - if a license was not held the previous year,
applicant must wait one year
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Massachusetts added an additional "special license"
requirement to their already-existing landing license, which
obligates permit holders to comply with state reporting
requirements.

This license must be purchased for a nominal

fee of $10 and $20, which helps defray administrative costs
to the state.

Massachusetts has a state reporting system in

addition to the federal reporting system, and vessels with
this special permit must submit a bi-annual report to the
state, documenting all summer flounder they have landed in
Massachusetts.
Rhode Island proposed a limited entry fluke landing
license during 1994, which was abolished after evoking
severe criticism and threats of a lawsuit from
Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries.

the

Following

Massachusetts' reduction from 5,000 pounds to 100 pounds on
February 5, 33 Massachusetts vessel operators purchased
Rhode Island state licenses, who incidentally, were
fishermen that had previously not landed fluke in Rhode
Island.

Between February 5 and February 26, 1994, 162,169

pounds, or 28% of all the fluke that was landed in Rhode
Island during that sub-period, was brought in by these 33
boats.

Rhode Island was concerned that their quota would be

rapidly depleted from the unexpected increase in landings
from out-of-state boats, and devised a plan to reverse the
situation.
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Distressed by the onslaught of what the Department of
Environmental Management perceived as non-traditional
fishermen landing in Rhode Island, they attempted to limit
the landing of fluke to historical participants.

First,

they dropped the possession limit to 2,000 pounds by
emergency regulation on February 8, in what was supposed to
be a temporary measure until a more permanent strategy could
be executed.

On March 15, emergency regulations were

drafted by the state in an attempt to limit boats from
landing in Rhode Island.

The emergency proposal required

that all applicants provide documented proof that they had
sold at least 100 pounds of fluke to a Rhode Island dealer
between January 1985 and January 1990.

This was the same

time period used for federal applicants to qualify for a
federal fluke permit.

If the vessel was under construction,

being re-rigged, or was being replaced during this time, it
could also qualify (RIDEM, RS2914-1).

Upon issuing this

proposal, the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries
responded, "We will see you in court," after which Rhode
Island withdrew the proposal to avoid legal controversy.
Incidentally, an additional provision that was proposed but
later dropped in the final revision, was to limit out-ofstate permit holders to the maximum possession limit allowed
in their home state, but let in-state permit holders land
the maximum limit permitted by the state of Rhode Island
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(Sisson).

Rhode Island settled on establishing a

restrictive out-of-state dealers license, which prevents
offloadings from taking place at locations other than bona
fide facilities, a common occurrence in Rhode Island prior
to the establishment of this license.
If Connecticut succeeds with their latest proposal,
they will be the second state to institute a limited entry
summer flounder landing license.

The time series used to

determine eligibility is quite generous, however, any
captain who made the unfortunate decision of taking a hiatus
from landing in Connecticut in 1993, will be unable to
obtain a license in the future.
Both New York and North Carolina require that an
applicant have held a license the previous year, in order to
obtain a license.

If an applicant did not hold a license

during the preceding year, he must wait until the following
year to obtain one.
New Jersey currently has the only limited entry state
landing license for summer flounder.

Applicants must prove

they landed a minimum of two trips of 1,000 pounds each,
during the time period specified by the state.
Delaware granted landing rights exclusively to the
state gillnet fishery, in recognition that out-of-state
boats have rarely landed summer flounder in Delaware.
Reserving the quota strictly for the gillnet fishery has
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allowed the state to manage the quota during one month of
the year, and should not be considered a hardship to out-ofstate boats that never had a tradition of landing summer
flounder in Delaware.
A total of six states have changed their landing
license requirements since 1993, as a direct result of
Amendment 2, and it seems likely that more states will
follow suit.

Before Amendment 2 was passed, states either

required no license at all, or simply charged a fee to
vessel operators to land fluke.

Most states now have

additional prerequisites that must be met, before a license
will be issued.

New York and New Jersey were the only two

states whose new landing licenses were established to
coincide with the passage of Amendment 2, however, New
Jersey also issued a moratorium.

This has prevented any

opportunistic race by federal permit holders to secure state
landing licenses for future access, after witnessing the
repercussions of state-by-state quotas.
Despite other states that have established landings
criteria or waiting periods, many license holders that
landed out-of-state for the first time, as well as
speculative applicants, were able to obtain summer flounder
landing licenses.

This is because most states did not issue

their licensing requirements until after Amendment 2 became
effective, allowing fishermen to secure licenses they might
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their proposal.
Both the mixed trawl fishery and the directed summer
flounder fishery contributed significantly to Rhode Island's
share of the coastwide quota, but it appears the directed
fishery has suffered a disproportionate disadvantage,
because their fishery cannot operate on a profitable basis
under these circumstances any longer.

It has become

increasingly difficult for Rhode Island to maintain trip
limits that range from 5,000 to 200 pounds throughout the
year, because more out-of-state boats are landing there than
ever before, boats that had historically not landed fluke in
Rhode Island.

In fact, the most compelling reason that

Rhode Island agreed to approve state-by-state quotas, was
the belief that their allocation would be sufficient to
allow boats that had historically landed there, to continue
doing so throughout the rebuilding years (McCauley, 1994).
Increased out-of-state landings has thwarted their efforts,
and essentially ensured that these proposals will not be
approved in the near future.

Ironically, the boats that

traditionally landed in Rhode Island (directed fishery boats
from Rhode Island) have lost the ability to maintain their
fishery, largely due to out-of-state boats that did not have
a prior landing history, filling more of the state quota
than Rhode Island had anticipated.
North Carolina and Virginia can accommodate their
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directed summer flounder fishery because they have large
allocations, while New Jersey is able to because they have
curtailed out-of-state landings through limited entry
licenses.

Rhode Island has neither a large quota nor a

limited entry landing license, and thus, is unable to
entertain the recent requests for separate trip limits for
different fisheries.

The rationale for approving these

proposals is logical, and enforcement of them should be no
more difficult for the state of Rhode Island than under its
current plan.

Unfortunately, quotas in general, tend to be

controversial and unpopular effort control mechanisms for
many fishermen, and state-by-state quotas appear to be even
more unfavorable.

Many fishermen perceive them as "unfair"

because each state has a different quota and trip limit, yet
they fish alongside each other in the same inshore,
nearshore, and offshore waters.

State-by-state quotas have

taken the state's authority one step further by allowing
them to manage the quota to suit their industry, further
increasing their ability to accommodate various fishing
interests within the state.

The establishment of sub-

periods and trip limits are evidence that states have done
just that.

At a time when there is inadequate quota to

satisfy all permit holders, these proposals are likely to be
disapproved by the majority, in this case, the mixed trawl
fishery.

The offshore directed summer flounder fishery has
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diminished to the point of near-extinction in southern New
England; Massachusetts and Connecticut also have maximum
landing limits of 5,000 pounds.

Southern New England permit

holders who wish to continue their offshore directed summer
flounder fishery will have to land in ports much further
south from now on.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
DISCUSSION

There were 1,964 federal summer flounder permits
initially issued under this Plan, and those permit holders
who participated in the survey, represent but a very small
segment of this group (Niedman).

The level of historical

participation for everyone issued a permit, could
hypothetically vary from one pound of summer flounder landed
during a ten year period, to over one million pounds during
this same ten year period.

The individuals who took part in

this survey, were those who were expected to have been
directly impacted by Amendment 2, and not fishermen whose
licenses were obtained in purely incidental fisheries.
Based on responses obtained in the questionnaire, there can
be no doubt that fishermen are landing in different states
to take advantage of more favorable trip limits.

Some

respondents abandoned this practice after the first year,
because they could no longer make profitable trips, while
others could not tolerate the inconveniences associated with
landing in different states.

For those who have chosen to

steam from state-to-state to land their summer flounder,
their operating expenses have increased as a direct result,
predictably so.

The question then arises of whether or not

higher incidences of out-of-state
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landing~

and the related

expenses, should be accepted as part of the costs associated
with managing a species through state-by-state quotas.

In

other words, would an alternative to this type of quota
management provide comparable protection to the resource,
but impose less hardship on the commercial fishing industry?
Many of the complications that arose during the first
two years of Plan implementation, were problems that some
industry members had anticipated would occur.

There are

numerous correspondences between Council members, the
fishing industry, and industry groups, expressing concern
for some of the dilemmas they believed would be encountered
as a result of state-by-state quotas.

The first and

foremost was the expectation that permit holders would be
expected to land in different states, depending on the
status of the quota in each state.

The Office of General

Counsel identified this situation as a "problem" in July
1991, and queried whether there was anything that could be
done about it.

The prediction that "the affected states may

take action to prevent it in the future," was insightful
(MacDonald, 1991), but it is doubtful anyone knew just what
lengths states would go to, to prevent their quota from
being filled by out-of-state boats.

The chapter on State

Licensing should leave no doubt that states have taken such
action, and will continue to make the obstacles for
obtaining landing licenses more demanding.
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After examining a number of quota options, trip limit
strategies, and seasonal closures, the MAFMC came to the
conclusion that state-by-state quotas offered the best
solution of reducing mortality on older fish.

There were

two major reasons trip limits were rejected by the Council.
First, it would have been difficult for valid estimates to
be made on the number of potential trips that could occur
during a specified period of time, given the large number of
permit holders.

Secondly, enforcing designated trip limits

for such a large numbers of boats was viewed as a problem
(MAFMC, 2/11/93).

In fact, the MAFMC envisioned this

enforcement burden to be "overwhelming," for the federal
fisheries service (Bryson, 12/27/91).

Ironically, trip

limits have become the preferred course of action by many
states, despite the Council's rejection of them.
Enforcement of trip limits remains exclusively with the
states, because the limits do not take effect until a vessel
leaves the EEZ to enter state waters.

Even if federal

officials had the authority to enforce a state rule in
federal waters, there would be no way of knowing which trip
limit to enforce, as each state's is different, and
fishermen are free to land in any state.

The challenges of

predicting potential numbers of trip limits in a given time
period has also not been avoided, as many state directors
that have had to execute constant changes throughout the
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year, can attest.
Amendment 2 requires states to adopt specified
regulations contained in the federal Plan, but without
adequate enforcement, these regulations are rendered
useless.

The New England Fisheries Management Council

raised the issue of additional costs to states in a memo to
the MAFMC in 1992.

They posed the question, "Who will pay

for the additional state enforcement efforts (Gibson,
7/17/92)?"

The states are now asking the same question.

In

addition to the minimum fish size limits and the
recreational bag limits, states must now enforce the
possession limits laws they have created.

The costs

associated with enforcing these trip limits has not been
avoided under state-by-state quotas, but has simply been
passed on to the states.

Granted, trip limits were not one

of the regulations that states were required to institute,
but given the circumstances, many states had little choice
but to implement them, and are now faced with higher costs
as a result.

Thus far, no states have been given additional

resources to enforce new regulations mandated under
Amendment 2, and it is unlikely that funds will be
forthcoming in the near future (Moore).

Five million

dollars in 1995, and seven million dollars in 1996, have
been appropriated to carry out the provisions of the
Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Management Act (PL 103-206, Sec
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809).

While these funds have been allocated to cover the

costs of managing all species, it might be prudent to set
aside some of this money to help states enforce trip limits.
Regardless of whether or not state-by-state quotas are
replaced by another form of quota management, trip limits
will likely be included in the new strategy, and enforcement
of them will be critical to the success of the Plan.
Another concern expressed by the MAFMC staff, was the
constant adjustments that the Regional Director would have
had to make if trip limits were instituted by the Council.
Trip adjustments would have been routine, to avoid exceeding
the target mortality level, and, "this would have created
too much uncertainty for the fishermen to plan their
activities (MAFMC, 2/11/93)."

The Council favored state

quotas because they believed they would cause the least
amount of regulation of fishermen, thus preventing micromanagement.

In lieu of one Regional Director making

periodic adjustments, there are now at least six states
actively making changes to trip limits, year-round.

The

constant adjustment of possession limits has not been
avoided, but once again, has been passed along to the
states, and the confusion that the Council had hoped to
avoid is alive and thriving.

This trend does not appear to

have diminished during the second year that states managed
their quotas; New York changed possession limits ten times
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before closing the state in 1994.

The micro-management that

was envisioned under a federally managed quota seems to have
been surpassed beyond anyone's greatest expectations with
the advent of state managed quotas.
One of the most common problems associated with various
quota management strategies is the underreporting of
regulated species (Muse and Schelle 1989, Symes 1992).

The

Council expressed the importance of obtaining correct
landings data in order to meet the mortality reduction
target level, and accurately predict stock size estimates.
In a memo issued from the NEFMC several months into the
Plan, the concern was raised, as well as a request for a
confirmation that all landings were being collected
(Marshall, 3/2/93).

Fishermen and dealers have attested to

the author, that widespread underreporting is taking place
under this Plan.

Some respondents that were polled openly

admitted to underreporting their catch, or reporting no
landings at all.

The common frustration felt by many, is

that if they were simply landing in a state further south,
their actions would be legal.

Others were well aware that

their neighbors were violating possession limits, avoiding
detection, and believed it would be foolish if they did not
do the same.

The Council stated that the perception of

fairness of enforcement from state to state, and by the
federal government, is vital in assuring compliance under
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this Plan (MAFMC, 1991 P 13).

The researcher believes the

perception of fairness regarding the disparity in state
allocations is equally as important.

Many permit holders

feel the disproportionate shares are unfair to states with
smaller allocations, especially because they are harvesting
fluke from the same fishing grounds, and that this has led
to incidences of underreporting.

Some states, budget

permitting, have implemented increased enforcement efforts
to curtail the problem.

For instance, Rhode Island

instituted a landing window following alleged widespread
illegal landings, including a rumored 37,OOO-pound trip
landed in the state (McCauley, 1994).

All states now have a

reporting system which requires state permitted dealers or
fishermen to report their catch, either weekly, or by year's
end.

Because Amendment 2 only requires federal permit

holders to report landings, there is the possibility that
exclusively state-permitted fishermen and dealers will
escape reporting requirements.

It is encouraging to see

that states have taken the initiative to close this
reporting gap, but the author believes that the current
perception of unfairness held by many industry members is a
powerful force that will continue to subvert efforts at
receiving accurate landings information.
While underreporting could likely be reduced with
greater enforcement from the states, they will need more
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money to do so, but the outlook for additional money is not
promising.

The outlook for abandoning state-by-state quotas

is quite good, however.

If an alternative is adopted,

states may have a stronger appeal to request funding,
because they will be enforcing a federal landing limit, not
a state limit.

Presumably, there will also be additional

at-sea enforcement by the Coast Guard, which was previously
not performed because of the myriad of existing trip limits
and lack of jurisdiction.

It would seem that the ability to

enforce possession limits would be greater if there is both
federal enforcement in the EEZ, and additional funds
provided to states, if state-by-state quotas are replaced by
a federally-managed quota.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
CONCLUSION

One quote in a popular fisheries publication, four
months after Plan implementation, summed up the
dissatisfaction of many fishermen with state-by-state
quotas.

"The fluke thing is just driving us all nuts.

Every two weeks it changes.

It's so much extra work for

everybody and it's a real economic hardship.

Fishermen have

to put out all this money for licenses (to land in states
with available quota) and the dealers left behind lose out,
not just on fluke, but all the other fish they would have
been able to buy (CFN, 4/93 19A)."
State-by-state quotas bring to mind the proverbial
shell game, in that, one month one state has favorable trip
limits, the next month another state, and so on.

While the

shell game keeps the prize well-concealed, and the
participant must rely solely on chance to prevail, state-bystate quotas are constantly shifting the spoils from state
to state; it would seem a fair amount of luck on the part of
the permit holder is also essential if one is to gain
advantage of the most opportune landing conditions.

Knowing

in advance what each state plans to do with its quota does
little more than brings fishermen out of complete obscurity.
Keeping in touch with local fisheries representatives to
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track the progress of state's landings, carries them a step
further to where they can now begin to plan a course of
action.

But when unexpected increases in landings occur,

late dealer reports that dramatically boost the state's
actual total, or unforeseen changes take place in a
neighboring state that prompt quick changes in trip limits,
fishermen can literally be left in the lurch.

The author

does not suggest that fishermen should be entitled to a
predictable life of fishing, absent of surprises, but when
deviations and diversions are multiple and continual, the
ability to plan a course of action becomes virtually
impossible.

Of course, the confusion would be reduced if

fishermen did not ply the eastern seaboard, landing only in
their home state, but anyone who advocates such a
proposition is too far removed from the realities of the
commercial fishing industry to engage in a discussion of the
issue.
There will likely be less changes to state plans as
more states limit entrants and can control the number of
boats landing in a given state, as they receive landings in
a more timely fashion, and as their ability to forecast
future landings becomes better.

The confusion may diminish,

but the extra costs associated with travelling from stateto-state will not.

Captains and dealers will make summer

flounder available to the consumer in spite of the ordeals

199

they must endure.

If twelve million pounds of summer

flounder is the quantity permitted to be commercially
harvested in a given year, twelve million pounds will be
caught, sold, marketed, and consumed.

The question is, how

many added gallons of fuel must be burned, how many extra
licenses procured, how many extra meals consumed at sea, how
many risks taken to land in a state with the highest trip
limit, and how many extra miles must be driven to transport
fish back to the dealer's home state, that would otherwise
not be part of the cost of doing business?
these additional expenses

~

Unfortunately,

becoming part of the cost of

doing business, with absolutely no benefit to anyone except
the fuel companies, the grocery stores, and the state
licensing agencies.

Add to this list, the social costs

associated with more time spent away from family, and the
absurdity of the situation becomes even greater.
In assigning individual shares to states, the Council
did not intend for states to transfer these privileges
exclusively to their own residents, but expected all permit
holders to have an equal opportunity to harvest the quota.
The Council did however, envision that states would favor
requests from their industry over industry requests from
other states.

An internal memo issued by the MAFMC prior to

the passage of Amendment 2, specified that, "The major
advantage to State quotas is that the individual state can
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tailor its allocation to its specific needs (MAFMC, LISFAOD-OOS) ."

State-by-state quotas have made it possible for

eleven states to accommodate north, south, inshore,
nearshore, offshore, trip boats, day boats, and any fishery
in-between.

The Council may have given states more than

just the ability to manipulate the quota to suit regional
fisheries, but they may have also granted a quasi-form of
allocation rights to residents of various states.

Permit

holders from the home state now have greater control over
how the quota is managed, regardless of the level to which
in-state boats contributed to their historical landings.
Out-of-state boats that may have contributed far more to
historical landings will likely have a minimal influence on
decisions regarding management of the quota (Virginia's
influence on decisions made by North Carolina may be the
exception).

Fishermen from North Carolina who had a

longstanding tradition of fishing and landing in southern
New England will be the first to verify this claim.

Much of

the southern fleet that was an ongoing presence in Rhode
Island and Massachusetts during the summer months has become
but a scarcity since Amendment 2 was passed, despite their
large contribution to the northern states' allocations.
Under an individual quota plan, historical participants
can expect to recoup an individual share based on the
relative percentage of their participation in the fishery.
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Open access quotas allow anyone with a valid permit
(typically based on some form of historical participation)
to gain access to the fishery.

State-by-state quotas appear

to fall somewhere in-between, in that anyone who qualifies
for a summer flounder permit (based on very minimal
qualifications), will have equal access to the quota, but
influence on policy with respect to trip limits and subquotas, will be reserved for the residents of respective
states.

The researcher does not advocate the use of

individual quotas so that quota shares will be granted in
proportion to fishermen's past participation, but simply
wishes to suggest that much of the frustration expressed by
permit holders, is due to the loss of a fishery to those
fishermen who had far less of a participation than they did.
Had they foreseen Amendment 2, they might have landed in
their home state for 12 months out of the year throughout
the 1980's, to secure a percentage that was in proportion to
their level of fishing.

The states can certainly not be

criticized, for they have done what is to be expected.

The

researcher does wish to express dissatisfaction for this
type of quota management for the reasons described herein,
and implores the Council to examine other options than the
current Plan.
Although state-by-state quotas were unanimously
approved, some parties suggested making them temporary, with
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the opportunity to examine other allocation options at the
end of the first year (Gibson, 7/16/92).

It has now been

two years since state-by-state quotas were effected, and the
possibility of adopting an alternative quota scheme is now
being revisited.

Some of the alternatives to state-by-state

quotas offered by the industry include six 2-month coastwide quotas, with each quota evenly allocated among the six
divisions.

This proposal was offered in response to the

ongoing dilemma of state closures, and a lack of continuity
of supply to dealers in New Jersey.

The state was often

closed for several months before reopening for the next subperiod, and this strategy proffers to prevent closures from
occurring for more than four to six weeks at a time
(Bergmann).

Another proposal submitted to the MAFMC

advocates one coast wide quota divided among the 12 calendar
months, according to the percentage distribution of summer
flounder landings between the years 1983-89.

Combined with

coast wide trip limits, this would theoretically allow the
seasonal fisheries to continue throughout the year, and
ensure continuity of supply (Lauren Jo).

These proposals

are among some of those submitted to the MAFMC, in response
to their request for suggestions from the industry to
improve the current quota situation, and more are likely to
follow.
If some variation of a coastwide quota is chosen to
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replace the current scheme, there will undoubtedly be
accompanying trip limits to satisfy the industry's requests,
and to stay within the target mortality level.

While the

limits will likely be raised and lowered by federal
officials, just as they have been over the last two years by
the individual states, it should be easier for fishermen to
keep abreast of current trip limits because one central
agency will be issuing the notices, not half a dozen.

There

will be no more need to contact a representative from each
state to learn of its current status, because it will be
uniform from state-to-state.

More importantly, the extra

costs associated with travelling to another state for no
other reason than to take advantage of a more favorable trip
limit, will be eliminated.
Establishing one coastwide quota, North / South quota,
seasonal quotas, or whatever alternative that may be chosen
to replace individual state shares, is liable to stir some
opposition among the fishing industry.

States that have

small allocations will improve their current status, as they
will have a greater opportunity to increase landings, and
will readily favor the alternatives.

other states may

diminish their standing, as they will have less ability to
land the quantity of summer flounder that they currently
land in their state.

These states will be very reluctant to

"even the playing field" if their fishery cannot operate as
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productively as it does now.

The discussion regarding the

mixed trawl fishery and the directed fishery has
implications for any coastwide quota that may be
contemplated to replace state-by-state quotas.

The Middle

Atlantic Fisheries Management Council is currently preparing
a Scoping Document, scheduled for public comment in the
Spring of 1995.

Among some of the measures proposed in

Amendment 7 to the Summer Flounder FMP, is the establishment
of another quota strategy.

Whatever seasonal or monthly

plan is chosen, there will likely be concurrent trip limits,
as it would not be possible to allow unlimited trips yearround in all eleven states, while maintaining the target
mortality level.

Presumably, the trip limits will not be

set very high, and in the event that they are, they would be
reduced, as the quota is filled.

The concern held by the

author is that traditional directed fisheries in states such
as Virginia and North Carolina cannot be held to small trip
limits, while maintaining a viable fishery.

Many of these

fishermen do not participate in the mixed trawl fishery, and
rely on the directed fishery throughout most of the year.
Unlike Rhode Island, there are far more directed fishery
fishermen in North Carolina, and the impact to the southern
fleet is likely to be devastating if modest trip limits are
imposed.

It is suggested that the Council consider

proposals similar to the ones put forth by Rhode Island
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fishermen, which categorize permit holders as "directed" or
"mixed trawl" fishermen.

Different limits would be set

depending on the fishery, and fishermen could switch freely
from one to the other, depending on their status in the
exempted fisheries program.

Since Amendment 7 will be taken

to public hearing and ultimately voted on/ the inclusion of
large trip limits to accommodate the southern fleet should
be made part of the Plan if the Council hopes to receive
sweeping support.
Unequivocally, National Standard 5 has been violated,
in that Amendment 2 does not promote efficiency, and the
fishery is not operating at the lowest possible cost.
Increased costs including permits, operating costs/ and less
price received for product are all costs which have caused
reduced income to fishermen, with no concurring benefits to
offset these costs.

To counter this by asserting that

eventually the costs will be offset in the long runt when
the stocks rebuild, cannot be accepted.

Differences in trip

limits from state to state should not become one of the many
factors which influence fishermen's decisions of where to
land their catch, and the higher costs associated with doing
so cannot be justified.

The differing trip limits have done

nothing more than create artificial barriers during certain
times of the year, barriers which satisfy no conservation
purpose.

The time spent harvesting fish is not always going
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to be the same from trip to trip (factors such as
availability of fish, weather, and time of year, to name a
few, will greatly affect this), but when additional time
spent at sea is not due to factors related to catching the
fish, but is influenced by additional time spent steaming
from state to state, these costs cannot be rationalized.
The author offers no words of criticism to all those
who worked unfailingly to develop Amendment 2.

Logically,

state-by-state quotas would seem to be the best alternative
to accommodate all segments of the summer flounder fishery.
It goes without saying, that during the rebuilding years
many permit holders are going to suffer great misfortune,
but will survive by whatever means necessary.

Still others

will be unable to endure the losses, and will leave the
fishery altogether.

After two years of Plan implementation,

the lesson learned may be that all segments of the fishery
simply cannot be accommodated.

If this is true, then who

are the victors to whom go the spoils?

Will it be the

fishermen who have traditionally fished for summer flounder
for the last fifteen years, ten months out of every year?
Or will it be the fishermen who have always harvested a
substantial quantity of fluke in a mixed trawl fishery, or
in a directed fishery for other species?

Maybe it will be

the newcomers, who have recently been displaced from the
groundfish fishery.

These are concerns that the Council
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will certainly be facing when developing Amendment 7, and
responses to their proposals will be heard in great numbers
from North Carolina to Maine.
The author believes that solving the overfishing
problem, while trying to maintain fairness when assigning
fishing privileges, is a profound task that constantly
challenges fisheries managers.

One of the elements that is

commonly overlooked when preparing resource management
plans, is the lack of including human motivation and
responses that make up the system being managed (Ludwig, et.
al.,).

As seen with Amendment 2, fishermen will respond to

better opportunities in other states, despite the
inconveniences associated with doing so.

They will always

be striving to gain a competitive advantage over one
another.

Recognizing this aspect of human nature, and

accounting for it when developing management plans, might
help prevent a reoccurrence of what took place with stateby-state quotas.

By attempting to reduce some of the

disparities and perceived inequities, the Council should be
able to develop a plan which will be more agreeable to the
fishing industry.
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EPILOGUE

In a recent court decision, Fishermen's Dock
cooperative, et al. v. Ronald H. Brown, Federal District
court Judge Robert Doumar, determined that the Secretary of
Commerce's official designees acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner, in failing to use a lower estimate for
discard mortality when calculating the annual commercial
quota for 1994.

The Court also found that using a figure

one standard deviation below the mean did not utilize the
best scientific information available.

The quota which was

established at 16.005 million pounds for 1994 was
invalidated by the Court, and the Department of Commerce was
ordered to reset the 1994 quota at 19.05 million pounds
(Civil Action # 2:94cv338).
November 4, 1994.

This decision was reached on

By early December, many states still had

remaining quota left under the original allocation of 16.005
pounds (Gehan, 6B).

Despite the Judge's directive to the

Department of Commerce to grant an additional 3.05 million
pounds to the commercial fishing industry, many states
decided not to use this additional quota (Moore).

The Judge

issued a "Consent Order" on December 19, which directed the
Secretary to transfer the 3.05 million pounds to 1995, a
quota that could not be considered an overage when setting
the 1996, or future, commercial quotas (Pierce, 1995, P 6).
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This verdict has been acclaimed by some as a landmark
decision which will compel more open communication between
scientists and the general public.

Some industry groups do

not believe that the best scientific information is being
employed, and that the Councils must balance the needs of
conservation, and social and economic considerations (Gehan,
6B).

Other parties are concerned that this decision has set

the stage for the courts to substitute their judgment for
the discretion granted to scientists and fisheries
biologists, trained in their areas of expertise (Anderson).
Many of the states are in fact, reluctant to accept the
additional quota, for fear that the current fishing
mortality target level will be subverted (Moore).

The Mid-

Atlantic Fishery Management Council is also concerned that
future target mortality levels will be frustrated if the
additional 3 million pounds is landed, which may result in a
lower quota for future years (Anderson).

The decision has

been appealed by NMFS, and if re-affirmed, it is likely that
many, if not all states, will land this additional amount in
1995 (Pierce, 1995, p 6).
The frustration felt by many fishermen regarding the
inequitable distribution of state allocations has taken many
forms.

Expressions of vocal dissatisfaction and willful

violation of possession limits have occurred with great
frequency during the past two years, and the author is
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concerned that these manifestations of frustration will
escalate to higher levels.

Industry members predicted

before Amendment 2 was passed, that state-by-state quotas
would pit offshore fishermen against inshore fishermen, and
one state against another (JDC, p 29).

Tensions are growing

even greater as more fisheries become depleted, and there is
no telling what lengths fishermen will go to, to maintain
their livelihood.

It seems inevitable that state-by-state

quotas will have to be replaced by some other quota
mechanism.

Much has been learned in the last two years, and

new alternatives proposed by the Council will be able to
address some of the lessons learned.

With effort reduction

being mandated under many different FMPs, the researcher
concludes that the only mechanism to prevent extensive
subversion of fisheries regulations and large scale economic
ruin of many fishermen is for the federal government to
institute a buyout scheme.

This seems to be the only

solution to the problem of too many boats and not enough
fish.

It has been said by many industry members and will be

reiterated here; if the government can spend millions of
dollars to aid ailing nations, they should extend this
assistance to the citizens of this country who stand to lose
their homes and vessels under the current management regime.
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APPENDIX
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STATE-BY-STATE QUOTA MANAGEMENT
home port:
The following questions pertain to your situation before
Amendment 2 was implemented (January 1, 1993):
1) Did you land summer flounder in a directed fishery prior to
1993?
NO
YES

Did you ever land summer flounder to supplement another
fishery prior to 1993?
NO
YES

2)

If you don't land summer flounder in a commercial fishery,
please stop here - Thank YOu-----------------------------3) Prior to 1993, approximately how many summer flounder trips
per year were directed trips and how many were non-directed
trips?

Number of Directed Trips
(used a large mesh)
Number of Other Trips
(used a small mesh)
~ summer flounder out-ofstate for any of the following reasons?

4) Prior to 1993, did you ever

a) better price offered by out-of-state dealer

YES

NO

b) out-of-state dealer was closer to my
offshore fishing location

YES

NO

c) vessel had to land out-of-state due to
bad weather offshore

YES

NO

d) port in home state did not offer
safe landing conditions
e) other - please explain

YES
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5) How many times did you land summer flounder outside your
home state?

6) In landing your summer flounder out-of-state prior to 1993,
did you experience the following costs?
1- No Impact 2- Slight Impact 3- Moderate Impact
4- Significant Impact 5- Very Significant Impact
a) increased out-of-state permit costs
b) increased operational costs (fuel, ice, etc.)
c) received less money for same product
from unfamiliar out-of-state dealer
d) waited longer to be paid from
out-of-state dealer
e) increased costs to pay out-of-state lumper
f) other - please explain

7) Prior to 1993, were you ever coerced, threatened, or
intimated by dealers from another state, not to land summer
flounder in that particular state?
NO
YES
8) Prior to 1993, were you ever coerced, threatened, or
intimidated by other fishermen from another state, not to land
summer flounder in that particular state?
YES
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NO

The following questions pertain to your situation after
Amendment 2 was implemented (January 1, 1993):
1) After 1993, did you ever land summer flounder in a directed
fishery?
YES
NO

2) After 1993, did you ever land summer flounder to supplement
another fishery?
YES
NO
If you have not landed summer flounder outside of your home
state after 1993, please stop here - Thank You-----------3) After 1993, approximately how many summer flounder trips
were directed trips and how many were non-directed trips?

Number of Directed Trips
(used a large mesh)
Number of Other Trips
(used a small mesh)
4) After 1993, did you ever la~d summer flounder out-of-state
for any of the following reasons?
a) received better price from
out-of-state dealer

YES

NO

b) out-of-state dealer was closer to my
offshore fishing location

YES

NO

c) vessel had to land out-of-state due to
bad weather offshore

YES

NO

d) port in home state did not offer
safe landing conditions

YES

NO

e) home state prohibited or limited summer
flounder landings, but another state did not

YES

NO

f) other - please explain
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5) After 1993, how many times did you land summer flounder
outside your horne state?

6) In landing your summer flounder out-of-state after 1993,
did you experience the following costs:
1- No Impact 2- Slight Impact 3- Moderate Impact
4- Significant Impact 5- Very Significant Impact
a) increased out-of-state permit cost
b) increased operational costs (fuel, ice, etc.)
c) received less money for same product
from unfamiliar out-of-state dealer
d) waited longer to be paid from out-of-state dealer
e) increased costs to pay out-of-state lumper
f) other - please explain
7) After 1993, were you ever coerced, threatened, or
intimidated by dealers from another state, not to land summer
flounder in that particular state?
NO
YES
8) After 1993, were you ever coerced, threatened, or
intimidated by fishermen from another state, not to land
summer flounder in that particular state?
YES
NO
9) How have summer flounder possession limits affected you or
your business?
(Please circle your choice)
1- Moderately positive Impact 2- Very Positive Impact
3- No Impact 4- Moderately Negative Impact 5- Very
Negative Impact
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10) How else has you or your business been affected by the
state by-state regulation of Amendment 2? (OPEN)
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